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Summary 
The Internet is increasingly being depended upon to provide large-scale content 
distribution. An important need is mechanisms to aid in the scalability of distri-
bution services. These mechanisms include multicast, anycast, peer-to-peer, and 
overlay-based content distribution networks. Multicast communication provides an 
efficient transport mechanism for one-to-many and many-to-many communication. 
Anycast aids in service discovery and replication by providing a mechanism for de-
livering a single request to one of many servers servicing an address. Peer-to-peer 
systems allow efficient content location and retrieval among large groups of users. 
Overlay-based content distribution networks provide reliable and robust distribution 
frameworks. 
As content distribution on the Internet becomes more pervasive and the value 
of the content being distributed increases, the security of this content and its dis-
tribution channels has become a main concern of content creators, owners, and 
providers. There have been significant advances in maturing the distribution mech-
anisms; however, there are a number of distinct security issues in these technologies. 
These issues exist because of two reasons: 1) the issues are introduced by the new 
distribution mechanisms; or 2) the issues also exist in unicast, but the unicast solu-
tions do not apply. To address these problems, our research aims to develop flexible 
content protection architectures for large-scale content distribution. 
Specifically, the contributions of this work are as follows. 
• We developed WHIM, a scalable system that allows multicast content to be 
securely marked with distinct information for distinct receivers. This system 
introduces two new concepts: 1) generation of a watermark based on the re-
ceiver's location in a tree overlaying the network; and 2) incremental insertion 
xiii 
of the watermark in the content as it traverses an overlay network. We pro-
pose and evaluate several forms of this architecture and show how it improves 
scalability while increasing security. We also develop an implementation of the 
system that allows a multicast video stream to be watermarked by a hierarchy 
of intermediaries. 
• We generalize the problems of secure IGMP and secure anycast server adver-
tisements into a problem of group access control and propose Gothic, a com-
plete architecture for providing group access control. Gothic centers around 
a novel authorization architecture. This is complemented by a proposal for a 
group policy management system that allows the group owner to be authen-
ticated before being allowed to specify the group access rights. This system 
can be applied to other works that involve group policy. We show how Gothic 
operates in a number of environments including application-layer multicast, 
source-specific multicast, application-layer anycast and global IP-anycast. We 
evaluate the security and scalability of the architecture and show that it im-
proves scalability over previous solutions while maintaining or increasing the 
level of security. We also propose methods of integrating Gothic with the 
group key management system and content distribution tree. We propose and 
evaluate a group-access-control-aware group-key management technique that 
leverages the existence of a group access control system to substantially reduce 
overhead. 
• We describe and implement a rights management architecture for decentral-
ized peer-to-peer file sharing systems called CITADEL. CITADEL builds a 
protected file sharing environment over a normal peer-to-peer network using se-
cured content objects and file sharing software enhanced to perform protection 
operations. A flexible content importation system that is part of CITADEL 
allows all users to insert new content as well as additional copies of protected 
XIV 
content. We explain how CITADEL provides the flexibility necessary to sup-
port common content distribution business models. We also provide results 
that show the performance of the system relative to other possible approaches. 
Finally, we describe an implementation of CITADEL that uses the Gnutella 




As content distribution on the Internet becomes more pervasive and the value of 
the content being distributed increases, the security of this data has become a main 
concern of content providers. Content distribution has become pervasive in part due 
to the deployment of scalable networked services and architectures. These mech-
anisms range from network services such as multicast and anycast to networked 
architectures such as content distribution networks (CDNs) and peer-to-peer sys-
tems. The availability of such systems has sparked the interest of end-users and 
content providers. End-users are attracted to such distribution method's ability to 
locate and obtain a wide variety of content. Content distributors are drawn to such 
system's large distribution channel and low cost. 
There is significant interest by content creators and owners in the protection of 
the content that is distributed in these systems. Content protection in any envi-
ronment is a formidable challenge due to the complex protection goals and range of 
possible attacks. Additionally, content protection in large-scale content distribution 
environments introduces a number of issues that do not exist in client-server sys-
tems. There has been previous research in understanding and solving security issues 
in client-server environments. However, the introduction of decentralized systems, 
group-based systems, and multicast systems brings about a new set of problems. For 
example, confidentiality, integrity, trust management, and non-repudiation mecha-
nisms in unicast systems do not translate to large-scale content distribution systems. 
1.1 Applications 
Innovation and the human imagination have repeatedly led to applications that 
stretch the limits of the computing capabilities of the day. As the demands of appli-
cations increase, we have developed sustaining technologies to increase the lifetime 
of the current technologies. More significantly, it is said that disruptive applications 
stimulate disruptive technologies that introduce a new value proposition [45]. For 
example, many of the advances in website technology is considered sustaining tech-
nology while the introduction of peer-to-peer content distribution can be considered 
a disruptive technology. 
There are four forces that drive applications: the types of content that users 
deisre, the ways that users wish to access the content, the bandwidth that is available 
to users, and the format in which content is available. Content types include movies, 
music, pay-per-view events, software, business information such as stock quotes, 
news data such as weather or world events, and real-time conversations. 
Another factor is the formats in which the content has been made available. 
This is influenced heavily by advances in compression and storage. For example, 
over the years video compression has advanced from MPEG-1 to MPEG-2 [191] to 
MPEG-4, MPEG-7, MPEG-21 \ and Windows Media Video 2. Similarly audio has 
progressed from WAV to MPS and Ogg Vorbis [202]. Such changes have significant 
impact on the applications. For example, the emergence of the MPS compression 
format made it possible to transport audio content over the Internet in a amount of 
time that users found reasonable. This made applications such as Napster possible. 
Similarly, MPEG-4 and Windows Media Video codecs allow movies and other video 
content to be compressed to a size that allows such files to be exchanged over the 
Internet. Diff"erent multimedia streaming formats also have infleunced applications. 
The increase in available bandwidth is also a driving force. Over the last few 
years, the amount of bandwidth available to home users rise from 28.8 kbps to 33.6 
^ http://mpeg.telecomitalialab.com/ 
^http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/ 
kbps to 56 kbps and then drastically increase to 1.5 mbps and up for some users. 
This has made significant changes in the number of users capable of participating 
in Internet content distribution and the expectations of those users. 
The ubiquity of devices has changed the places and times that users are able to 
access content. The recent popularity of wireless devices and portable entertainment 
devices has influenced applications. We have witnessed computing devices move 
from the office into the home office with PCs and then throughout the home with 
laptops and computerized entertainment centers. Now with wireless devices, PDAs, 
and portable entertainment devices, computing and content devices are able to move 
with the user outside the home. 
1.2 Content Distribution Methods 
The Internet has succeeded at supporting wide-scale communication in the form of 
e-mail and web pages. That success has led to technical growth issues, users that ex-
pect more, and providers that want to deliver more. Growth issues are a result of the 
current size and use of the Internet exceeding the original design goals. Therefore, 
there are some technical barriers such as limited scalability resource bottlenecks and 
the lack of inherent quality of service (QoS) due to the best-effort model. Higher 
user expectations have come as a result of the Internet's success. Users expect higher 
speeds and higher quality. Providers have seen proof of the Internet's potential and 
now aim to deliver even richer content and offer new services. 
These are not new issues. Every since the invent of the Internet, users have 
pushed it beyond its intended limits and along the way there are technical barriers. 
Today, we are again asking more of the Internet than it was designed to give. So 
again we must overcome the technical issues to meet our demands. 
Years ago, there was a need for applications that would sent data to large groups. 
Multicast was developed as an efficient delivery mechanism to ease that strain. Other 
work resulted in the use of caches in networks to increase efficiency. Recently, we 
have built upon our earlier gains and discovered ways to supplement the Internet 
to provide the resources to meet our demands. This has resulted in mechanisms 
such as content distribution networks (CDNs). Other efforts have sought to provide 
efficient content location and retrieval to end-users; this has lead to the popularity 
of peer-to-peer systems. 
1.2.1 Evolution of Content Distribution 
Content distribution as it is today is a result of years of evolution. The evolution 
is sometimes driven by technology, but often driven by applications. Content dis-
tribution consists of storage and caching mechanisms and delivery mechanisms. In 
this section we briefly discuss the evolution that has taken place in these two areas. 
1.2.1.1 Evolution of Caching and Storage Infrastructure 
It was realized early on that scalability can be increased by allowing popular requests 
to be handled with some sort of aggregation [24]. Frequently requested objects could 
be stored in a manner that did not require a full operation to service a user with that 
object. Similar concepts have been used in other areas such as memory caching. 
As the world wide web increased in popularity, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
began to seek ways to lower their bandwidth costs and many used forward proxy 
caches to cache web pages and other objects that were requested by their customers. 
This concept advanced to include mechanisms such as co-operative caching that 
allow multiple caches to exchange information for increased efficiency [207]. 
Later, content providers used forward proxies when seeking ways to provide bet-
ter QoS for their customers. However, many of these were maintained by the content 
provider rather than the ISP and served that provider's most popular content. 
As content storage was pushed further to the edge of the network, it finally 
reached the actual edge: the end-users' computers. This is the underlying concept 
behind peer-to-peer content distribution. Files are stored at peer computers and 
exchanged directly between peers. 
As content became more distributed, mechanisms that allowed the efficient lo-
cation of these resources became important. These mechanisms include server se-
lection, request redirection, content location, and service location [200]. Server 
selection involves an enduser choosing a particular server from a group of servers 
based on some metrics. Request redirection allows a host to send a request to a gen-
eral address and have it redirected to a specific server. This usually involves some 
form of server selection algorithm. Anycast is an important mechanism in providing 
server selection, server location, and request redirection. Content location allows a 
host to efficiently locate content within a distributed system and is an important 
component of peer-to-peer systems. 
1.2.1.2 Evolution of Delivery Model 
Multicast was developed to provide scalability by allowing a server to service mul-
tiple requests with a single response. Multicast enables efficient large-scale con-
tent distribution by providing an efficient transport mechanism for one-to-many 
and many-to-many communication. Over the years, multicast has been the topic 
of many research, engineering, and deployment efforts. These efforts have contin-
ued to transform multicast into a technology that can be relied upon by many 
applications. Work has been done in reliability, manageability, scalability, quality-
of-service, address allocation, inter-domain multicast, pricing/billing, and ease of 
deployment [60]. 
There have been a number of multicast routing protcols proposed including 
DVMRP [164], MOSPF [143], PIM-DM [57], PIM-SM [64], and CBT [23]. Re-
cently, single source multicast (SSM) [100, 98] has been proposed that simplfies 
some of the problems faced by normal any-source multicast (ASM), but it is too 
soon to determine how widespread its use will be. 
The industry has come to require a multicast model that is ready for deployment 
in commercial applications. Thus, to provide the necessary components, the new 
paradigm is to add layers to the infrastructure instead of engineering the mecha-
nisms into the existing layers. This has lead to the use of overlay networks and 
application-layer multicast to provide the missing pieces. Other reasons for interest 
in overlay networks is that they can offer increased QoS, more robustness, and better 
manageability [47]. The use of application-layer multicast does not rule out the use 
of or replace the need for IP multicast. Application-layer multicast allows rapid de-
ployment and a platform to build additional services on top of the multicast model. 
However, application-layer multicast is not as efficient of a delivery method as IP 
multicast. In many environments, application-layer multicast and IP multicast can 
co-exist. 
Another advancement in content delivery is the ability to provide enhanced ser-
vices during content distribution. This allows distributed applications to act on the 
content as it is being delivered. Such work includes active services, overlay services, 
and web services. The added functionality may include video smoothing, transcod-
ing, content personalization, advertisement insertion, or content protection. 
1.2.2 Multicast 
There are a number of available multicast routing protocols that provide the efficient 
transport mechanisms of multicast by routing packets with one group destination 
address to multiple recipients. The routing protocols must be aware of group mem-
bers in the network in order to deliver packets to them. The mechanism provided 
for doing this is the Internet Group Membership Protocol (IGMP) [33]. A host uses 
this protocol to notify an edge router that it should deliver packets from a particular 
multicast group to that host. 
1.2.3 Content Distribution Networks 
Content distribution networks (CDNs) are network infrastructures that are deployed 
to deliver content reliably and quickly [200]. The idea is that on top of network 
layer connectivity we utilize transport through application-layer resources to provide 
improved and novel services. 
CDNs utilize various mechanisms to overcome common problem areas of the 
Internet. These problem areas include network congestion and content server bot-
tlenecks. CDNs allow higher levels of service and new levels of scalability. Due 
to the nature of placing functionality at higher levels, deployment of new services 
becomes can occur more rapidly. 
CDNs involve a number of components. Content routing systems utilize infor-
mation known by the application to achieve intelligent routing. Content transport 
can be achieved with application-layer multicast, IP multicast, or unicast. The con-
tent distribution system may also include content caching mechanisms. The proxy 
execution environment allows services to be deployed within the network. Content 
peering involves the internetworking of seperately managed CDNs. The redirection 
fabric maps the client request to the CDN to be served. Content network manage-
ment involves managing the overlay network including the deployment, routing, and 
monitoring of the network. This allows a number of powerful features such as mon-
itoring of application usage, integration with the pricing model, application-layer 
quality of service (QoS). 
There have been a number of research efforts that proposed application-layer 
multicast systems [72, 47, 42] and systems for deploying and managing overlay 
networks [197]. There have been a number of deployed content distribution net-
works ncluding commercial networks like Inktomi [103] and Akamai [13] and non-
commercical networks like Internet2 Distributed Storage Infrastructure (I2-DSI) [104]. 
1.2.4 Anycast 
Anycast allows multiple servers to provide a service at a single address called the 
anycast address. Each anycast server lets the routing protocol know that it is 
listening to the anycast address. Then when a host wishes to contact a server 
providing that particular service, it simply sends a request to the anycast address. 
The routing system knows which servers said that they are providing that service, 
so it chooses one of those servers and forwards the request to it. Besides the basic IP 
model of anycast [155), global IP anycast [116] and application-layer anycast [212] 
have been proposed. 
1.2.5 Peer-to-Peer 
Peer-to-peer networks are formed as a logical connection of endhosts over the phys-
ical network. Peer-to-peer file sharing systems consist of two components, the file 
locat ion process and the file retrieval process. In most peer- to-peer systems, the 
file retrieval process is decentralized. That is, files are transferred directly between 
peers rather than through a client-server model. However, peer-to-peer systems dif-
fer in the file location process. There are two main types of peer-to-peer systems. 
Centralized systems such as Napster ^ provide indexing and searching functions at 
a centrally managed location (or a set of replicated locations), while decentralized 
systems depend on the peers themselves to manage content indexing and search func-
tions in a distributed manner. Among the decentralized systems, there are naive 
broadcast query systems such as Gnutella [78] and distributed hash table (DHT)-
based systems such as CAN, Chord, Pastry and Tapestry [170, 194, 179, 214]. 
1.3 Security Goals 
Information security has been an active area for the last thirty years. The focus 
has sometimes shifted depending on the computing environment at the time. Early 
work focused on system security in multi-user and multi-process systems [125, 25]. 
Then there was work that oflPered formal definitions of security properties and mod-
els [126]. Later work began to examine security issues in distributed systems such 
'http://www.napster.com 
as encryption, authentication, authorization, and trust management [119, 150, 26). 
The focus then shifted to protecting data over large networked systems and also pro-
tecting the systems. As new types of networked systems are proposed, we still are 
working on defining models to represent our goals and threats, methods to perform 
authentication and authorization, mechanisms to protect the data on the system, 
and ways to protect the system itself. 
In this section we briefly discuss some fundamentals of information security such 
as the diflferent types of security services that may be desired in a particular en-
vironment, the attacks that aim to deny these security services, and the classes of 
mechanisms to defend against these attacks. 
1.3.1 Security Services 
A security service is a property that may be desired in a particular environment to 
enhance the security of information. These services counter the diflferent security 
attacks and use some security mechanism to do so. 
A common classification of security services defines six distinct services [117]: 
• Confidentiality: Protects data from release of contents. 
• Access control: Limits and controls access to objects. 
• Availability: Ensures continuous service for intended users. 
• Authentication: Ensures the identity of an entity or of the source of data. 
• Integrity: Ensures that the data received is the data that was sent. 
• Nonrepudiation: Ensures that neither party participating in communciation 
can deny the occurence of the communciation. 
1.3.2 Security Attacks 
The most common classification of security attacks defines four general categories 
of attack [119): 
• Interruption: A component of the system is damaged or otherwise made un-
available for authorized users. 
• Interception: An entity gains access to information that it is not authorized 
to receive. 
• Modification: An entity modifies some component of the system such as mes-
sage contents or modifying the behavior of a program. 
• Fabrication: An entity creates unauthentic objects such as messages or data 
files. 
We highlight the types of attack that are dealt with in this thesis and show 
the particular security service that they attack. Interception and eavesdropping are 
attacks on confidentiality. Theft-of-service and redistribution are attacks on access 
control. Interruption or denial-of-service are attacks on availability. Masquerading 
is an attack on authentication and integrity. 
1.3.3 Security Mechanisms 
We classify security mechansims by the role they play in defeating attacks: 
• Prevention: These mechanisms aim to protect resources in order to deny the 
ability to perform a security attack or to provide deterrence to decrease the 
likelihood of an attack. 
• Detection: These mechanisms are designed to detect the presence or occurence 
of an attack so that some measures can be taken. 
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• Response: The role of these mechanisms is to respond to an attack in a passive 
or active manner. Passive responses include increasing security by enforcing 
a more stringent policy. Active responses may include executing a reciprocal 
attack. 
In this thesis, we concentrate on preventive mechanisms. There are two types of 
preventive mechanisms: protection mechanims and deterrence mechanisms. Protec-
tion mechanisms aim to shield systems from exposure. Deterrence mechanisms aim 
to discourage attackers from acting. Protection mechanisms can be compared with 
a lock on a door while deterrence mechanisms are similiar to a security camera. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
This thesis seeks to define security and content protection issues in large-scale con-
tent distribution and propose architectures to solve a range of the issues. We identify 
the content protection and security goals and methods used to achieve these goals 
in traditional client-server environments. We discuss the mechanisms used for large-
scale content distribution and examine cases in which the traditional mechanisms 
cannot be utilized in large-scale systems. Additionally, we identify new issues that 
appear due to the nature of certain large-scale distribution systems. We then pro-
pose solutions for a range of these issues. Our set of solutions provides a flexible 
architecture for content protection for various distribution methods. Specifically, we 
address the following issues: 
• Theft deterrence: In unicast environments, fingerprinting is achieved by 
watermarking the content at the source then distributing it. In a multicast 
environment, this approach offers no security since all receivers will share a 
common fingerprint. We explore methods to securely watermark multicast 
multimedia content while maintaining the scalability advantages of multicast. 
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• Distribution tree protection: In multicast content distribution, users at-
tach to tlie distribution tree using the Internet Group Membership Protocol 
(IGMP). In the current model, any host can use IGMP to become a member 
of any IP multicast group causing eavesdropping, theft-of-service, or resource 
utilization leading to denial-of-service. In this work, we explore a method to 
provide access control within IGMP without introducing heavy loads on the 
network infrastructure such as routers. 
• Rights management: The popularity of decentralized peer-to-peer file shar-
ing systems has led to environments that require content protection but lack 
a central authority to enforce the protection. How can content protection be 
provided and enforced without a central authority? How can the open peer-to-
peer sharing experience be maintained in the presence of a content protection 
system? In this work, we describe a content protection architecture for de-
centraHzed peer-to-peer file sharing systems that is designed to answer these 
questions. 
1.5 Organization of Dissertation 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we provide 
an overview of content protection. Chapter 3 summarizes our work in developing 
WHIM, a scalable fingerprinting for multicast environments. Chapter 4 describes a 
group access control architecture for secure multicast and anycast called GOTHIC. 
Chapter 5 motivates the need for content protection in peer-to-peer systems and 
discusses CITADEL, an architecture for content protection in peer-to-peer systems. 
In Chapter 6 we describe practical issues involving CITADEL including its support 
of common business models, simulation results, and an implementation of the sys-
tem. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the contributions of the work presented in this 
dissertation and outlines some future directions for this research. 
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Chapter 2 
Overview of Content Protection 
There are numerous works in content protection that cover many environments, dis-
tribution methods, content types, and protection goals. The goals within content 
protection are sometimes referred to as copy protection, conditional access, or digi-
tal rights management. Digital rights management is a more generic term that can 
be used to describe some set of content protection schemes that compose a partic-
ular system for value chain participants from content creators to consumers. Three 
phases of content protection that are common across different distribution methods 
and content formats are protected distribution, protected storage and output protec-
tion. Protected distribution deals with providing conditional access or enforcing an 
access policy in the distribution model. This essentially controls access to protected 
objects. Protected storage deals with controlling access to the actual content in a 
protected object. This essentially controls playback of protected objects. Output 
protection deals with protecting content after an authorized user is accessing the 
content. This focuses on restricting access to the content as it is played by the user. 
Output protection work includes Digital Transmission Content Protection (DTCP) [11] 
for protecting content during transmission between devices using IEEE 1394 or Uni-
versal Serial Bus (USB), Macrovision Copy Protection [132], High-bandwidth Digital 
Content Protection (HDCP) [59] for protecting content during transmission to digi-
tal displays, and Microsoft's Secure Audio Path [140] for protecting content on PCs 
during transmission to audio devices such as sound cards. 
Protected storage work includes Content Protection for Pre-recorded Media 
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(CPPM) [8] for protection pre-recorded DVD-Audio, Content Protection for Record-
able Media (CPRM) [9] for protecting content stored on recordable media such as 
DVD-R or flash memory, Content Scrambling System (CSS) [10] for protecting pre-
recorded DVD video, and copy-protected CD solutions such as the Cactus Data 
Shield [141] for protecting pre-recorded CDs from replication or extraction to files 
such as MP3s. 
Protected distribution work takes many forms differing greatly depending on the 
distribution method. In cable and satellite, conditional access is provided by set-
top boxes enforcing subscription and pay-per-view models; see for example the NDS 
VideoGuard [149]. In CD and DVD sales, conditional access simply means that 
the person that pays for the content receives the media containing the content. On 
websites that sell content, protected distribution is performed in the client-server 
model of purchasing rights and obtaining content. In multicast or group communi-
cations, protected distribution is provided by using group keys to access encrypted 
content [35] and by controlling access to the multicast distribution tree [110]. 
In this section, we provide an overview of security issues and research in con-
tent distribution. We first discuss the causes behind the multicast security issues 
in Section 2.1.2. We then provide more detailed explanations of security problems 
in multicast and proposed solutions. We discuss four areas of multicast security re-
search: receiver access control, group key management, source authentication, and 
multicast fingerprinting. For each area, we further explain the vulnerabilities that 
it introduces, outline the objectives of solutions, and survey work in the area. In 
Section 2.6, we briefly highlight other security issues in multicast content distri-
bution including source access control, secure multicast routing, and group policy 
specification. Section 2.7 explains work in video watermarking. In Section 2.8 we 
discuss related network security and content protection work. 
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2.1 Causes of Multicast Security Issues 
Multicast enables efficient large-scale content distribution by providing an efficient 
transport mechanism for one-to-many and many-to-many communication. Over the 
years, multicast has been the topic of many research, engineering, and deployment 
efforts. These efforts have continued to transform multicast into a technology that 
can be relied upon by many applications. Work has been done in reliability, man-
ageability, scalability, quality-of-service, and ease of deployment. As these areas 
become more mature, there is increased potential for multicast to be used as the 
underlying distribution mechanism for content distribution applications. Therefore, 
security in multicast content distribution is an concern. The maturity of multicast 
security solutions has the potential to enable the use of multicast for confidential 
and high-value content and help spark the use of multicast by new applications. 
There are a number of security issues in multicast content distribution that are 
directly related to the properties of multicast that make it efficient and attractive. 
There has been research that provides solutions to many of these security issues. 
Some of these solutions are ready for deployment, some are nearing maturity, and 
others are only in the early phases of research. The maturity and deployment of 
these solutions will help increase the ability of multicast technology to deliver new 
applications and more content. In the next few sections, we examine these various 
issues and solutions for providing secure multicast content distribution. ^ 
2.1.1 Properties of Multicast 
The definition of the host group model [43] provides a summary of the key properties 
of multicast: "a host group is a set of network entities sharing a common identifying 
multicast address, all receiving any data packets addressed to this multicast address 
by senders (sources) that may or may not be members of the same group and have 
no knowledge of the groups' membership." This definition highlights the three main 
^An appreviated version of this taxonomy will appear [112]. 
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properties of multicast: 
• All members receive all packets sent to the address: Multicast routing delivers 
all packets sent to the multicast address to all members of the multicast group. 
• Open group membership: Multicast provides an open group model and allows 
group membership to be transparent to the source. 
• Open access to send packets to the group: Any host can send data to the 
multicast address and it will be delivered to the multicast group without regard 
for the source of these packets. 
We note that we focus here on the host-group native-IP multicast model which 
allows so called Any Source Multicast (ASM) as the most general multicast model 
available. As such it also represents the most challenging context in which to pro-
vide content-distribution security functions. Other multicast models provide more 
restrictive frameworks that may make it easier to deal with some security aspects. 
For example in the Small Group Multicast [166] model the source needs to know 
the identity of the multicast group members. Another example is the use of Source-
Specific Multicast (SSM) [99] in which groups are associated with a single source 
and only that source can transmit to the multicast group. Another example is 
Application-Layer Multicast[49, 106] that utilizes an overlay network to implement 
multicast functionality including group management and packet forwarding. These 
more restrictive models, however, while possibly alleviating some aspect of securing 
multicast distribution, continue to possess other multicast properties (for exam-
ple, the lack of distinction of received data among the receivers) and therefore, the 
security techniques surveyed here continue to be relevant. 
2.1.2 Security Issues and Solutions 
These properties of multicast lead to security issues and vulnerabilities because 
of two reasons: 1) the issues are multicast-specific; or 2) the issues also exist in 
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unicast, but the unicast solutions do not apply. Figure 1 shows how each of the 
three multicast properties leads to vulnerabilities and it shows the areas of research 
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Figure 1; Some Multicast Security Issues and Solutions 
• The open group model is beneficial in many environments because it provides 
a lightweight join operation, the source is not required to maintain state for 
all group members, and it allows some anonymization for group members. 
However, this same property of multicast also causes security issues since it 
is not possible to restrict communication to a set of authorized hosts. In 
the IP-multicast model, any host can use the Internet Group Membership 
Protocol (IGMP) [33] to become a member of any IP multicast group— 
possibly leading to eavesdropping, theft of service, or denial of service. The 
latter attack can be caused by a malicious host joining a number of multicast 
groups, thereby utilizing large amounts of bandwidth or router resources. To 
defend against these threats, two classes of solutions have been proposed: 
group data encryption with group key management and multicast receiver 
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access control. 
• The multicast model delivers any traffic sent to the multicast address to the en-
tire group. This means that any host can send data to the multicast group.This 
leads to two problems. First, group members need to able to verify that mes-
sages received are from the intended source. Multicast source authentication 
solutions have been proposed to provide this functionality. Secondly, there 
should be mechanisms to restrict unauthorized sources from sending data to 
multicast groups due to the potential for denial-of-service attacks. Multicast 
sender access control solutions are necessary to defend against this threat. 
• The fact that all members receive all packets sent to the group is a funda-
mental feature and benefit of multicast; however, this property also causes 
some security mechanisms that are used in unicast to not work in multicast 
environments. One reason for this is that there is no individualization of the 
received data. Traditionally, this individualization has sometimes been used 
to provide security. For example, fingerprinting [203] is the embedding of 
receiver identifying information in content to deter unauthorized duplication 
and propagation. However, fingerprinting techniques used in unicast environ-
ments do not work in multicast environments because all users receive the 
same data. Therefore, multicast fingerprinting [46, 32, 198, 109] solutions 
have been proposed to achieve unique fingerprinting in a multicast environ-
ment while maintaining the efficiency of multicast. 
As stated above, most of these issues exist across the different multicast models. 
However, some of the multicast schemes may be immune to some of these issues 
due to their design. For example, Single-Source Multicast inherently provides some 
source access control since the group address is based on the source's unicast ad-
dress .̂ Small Group Multicast provides some receiver access control since the source 
'This is actually a side effect of reverse path forwarding, not intentional security. 
18 
knows the group membership. In Application-Layer Multicast, the receiver access 
control problem differs since group management may not be based on IGMP. 
In addition to the various models, multicast content distribution involves a num-
ber of potential environments composed of different Internet Protocol (IP) versions, 
routing protocols, address allocation schemes, and inter-domain requirements. The 
security issues that we discuss are relevant to these many flavors of multicast, but 
may vary slightly across the particular environments. 
In the following sections, we discuss these areas of multicast security research: 
receiver access control, group key management, source authentication, and multicast 
fingerprinting. For each area, we further explain the vulnerabilities that it intro-
duces, outline the objectives of solutions, and survey work in the area. In Section 2.6 
we briefly highlight other security issues in multicast content distribution including 
source access control, secure multicast routing, and group policy specification. 
2.2 Multicast Receiver Access Control 
There are a number of available multicast routing protocols that provide the efficient 
transport mechanisms of multicast by routing packets with one group destination 
address to multiple recipients. The routing protocols must be aware of group mem-
bers in the network in order to deliver packets to them. The mechanism provided for 
doing this is the Internet Group Membership Protocol (IGMP) [33]. A host uses this 
protocol to notify the routing system that it should deliver packets for a particular 
multicast group to this host. In the current model, any host can use IGMP to be-
come a member of any IP multicast group causing eavesdropping or theft of service. 
The traditional method used to protect the information is to encrypt the multicast 
data and provide decryption keys only to authorized members (as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3). In some cases, encrypted communication is not possible for any number 
of reasons including legal issues or technical reasons. Even if encryption is used, 
there are still risks involved with unauthorized users receiving encrypted data such 
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as traffic analysis and possibly cryptanalysis. The current model is also vulnerable 
to a denial-of-service attack in which malicious hosts join a number of multicast 
groups utilizing large amounts of bandwidth or router resources. 
Solving these problems requires controlling the ability of hosts to join the multi-
cast group. We call this multicast receiver access control. The need for a solution to 
these problems is well-known and was first stated in [81]. The term secure IGMP 
has been used to refer to the protocol that would provide the solution. 
2.2.1 Objectives 
The primary objective of a multicast receiver access control system is to provide 
a means of restricting hosts' ability to join the multicast group. The secondary 
objective is to maintain scalability. 
• Security: The system should be able to effectively restrict unauthorized re-
ceivers from joining the multicast group. This means restricting the ability of 
these users to access the data being delivered to the multicast group as well 
as stopping the users from establishing any state in the multicast routers. 
• Message overhead: The system must also minimize communication overhead 
for each of the entities involved as well as minimze the overall network traffic 
overhead that is introduced. 
• Computational overhead at the routers: In order to achieve scalability and 
to remain a lightweight system, the system must minimize the amount of 
computational overhead that is required of the routers. 
2.2.2 Proposed Solutions 
Figure 2 shows a classification of multicast receiver authorization solutions based 
on how they provide revocations. Some systems do not provide revocation, some 
systems leverage the authorization state maintained by some outside system, some 
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systems must query a centralized server to maintain authorization state, other sys-
tems distribute access control lists to routers, and some systems efficiently provide 
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Figure 2: Multicast Receiver Authorization Systems 
• Hardjono and Cain 
Hardjono and Cain [87] present a method for delivering keys to enable IGMP 
authentication and suggest a method of authorizing group members. The au-
thorization server provides capability-like access-tokens to group members and 
access control list-like token lists to the routers. The host sends a join request 
including the access-token to the router that verifies that the access-token is in 
the token list. There are two vulnerabilities in the system: 1) Malicious users 
can perform a replay attack by presenting another user's access-token because 
the access-tokens are not related to the identity of the user. The system at-
tempts to protect against this by having each router only accept a particular 
access-token once; however the same access-token can be used on any other 
router. 2) Malicious users can cause the router to accept fake access tokens 
because the issuer signature is not verified by the router. One inefficiency 
of this system is that all membership changes require distributing new token 
lists to all routers because of the use of a distributed ACL-based design for 
revocation. 
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• Ballardie and Crowcroft 
Ballardie and Crowcroft [22] provide an early survey of multicast security 
threats and present some countermeasures. Within the discussion, they present 
a version of IGMP that allows receivers to be authorized before joining the 
group. The architecture includes authorization servers that possess ACLs dis-
tributed by an initiator. The host sends a request to an authorization server to 
obtain an authorization stamp (AS) that is included in the join request sent to 
the router. The router forwards the host's request to the authorization server 
for approval. There are two vulnerabilities in the system: 1) An unauthorized 
user can obtain an authorization stamp by authenticating as itself, but then 
providing the spoofed address of an authorized user for authorization. This 
vulnerability is due to the fact that the AS uses the distinguished name to 
authenticate the host, but uses the IP source address to authorize the host. 
2) An unauthorized user can cause the AS to accept an invalid authorization 
stamp such as one from a different group or one for a different user. This is 
because the AS only verifies the signature of the authorization stamp without 
verifying the information in it. One inefficiency of this system is that many 
of the authorizations and verifications are unnecessary because the authoriza-
tion server actually only uses the router's interface address to authorize the 
request. This does happen to limit the damage of the two flaws mentioned 
above and causes them to not directly lead to unauthorized access. 
• Standards work in progress 
Recently, there have been a number of efforts within the Internet Engineering 
Task Force(IETF) to standardize a multicast receiver authorization system. 
Castelluccia and Montenegro [36] propose the use of cryptographically gener-
ated addresses to restrict access to the multicast group. The authors propose 
a basic scheme that provides no revocation and a certificate-based scheme that 
provides time-limited revocation. He, et al. [93] discuss the simple multicast 
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receiver access control(SMKKC) system that also uses time-limited tokens. 
Coan, et al. [50] describe HASM, a multicast receiver and sender access con-
trol system that utilizes Kerberos tokens. 
2.3 Group Key Management 
In unicast, two users can provide confidentiality by encrypting data with a shared 
key. In multicast, group key encryption is used in which the multicast traffic is en-
crypted with a symmetric key and every authorized member of the group is given the 
decryption key. This becomes complicated by the case in which group membership 
is dynamic. Upon a change in membership, it is often necessary to change the group 
key so that the leaving member cannot access new broadcasts or so that the new 
member can not access old broadcasts. The term leave is used to describe the act 
of a voluntary leave or a forced leave. It is necessary to reduce the cost of updating 
the group key in these situations. When a new member joins, the new group key 
can be sent to the original group members using the old group key. However, when 
a member leaves, the solution involves more work. The simplest approach is, upon 
each leave, compute a new group key and send it to each user encrypted with its 
individual key. This is not acceptable because it requires n separate encryptions and 
transmissions for each join or leave. A simple improvement is to encrypt the new 
key with each user's individual key (resulting in n encryptions), but send all of the 
keys in one message to the entire group. This reduces transmission costs, but still 
requires n encryptions and causes the users to be able to detect their key among 
the group of keys in the received message. Work in group key management aims to 
provide efficient rekeying schemes for dynamic group memberships. 
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2.3.1 Objectives 
• Scalability: A group key management solution should be able to handle large 
Internet groups. This requires low requirements for support infrastructure as 
well as low message and computational overhead. 
• Forward and backward secrecy: Forward secrecy is the ability to keep leav-
ing members from accessing future communication. Backward secrecy is the 
ability to keep new members from from accessing past communication. Some 
systems require forward secrecy but not backward secrecy. 
• Collusion resistance: Collusion is when a set of authorized or unauthorized 
members work together to gain access to communication that they are not au-
thorized to access. A scheme should be able to state its resistance to collusion 
of a group of c members. 
• Message overhead for rekeying: Schemes should aim to provide efficient rekey-
ing by reducing the message overhead necessary for rekeying on a join or leave 
to less than 0(n) as in the naive approach. 
• Computational overhead for rekeying: In addition to reducing the message 
overhead, schemes should maintain minimum computational overhead for rekey 
operations. 
• Storage overhead: Some schemes add storage requirements in order to reduce 
message overhead. Such schemes should maintain reasonable storage require-
ments for group members as well as for the group key controller. 
• Reliability requirements: Many schemes make use of multicast to rekey the 
group. Schemes should account for the fact that multicast is unreliable by 
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Figure 3: A Taxonomy of Group Key Management Solutions 
2.3.2 Proposed Solutions 
Work in group key management schemes includes basic schemes, hierarchical schemes, 
batching schemes and tradeoff schemes as shown in Figure 3. Basic schemes include 
the earlier work in group key management and did not focus on efficient rekey-
ing. Hierarchical schemes include the first attempts at reducing rekeying overhead. 
Batching schemes attempt to further reduce rekeying overhead by not changing the 
key on every join or leave, but instead batching a number of joins or leaves before 
rekeying. It has been generally accepted and recently proven that O(logri) is the 
lowest overhead achievable by a group key management scheme if strict non-member 
confidentiaUty and non-collusion are required [193]. Tradeoff schemes attempt to 
provide lower than 0(log?7,) overhead by trading off some collusion resistance. 
• Basic Schemes 
- Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) [89] assigns a group controller 
(GC) to manage the keys for each multicast group. The controller gener-
ates and maintains symmetric keys for each member. The GC selects a 
group member to generate the keys with. Then, it validates each group 
member's permissions and sends the group key encrypted by the individ-
ual key. This scheme does not provide a solution for efficient rekeying. 
It simply provides a method to avoid a single central key controller by 
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allowing a group controller per multicast group. 
- Scalable Multicast Key Distribution (SMKD) [21] is based on the Core-
Based Tree (CBT) routing protocol. This scheme takes advantage of the 
hard-state of the core based tree to provide secure joining for the CBT 
group tree. CBT is hard-state since each router knows its neighbor and 
the configuration does not change. The core of the tree performs the 
duties of a group controller and generates the group session keys and the 
key distribution keys. As the tree expands and new routers are added, 
the key distribution tasks are assigned to the routers. They are given 
the ability to authenticate joining members and give them the group 
key. This technique only works with core-based tree and requires trusted 
routers. It does not propose a solution to efficient rekeying. 
Group Hierarchies 
- lolus [142] is a framework that divides the multicast group into a hi-
erarchy of subgroups. The central or top group is managed by a group 
security controller (GSC) and group security intermediaries (GSIs) are 
used to manage the other subgroups. Each subgroup uses a separate 
subgroup key. Since there is no single group key and only subgroup keys, 
it is only necessary to generate a new subgroup key for the subgroup that 
is involved in the membership change. Each user in the subgroup must 
be transmitted a new subgroup key using its individual key. lolus can 
also be used for encrypting and delivering the traffic. The GSI for each 
subgroup knows the keys for the neighboring subgroups. To send a mes-
sage, the member sends the message to its local GSI using its individual 
key, the GSI sends the message to the group using the group's subkey 
and sends the message to the GSIs of any neighboring groups using that 
group's subkey. Instead of actually re-encrypting the message to send 
it to other subgroups, a random key is chosen to encrypt the message 
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and the GSI encrypts the key and sends it along with the message to the 
neighboring GSI. This reduces the computation costs of a message being 
sent through multiple GSIs. 
Logical Hierarchies 
- Logical key hierarchies [204, 209) use a hierarchy of keys to obtain a 
scalable solution rather than a hierarchy of groups. Each user that joins 
the group receives a secret key shared with the group key controller. The 
controller maintains a /c-ary tree structure in which the root is the group 
key, the leaves are the n individual keys of the group members, and the 
intermediate keys are auxiliary keys used for key updates. Each member 
stores the set of keys in the path from its individual key to the root key 
This scheme allows the number of rekey messages to be reduced by al-
lowing the new keys to be encrypted with subgroup keys rather than 
individual keys for the majority of the group. The operation of rekeying 
upon a join is similar. This scheme reduces overhead to klogkU messages 
for a rekey operation and requires members to store log^n keys. 
- One-way Function Tree (OFT) [20] is also based on tree hierarchy but 
uses a different method to generate keys for the logical subgroups. Keys 
at interior nodes in the logical hierarchy are derived from other keys using 
one-way functions and mixing functions. This allows group members to 
compute the new subgroup keys upon a group rekey. This scheme reduces 
the message overhead to 0(log2 n) for a key update, but requires members 
to store up to 0(21og2n) keys. 
Tradeoff Schemes 
- HySOR [68] considers a range of protocols with varying message costs 
and vulnerability to collusion. In one extreme is logical key hierarchy 
that has O(logn) overhead and is resistant to collusion. On the other 
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extreme is a protocol based on the Linear Ordering of Receivers (LORE), 
which requires 0(1) messages for rekeying, but is vulnerable to any two 
receivers colluding. LORE uses two sets of auxiliary keys: forward keys 
denoted by fi and backward keys denoted by 6̂ . All users are ordered 
and assigned a rank between 1 and n. A receiver with rank i, ui, holds 
keys /i to fi and keys hi to bn- In order to rekey the group when ui leaves, 
the new group key is multicast to the group twice: once encrypted with 
/^+i and once encrypted with hi^^. Thus, all users with ranks higher 
than i and lower than i can decrypt the rekeying message. The authors 
present a scheme using a hybrid structuring of receivers(HySOR) which 
is tunable between the logical key hierarchy and LORE. HySOR uses a 
key graph where each leaf is a division of receivers and LORE is used to 
manage keys within each division. The authors show how an operator can 
tune the performance and collusion resistance by changing the number 
of divisions. 
— Complementary Variable Approach (CVA) [204] is able to reduce message 
overhead to 0(1) but is vulnerable to collusion attacks. The controller 
generates n complementary variables j . Each member is assigned a rank i, 
\ <i <n. Each member i receives the group key and all complementary 
variables except ji. To remove a member i from the group, a message is 
sent to all members stating "remove member i". The current group key 
and complementary variable ji are used to create a new group key with 
some deterministic key variable generation process. Thus, all members 
except i are able to compute the new group key. This scheme reduces 
message overhead to 0(1), but is vulnerable to collusion and requires a 
storage overhead at the group members of n. 
• Batching Schemes 
- Boolean function minimization technique [38] batches membership changes 
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to reduce rekey overhead. The authors refer to this as cumulative member 
removal. The authors also present a new logical key hierarchy algorithm 
for rekeying that uses a set of auxiliary keys and dynamically generates a 
logical key hierarchy by composing different keys. This rekeying scheme 
achieves the same O(logn) overhead as the other logical key hierarchy 
approaches, but reduces the storage overhead at the group controller to 
O(logn) as opposed to 0(n). 
- MARKS [31] divides the group session into time slots, assigns one key 
for each slot, and changes the group key every time slot. MARKS also 
presents the technique of generating condensable key space with binary 
hash trees. MARKS involves no message overhead for rekeying during the 
group session. However, MARKS is limited in that it requires receivers 
to determine their leave time when they join the group; this cannot be 
met in many applications. Also, MARKS has problems with situations in 
which a receiver may join and leave a group multiple times over a given 
session. 
2.4 Group Source Authentication 
Source authentication is the ability of group members to verify the identity of the 
sender of a received packet. In unicast, a shared secret-key message authentication 
code (MAC) is used to provide authentication. In multicast, the group key provides 
a shared secret-key; however, performing message authentication with this key only 
verifies that the sender is a member of the group, but not necessarily the intended 
source. Many applications require a level of authentication that allows a receiver 
to identify the individual sender of a message. There has been work that aims to 
efficiently provide this level of source authentication. 
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2.4.1 Objectives 
The design objectives of a source authentication scheme should include the following: 
• Authenticity: The receiver must be able to verify the identity of the data's 
source. One level of functionality is that the receiver can verify that the data 
is from a group member. The next level of functionality is that the receiver 
can verify that it is from an authorized sender. The most precise functionality 
is that the receiver can determine the exact identity of the sender. 
• Integrity: The receiver should be able to verify that the received data has not 
been modified. Some schemes provide only authentication without integrity 
checking. 
• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation requires the ability to prove that a host 
sent a particular message. This prevents the sender from later denying the 
transmission of the message. 
• Efficiency: The efficiency of the solution is based on communication, storage, 
and computation overhead at the source and the receivers. 
• Collusion resistance: The scheme should provide protection against collusion 
or at least be able to state in a provable manner the level of protection against 
c-collusion. 
• Minimal latency: Some schemes require a certain number of packets to be 
stored before they can be signed or verified. For some real-time applications, 
this can introduce an intolerable delay. 
• Robustness against unreliable communication: Some designs are based on 
an assumption of reliable communication. Some multicast environments do 
not provide reliable multicast communications; therefore such schemes are 


















Figure 4: A Classification of Multicast Source Authentication Schemes 
2.4.2 Proposed Solutions 
As shown in Figure 4, there have been two approaches in multicast source authen-
tication schemes: hash-based schemes and MAC-based schemes. 
• Hash-based Schemes 
Digital signatures provide a simple method of individual authentication. How-
ever, due to the computational costs of computing and verifying digital signa-
tures, signing each packet is not a practical solution. 
- Packet Chaining 
Gennaro and Rohatgi proposed packet chaining, a solution to efficiently 
authenticating digital streams [77] that allows only the first block to be 
signed and contain an association with subsequent packets. The stream 
of data packets is partitioned into chains and each packet in the chain 
contains a hash of the next packet in the chain. Thus only the first packet 
in the chain must be signed. This works for streams that are finite and 
in which the data is known in advance. For infinite streams, multiple 
one-time signatures are used. 
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Tree chaining 
Wong and Lam [210] proposed tree chaining, a technique that partitions 
the stream of data packets into blocks and forms a tree structure to per-
form authentication. Each block of n messages can be authenticated with 
one signature. It differs from Gennaro and Rohatgi's approach because 
the association made between packets is a tree-based association rather 
than a linear one. Each leaf node is a message digest of a data packet 
and the parent nodes are message digests of the two children nodes. The 
root node is the message digest for the block which is signed once for the 
entire group. The data packet is sent along with the block signature, the 
packet position in the block, and the siblings of each node in the packet's 
path to the root. In order for the receiver to verify the received packet, it 
recreates the path from the received packet up to the root. The digest of 
the received packet is computed and is used to recreate each node along 
the path. If the root that is computed by the receiver is the same as the 
signed one that was received with the packet, then the packet is verified. 
The receiver can cache the nodes so that it is possible to verify all the 
packets in the tree by computing each node in the authentication tree no 
more than once. 
Golle and Modadugu 
Due to the association between packets, the above approaches are sensi-
tive to data loss. Golle and Modadugu [79] proposed a hash-based scheme 
that aims to be robust against bursty packet loss. It achieves robustness 
by replicating packet signatures across multiple packets in the stream. 
The final packet also includes a signature. The authors provide results 
that show the burst tolerance of the scheme based on the efficiency re-
sources, 
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- Hybrid Signatures 
Rohatgi later proposed a scheme that makes use public key digital sig-
natures as well as faster one-way function-based k-t'ime signatures [178]. 
The scheme creates sets of k-time key pairs offline and uses the normal 
digital signature to certify the public /c-time keys. Message signatures are 
created online using a /c-time private key and the certified /c-time public 
key. The scheme avoids the need for reliable communication by sending 
the /c-time keys more than once. 
• MAC-based schemes 
There have been schemes proposed that use message authentication codes to 
provide authentication rather than digital signatures to increase efficiency. 
- Efficient MACs 
Cannetti, et al. proposed a scheme that makes use of efficient MACs [35]. 
In this scheme, the sender holds a set of I MAC keys and each group 
member holds a subset of the / keys. Each message is then MACed with 
each of the / keys and the recipient verifies the MAC with the keys that 
it holds. The authors show that appropriate choice of subsets provides a 
high probability of protection against c-collusion. 
- TESLA 
Perrig, et al. proposed TESLA, a MAC-based scheme that provides au-
thentication without regards for the packet loss rate [158]. The scheme 
involves the source signing the first packet and providing notification of 
a chain of MAC keys. Each packet Pi is authenticated with a MAC using 
a key Ki. Later packets reveal each Ki. The scheme requires some time 
synchronization between the sender and the receivers since each packet 
must be received before the next packet is sent. 
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2.5 Multicast Fingerprinting 
Encryption is generally used to safeguard the content while it is being transmitted 
so that unauthorized persons can not read the stream from the network, but this 
offers no protection after the intended receiver receives the data. There is no pro-
tection against unauthorized duplication and propagation by the intended receiver. 
Watermarking can provide protection in the form of theft deterrence. Watermarking 
is the embedding of some identifying information into the content in such a manner 
that it can not be removed by the user but it can be extracted or read by the appro-
priate party. Watermarks can be used for copyright protection or for identification 
of the receiver. Copyright protection watermarks embed some information in the 
data to identify the copyright holder or content provider, while receiver-identifying 
watermarking, commonly referred to as fingerprinting [203], embeds information to 
identify the receiver of that copy of the content. Thus, if an unauthorized copy of 
the content is recovered, extracting the fingerprint will show who the initial receiver 
was. 
In multicast environments, traditional fingerprinting or embedding the receiver's 
identification as the watermark at the source will not work since all the receivers 
will share the same watermark. It is necessary to watermark content with unique 
information for distinct receivers of the same multicast stream. A simple method 
to achieve unique watermarks for each receiver would be to watermark the stream 
differently for each receiver and to unicast the watermarked streams. Of course, the 
inefficiency of such a scheme calls for a better solution. The goal is to maintain the 
security of this approach while achieving scalability. 
2.5.1 Objectives 
The design objectives of a system to fingerprint multicast content should be security 
and scalability. We outline the concepts involved in achieving these goals. The 
features and components of the system necessary to accomplish these goals should 
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be designed into the solution. 
• Security: 
- Robustness of the fingerprinting method: The fingerprint is what dis-
tinguishes one user from another. This can be a particular pattern of 
frames or a particular pattern embedded in a frame. The method used 
must be robust to efforts of a user to remove this distinguishing infor-
mation. There has been significant work in multimedia watermarking. 
A scheme extending these efforts into fingerprinting multicast content is 
desirable since it assures a robust fingerprinting method. 
- Collusion problem: Collusion is when a set of group members work to-
gether to use the set of differently watermarked streams to create a copy 
of the content which cannot be determined to contain the fingerprint of 
any of those receivers. The solution must be based on a fingerprinting 
scheme that is not susceptible to collusion. 
- Asymmetric fingerprinting: Schemes should be able to provide asymmet-
ric fingerprinting. This allows the sender to identify the receiver of a re-
covered copy of data without previously knowing the fingerprinted data. 
Thus, the sender is not capable of distributing the data and accusing an 
innocent receiver [161]. 
- Protection Granularity: The granularity of protection is the amount of 
content that is needed for the protocol to be able to determine the receiver 
of the content. Schemes should be able to provide the smallest possible 
protection granularity but also be flexible so that this can be changed 
depending on the needs of the appHcation. 
• Scalability: 
- Logging Requirements; Logging is necessary because once the content is 
recovered and the fingerprint is extracted, there must be some record of 
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what receiver was represented by the ID recovered from the watermark 
at that instant in time. The storage and processing overhead of logging 
should be minimum. 
- Efficiency: The efficiency of the solution is based on the amount of data 
that the source must transmit and encrypt and the amount of data in-
troduced into the network. 
2.5.2 Proposed Solutions 
Figure 5 shows that there have been four classes of multicast fingerprinting solutions 
depending on where the watermarking takes place. Client-side marking schemes 
involve some client software that watermarks the content. Application-level schemes 
add logic to the application to deliver unique versions of the content. Network-level 
schemes involve computation in the network that causes each user to receive a unique 
version of the content. Overlay-based schemes involve intermediaries in the content 
distribution path that uniquely watermark the content for receivers. 
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Figure 5: Multicast Fingerprinting Solutions 
Text Content 
Brassil, Low, and Maxemchuck [30] proposed one of the first solutions for mul-
ticast fingerprinting. This system is designed for text documents and involves 
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multicasting the text documents and marking them at the chent's machine. 
The source then unicasts to each user a decryption program that contains the 
user's unique identification number. The program decrypts the document and 
inserts the identifying mark for that user. The authors note that since it is 
possible to reverse engineer the program and extract the decryption key, the 
key must be changed periodically which means that the entire program must 
be changed. One inefficiency is that in order to rekey the group, the docu-
ments are encrypted with a new key and programs with the new key built in 
must be unicast to every group member. 
• Application-based approach 
Chu, Qiao, and Nahrstedt [46] proposed a protocol to provide a different ver-
sion of a multicast video stream to each group member. The protocol creates 
two watermarked MPEG streams, assigns a unique random binary sequence to 
each user, and uses this sequence to arbitrate between those two watermarked 
streams. For the zth watermarked frame in stream j(j = 0,1), a different key 
KEY^ is used to encrypt it. Then user n is given either KEY^ or KEY^ de-
pending on the random bit sequence of user n. The efficiency of this protocol 
is hampered by the need to watermark, encrypt, and transmit two copies of 
the stream and by the significant amount of key messages sent. The ability of 
the protocol to detect a collusion is dependent on the length of the retrieved 
data stream. Even with a retrieved data stream of sufficient length, the algo-
rithm to determine a collusion is so complex that there is not a known length 
of retrieved stream that can guarantee a c-collusion detection, where c is the 
number of coUuders. The protection granularity of this protocol is large since 
it is based on the number of receivers. 
• Watercast 
Brown, Perkins, and Crowcroft [32] proposed a technique that has each group 
member receive a slightly different version of the multicast video stream. For 
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a multicast group with a tree of depth d, the source creates n differently wa-
termarked copies of each packet such that n > d. On receiving a transmission 
group of packets, each router forwards all but one of the packets. The last hop 
router then forwards exactly one packet to the subnet with the receiver(s). The 
goal is that each receiver then receives a stream that consists of a unique com-
bination of watermarked packets. The original receiver of a recovered stream 
can be determined by simulating the operation of various network components 
during the time that clip was originally transmitted. This makes the logging 
requirements high since the log must keep the state of the entire network from 
the start to the end of the transmission. The requirement that the source 
watermark, encrypt, and transmit n copies of the stream makes this solution 
inefficient. The scheme does not offer a solution for having multiple receivers 
on the same subnet since they will have the same User ID. The protection 
granularity is large because as the length of the clip increases, the probability 
of being able to specify a single receiver increases. Also, the ability to deter-
mine collusions is dependent on the length of the clip and requires extensive 
computation to determine what users could have possibly had access to the 
frames in the recovered stream. 
Selective Watermarking 
Wu and Wu [198] proposed a technique that multicasts most of the video and 
uniquely watermarks and unicast a portion of the video. Depending on the spe-
cific selection scheme used, the chosen segments could be from 90% to less than 
1% of the original video. There is a tradeoff between efficiency and security. 
As smaller amounts of the video are chosen for encryption and watermarking, 
the ability of persons outside of the group to obtain the video increases due 
to the proposal of not encrypting the video that is not watermarked and the 
ability of group members to obtain video that is not watermarked increases 
due to the fact that if only I frames are watermarked, then unwatermarked 
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I-blocks found in P and B frames can provide some degree of quality video. As 
larger percentages of the video are chosen to be watermarked, encrypted, and 
unicast, the security increases, but the efficiency of the protocol begins to re-
semble that of the simple unicast model. Since only I frames are watermarked, 
the protection granularity is each set of the I-frame pattern. 
2.6 Other Multicast Security Research Areas 
• Secure Multicast Routing 
Shields and Garcia-Luna-Aceves [188] proposed Keyed HIP (KHIP), a secure 
hierarchical multicast routing protocol. The authors show that multicast rout-
ing protocols are vulnerable to attacks against the routing infrastructure that 
can cause denial-of-service by creating routing loops or blackholes. KHIP pro-
vides authentication mechanisms that allow only trusted routers to join the 
multicast tree. The authors also state the need for a multicast receiver access 
control architecture and explain that it would complement KHIP. 
There has been work that aims to add security mechanisms to the PIM-SM 
multicast routing protocol [199]. This work is still in progress, but aims to 
provide protection for PIM-SM similar to that provided by KHIP. 
• Sender Access Control 
The problem of controlling which hosts can send data to a group is a separate 
problem from receiver access control. This is because IGMP is not used to 
register multicast senders. 
Ballardie and Crowcroft [22] proposed a scheme to detect and prevent unau-
thorized multicast traffic. This scheme requires each packet to include a times-
tamp and an authorization stamp. Upon noticing multicast traffic from a new 
source, a router forwards a copy of the packet to the authorization service that 
verifies that the authorization stamp was created by a host that has the rights 
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to send data for that particular multicast group and verifies that the times-
tamp is current. If the verifications fail, the router is notified and is required 
to send an alert upstream towards the source in order to have all routers block 
traffic from the unauthorized source. 
One viewpoint is that sender access control is becoming less of a problem 
with recent multicast schemes such as source-specific multicast (SSM) [99] 
that inherently provide sender access control. Recent discussions within the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) have maintained that receiver and 
sender access control should be solved separately but have considered a scheme 
similar to secure IGMP for sender access control. 
• Group Security Policy 
Multicast group policy is an important element of securing multicast content 
distribution. It deals with specifying the parameters and mechanisms involved 
with securing the group. 
McDaniel, et al. [136] presented requirements for policy management in se-
cure groups. This work explains that requirements include the specification, 
distribution, evaluation, and enforcement of policy. The authors show that 
previously there were two types of systems with regard to group policy. Trust 
management systems specified and evaluated policy in a well-defined manner, 
but lacked the ability to enforce them. Policy directed secure group communi-
cation systems defined and implemented policies, but do not always maintain 
secure distribution and composition of the policies. 
Another problem in group security policy is verifying the entity that is allowed 
to specify the group's policy. This entity is usually the group owner, but 
determining who is the group owner and authenticating an entity to be the 
group owner can be a complex task. In [110], the authors examine this problem 
and propose two solutions for a group owner determination and authentication 
5?/5^em (CODAS). 
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2.7 Video Watermarking 
This section reviews proposed video watermarking schemes and mentions the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each. This section is divided into two sections based 
on the domain in which the watermark is inserted for each scheme. The first section, 
compressed, reviews schemes that embed the watermark in the compressed video 
stream. The second section, uncompressed, reviews schemes that embed the water-
mark in a raw or uncompressed video stream. Another classification of watermarking 
systems is based on the information that is needed to retrieve the watermark. Pri-
vate marking systems require at least the original unwatermarked image. Whereas, 
public marking systems do not require the original unwatermarked images. Petit-
colas, et. al. [160] provide a survey of information hiding. 
2.7.1 Compressed Techniques 
Dittman, Stabenau and Steinmetz [61] proposed a technique that inserts a robust 
watermark in MPEG video while avoiding artifacts. First, a position sequence is 
generated from the user key as a seed with a secure random number generator. This 
sequence is used for hiding the watermark in the frame. Second, smooth and edge 
blocks are detected to improve the visual quality, then the watermark information is 
coded with error corrections and redundancy. Finally, three coefficients are selected 
to be used to embed each bit of the watermark information in a block as in the 
Zhao-Koch algorithm [123]. The Zhao-Koch scheme involves selecting two or three 
coefficients in the block and modifying the values of these coefficients so that the 
relationship between the values denotes the bit that is embedded in that block. This 
scheme has the advantages that it is a public marking system, artifacts are avoided 
by using smooth block and edge recognition schemes, and error correcting codes 
and redundancy is used to increase the robustness of the watermark. It also has the 
disadvantage that StirMark [159, ?] causes high error rates. 
41 
Hartung and Girod [90] proposed an idea that embeds the watermark in com-
pressed video. Let ttj(—lorl) be a sequence of information bits we want to hide in the 
video stream. We then make the spread sequence bi = aj,j *Cr <= i < 0 + 1) * Cr, 
where Cr is the chip-rate. The watermark is constructed as Wi = Alpha^bi^pi, where 
Alpha is an amplitude factor and pi( — lorl) is a binary pseudo-noise sequence. In 
order to add a watermark, we process the encoded video block by block. For each 
block, we do a zigzag scan, yielding a l2;64-vector of re-scanned DOT coefficients. 
For the DC-coefficient, we add the DC-coefficient of the watermark block to that 
of the encoded video block, obtaining the DC-coefficient of the watermarked block. 
For the AC- coefficients, we do the same add operation as long as the number of bits 
to transmit for the watermarked AC-coefficient does not increase. Hence, usually 
only few DCT coefficients of the watermark can be incorporated per 8x8 block. The 
scheme has the advantages that the watermark does not increase the bit rate. It has 
disadvantages such as the vulnerability to collusion and limited amount of embed-
ded information due to the bit-rate constraint. Also, since it is a private marking 
system, recovery of the hidden information requires the use of the same pseudo-noise 
sequence pi that was used in the coder, 
In Holliman, Memon, Yeo, and Yeung [101] proposed an adaptive scheme to 
embed watermark information in DCT blocks of image data. The scheme makes 
use of an algorithm to select the appropriate blocks for watermark insertions and a 
block-dependent seed generation algorithm to determine which coefficients to modify 
in a particular block. The algorithm attempts to reduce artifacts by not marking 
smooth and edge blocks. Smooth blocks are those that the number of non-zero 
coefficients in the lower right half of the DCT block are less than a threshold miriz-
Edge blocks are those that contain any unquantized coefficients with an absolute 
value exceeding a threshold miriE- To determine which coefficients of a particular 
block are modified, the authors suggest selecting bits of that block and concatenated 
with bits from some previous blocks and the private key, to be used as the seed to the 
pseudo-random number generator. The bit is embedding in the block in the same 
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way as the Zhao-Koch scheme using two coeffiecients [123]. Advantages of this 
scheme are that it is a public marking system, it avoids artifacts by using smooth 
block and edge recognition schemes, and does not significantly increase the bit rate. 
The disadvantage is that it is only shown to be robust against JPEG compression 
attacks 
2.7.2 Uncompressed 
Hartung and Girod [91] propose an algorithm that allows public retrieval of the wa-
termark. One problem for most watermarking techniques based on spread spectrum 
communications is that retrieval of the watermark requires the same pseudo-noise 
sequence pi used for embedding of the watermark. Hence, decoding of the water-
mark is not public since this would potentially allow attacks on the watermark. The 
algorithm resolves this problem by making only parts of the pseudo-noise sequence 
pi public. At the same time, the hidden information can be retrieved in the same 
manner. A modified pseudo-sequence is public where each n-th coefficient is taken 
from the original pseudo-sequence pi and all other coefficients are arbitrary random 
values with the same distribution as pi. The advantage of this scheme is that the 
watermark can be retrieved and verified publicly. However, the disadvantage is that 
the robustness of the publicly decodable watermark is lower than the robustness of 
the non-publicly decodable watermark. 
Dittman, Stabenau, and Steinmetz [61] suggested a way to embed a watermark 
in the spatial domain of an image. The algorithm overlays a 8x8 pattern over every 
8x8 block of the frame. First, a position sequence is generated to determine the 
blocks will be modified. Second, for each block a user key dependent pattern is 
made based on the inserted bit. Lastly, the created pattern is added to the original 
block. The advantages of this scheme are that it is a public marking system, it is 
resistant to the collusion attack, and it can embed a large amount of bits. It also 
has the disadvantage that StirMark [159, ?] causes high error rates. 
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Qiao [165] proposed a solution to embed a watermark in an uncompressed video 
stream that resolves the rightful ownership problem. Given an original image V, 
a key KEY is chosen. Then the watermark W = (wi) is created by applying a 
standard encryption function such as DES, i.e., Wi = DESkey{vi)i where Vi is the z-th 
pixel of V. Watermarked V^ is constructed as: vwi = Vix(l -\- AlphaxWi), Alpha = 
1. This solution has the advantage that it is non-invertible and it resolves the 
rightful ownership problem. The rightful ownership problem is when an attacker 
can manipulate the watermarked video and claim that he/she also is the original 
owner. The disadvantage of the scheme is that it is a private marking system. 
Hartung and Girod [90] proposed a solution to embed a watermark in raw video 
using ideas from direct-sequence spread spectrum communications. Let aj{—lorl) 
be a sequence of information bits we want to hide in the video stream. The spread 
sequence bi = aj,j * Cr <= z < (j' + 1) * Cr, where Cr is the chip-rate is created. 
The watermark is constructed as Wi = Alpha * bi ̂ Pi, where Alpha is an amplitude 
factor and pi(—lorl) is a binary pseudo-noise sequence. Then the watermark is 
added to the line-scanned digital video signal Vi yielding a watermarked video signal 
vwi = Vi -\- Wi. The advantages of this scheme is htat it is more robust than the 
scheme presented in this same paper that inserts the watermark in the compressed 
domain. The disadvantages are that it is a private marking system and it does not 
solve the collusion problem. 
2.8 Related Network Security Work 
There has been previous work in rights management or content protection for cen-
tralized peer-to-peer system, but not for decentralized peer-to-peer system. Outside 
of peer-to-peer, there has been work that does not share the same goal as CITADEL 
but is somewhat related. Related work includes authentication, authorization, and 
trust management systems for distributed environments as well as other rights man-
agement work. 
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• Centralized Peer-to-Peer Content Protection: The content protection system 
that was implemented as part of Napster was one of the most well-known [122]. 
This system relied on the central authority that maintains the indexing and 
location functions to provide content protection. Content identification was 
done based on the file name of the content. This approach used a blacklist 
of forbidden content. The system controlled the sharing of blacklisted files 
by not allowing users to locate these files. This was accomplished by either 
not allowing users to add these files to the index or not responding to queries 
for these files. This approach proved to be easily bypassed by users simply 
changing the file names. Ultimately, the content providers insisted that this 
system did not provide adequate protection and Napster was forced to shut 
down until it can provide adequate content protection functions [51]. 
• Peer-to-Peer Security: There have been a few different types of work in se-
curity for peer-to-peer security. These systems either focus on protecting the 
system, the file retrievers, or the file providers. Work in security of the peer-
to-peer infrastructure includes work by Sit and Morris [192] and Castro, et 
al. [37]. Secure Overlay Services [121] provides a proactive system for pre-
venting denial of service attacks and is also relevant to peer-to-peer systems. 
Work in anonymous systems include Anonymous Peer-to-Peer File Sharing 
(APFS) [185] and Freenet [74]. Work in censorship resistant peer-to-peer sys-
tems include Publius [131] and Eternity [15]. 
• Digital Rights Management (DRM) A number of commercial DRM solutions 
are offered such as Microsoft Rights Manager '̂ ; however, the details of most 
of the systems are not published. Park, et. al. [154] provide a taxonomy of 
architectures for controlling the dissemination of digital information. Judge 
and Ammar [111] discuss how watermarking technology can be used to achieve 
various DRM goals in peer-to-peer systems. Feigenbaum, et. al. [70] discuss 
'http://www.microsoft.com 
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privacy issues in DRM systems. 
Protected Content Formats: The idea of protection labels and attaching pro-
tection labels to the objects that they describe has been in the security lit-
erature for some time [25]. Slightly more recent work extended this into the 
concept of a secure package for storing content and its controls [113, 190]. 
Authentication and Authorization in Distributed Systems: There has been 
much work in access control models including traditional mandatory and dis-
cretionary access control (MAC and DAC) [162] and works that extend be-
yond MAC and DAC such as role based access control [181] and the dissem-
ination control model [135]. Neumann proposed an authorization system for 
distributed systems [150]. Wong and Lam describe a distributed authorization 
service [211]. Hayton, et al. proposed the Oasis architecture for access control 
in distributed environments [92]. 
Representation of Authorization Information in Distributed Systems: Ap-
proaches to representing authorization information in distributed system in-
clude extensible rights markup language (XrML) [67], extensible media com-
merce language (XmCL) [66] and generalized access control list (GACL) [211]. 
Trust Management in Decentralized Systems: The trust management prob-
lem involves creating security policies, verifying that certain credentials are 
adequate based on the security poHcy, and deferring trust to third parties. 
Key Note [26] provides a comprehensive system for trust management. 
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Chapter 3 
Theft Deterrence using Fingerprinting in 
Multicast Environments 
Encryption is generally used to safeguard the content while it is being transmitted 
so that unauthorized persons cannot read the stream from the network. However, 
end-to-end encryption offers no protection against unauthorized duplication and 
propagation by the intended receiver. This additional protection can be obtained 
by watermarking the content. Watermarking is the embedding of some identifying 
information into the content in such a manner that it cannot be easily removed by 
the user but it can be extracted or read by the appropriate party. Watermarks can 
be used for copyright protection or for identification of the original receiver after the 
data is propagated. Copyright protection watermarks embed some information in the 
data to identify the copyright holder or content provider, while receiver-identifying 
watermarking, commonly referred to as fingerprinting [203], embeds information to 
identify the receiver of that copy of the content. Thus, if an unauthorized copy of 
the content is recovered, extracting the fingerprint will show who the initial receiver 
was. 
Problems arise when attempting to fingerprint content in a multicast environ-
ment that do not arise in copyright protection watermarking. If copyright protection 
watermarks are embedded in the data at the source, then the watermarked data is 
multicast to the group of receivers. For fingerprinting, embedding the receiver's 
identification as the watermark at the source will not work since all the receivers 
will share the same watermark. It is necessary to watermark content with unique 
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information for distinct receivers of the same multicast stream. A simple method 
to achieve unique watermarks for each receiver would be to watermark the stream 
differently for each receiver and to unicast the watermarked streams. Of course, the 
inefficiency of such a scheme calls for a better solution. We aim to maintain the 
security of this approach while achieving scalability. 
We propose WHIM [109], a scalable system that allows multicast content to 
be securely marked with distinct information for each receivers. This system in-
troduces two new concepts: l)generation of a watermark based on the receiver's 
location in the network; and 2) incremental insertion of the watermark in content 
as it traverses the network. WHIM makes use of a hierarchy of intermediaries for 
creating and embedding the fingerprint. This allows security and scalability. The 
use of a hierarchy allows a new type of security by having a User ID based on the 
user's location in an overlay network. Security is also maintained by using proven 
watermarking algorithms to embed this User ID. The hierarchy leads to scalability 
by capitalizing on the efficiency of multicast distribution and by distributing the 
watermark embedding load from the source to the different intermediaries. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.1 we enumerate the design objec-
tives of WHIM. Section 3.2 gives an overview of the WHIM architecture. Section 3.3 
discusses the WHIM-Backbone component which is based on a hierarchy of inter-
mediaries that provide an efficient distribution architecture that fingerprints the 
streaming content. Section 3.4 describes the WHIM-Last Hop component, a secure 
protocol that fingerprints and distributes content between an intermediary and a 
group of receivers. Section 3.5 presents an analysis and simulation results of the 




The design objectives of a system to fingerprint multicast content should be secu-
rity and scalability. We outline the concepts involved in achieving these goals. The 
features and components of the system necessary to accomplish these goals should 
be designed into the solution. 
Security: 
Robustness of the fingerprinting method: 
The fingerprint is what distinguishes one user from another. This can be a partic-
ular pattern of frames or a particular pattern embedded in a frame. The method used 
must be robust to efforts of a user to remove this distinguishing information. There 
has been significant work in video watermarking see for example [61, 165, 90, 101]. 
A scheme extending these efforts into fingerprinting multicast content is desirable 
since it assures a robust fingerprinting method. 
Collusion problem: Collusion is when a set of group members work together 
to use the set of differently watermarked streams to create a copy of the content 
which cannot be determined to contain the fingerprint of any of those receivers. 
The solution must be based on a fingerprinting scheme that is not susceptible to 
collusion. 
Asymmetric fingerprinting: Schemes should be able to provide asymmetric 
fingerprinting. This allows the sender to identify the receiver of a recovered copy 
of data without previously knowing the fingerprinted data. Thus, the sender is not 
capable of distributing the data and accusing an innocent receiver. [161] 
Protection Granularity: The granularity of protection is the amount of con-
tent that is needed for the protocol to be able to determine the receiver of the 
content. Schemes should be able to provide the smallest possible protection gran-




Logging Requirements: Logging is necessary because once a video is recov-
ered and the fingerprint is extracted, there must be some record of what receiver 
was represented by the ID recovered from the watermark at that instant in time. 
The storage and processing overhead of logging should be minimal. 
Efficiency: The efficiency of the solution is based on the amount of data that 
the source must transmit and encrypt and the amount of data introduced into the 
network. 
3.2 WHIM Architecture Overview 
Our system has two components, WHIM Backbone (WHIM-BB) and WHIM Last 
Hop (WHIM-LH). WHIM-BB introduces a hierarchy of intermediaries into the net-
work and forms an overlay network between them. Figure 6 illustrates how the 
hierarchy is formed as an overlay network in the physical network. We distinguish 
each intermediary by its unique path from the source. This Path ID composed of 
intermediary IP addresses is embedded into the content to identify the path that 
it traveled. Each intermediary embeds its portion of the Path ID into the content 
it forwards the content. This embedding is performed using modified versions of 
existing video watermarking algorithms. This is along the lines of the recent trend 
towards introducing a hierarchy of entities into the network to provide active ser-
vices, such as reliable multicast [130, 156], Internet caching [69, 39, 114], multimedia 
proxy servers [187], and layered video multicast [128]. 
Each intermediary can have a set of child intermediaries and receivers. We 
call this set of child receivers the intermediary's domain. A watermark embedded 
by WHIM-BB identifies the domain of a receiver. Some literature suggests that 
identifying the domain of the receiver or the last hop before the receiver is adequate 
protection [32]; however, we feel that it is necessary in many applications to identify 
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the individual receiver. So, we propose WHIM-LH, which allows intermediaries to 
mark the content distinctly for any children receivers that they might have. WHIM-
LH forms a domain-wide secure distribution and fingerprinting system including key 
distribution and logging. 
A central component of WHIM-LH is a secure client-side fingerprint insertion 
program that communicates with the intermediary for registration and to receive 
the decryption keys and the stream. The security of this component can be achieved 
by using techniques such as Mobile Cryptography [180] and Time-Limited Blackbox 
Protection [97]. Clients join and register for the group at the domain level. This 
type of control is ideal for applications in which domains are responsible for the 
activity of its members. For example, a university might subscribe to a site-wide 
license for a broadcast then have students subscribe individually to receive it. 
WHIM-LH is a building block that when merged with WHIM-BB forms a robust 
layered solution for fingerprinting multicast content distinctly for each receiver in 
the group. Used together, WHIM-BB and WHIM-LH allow content to be marked to 
pinpoint the location of the receiver in the overlay network as well as to identify the 
individual receiver. WHIM protects against attacks in which receivers join a group 
using a fake IP address or name. Even if the WHIM-LH registration fails to lead to 
the actual receiver, the WHIM-BB Path ID will pinpoint the responsible domain. 
It should be noted that either of these can be used alone as a suitable fingerprinting 
system. WHIM-BB, alone, offers a fingerprinting system that identifies the domain 
of the receiver, but not the individual receiver. WHIM-LH can be used between 
the source and the group of receivers to fingerprint the content uniquely for each 
receiver. However, it lacks the scalability of the combined solution due to the lack 
of the distributed architecture and it does not provide any information regarding 







Figure 6: The Hierarchy of Intermediaries as an Overlay Network 
3.3 WHIM Backbone (WHIM-BB) 
WHIM-BB makes use of a hierarchy of intermediaries for creating and embedding 
the fingerprint. The fingerprint is based on the path from the source to the interme-
diary. This increases the security of the system and the scalabiUty of the watermark 
embedding. Use of a hierarchy allows a new type of security by having the user's fin-
gerprint based on the user's location in the network. Security is also maintained by 
using proven watermarking algorithms to embed this identifying information. The 
hierarchy allows scalable watermark embedding by distributing the embedding load 
from the source to the different intermediaries and by easing logging requirements. 
This section first describes the architecture of intermediaries, then discusses the dis-
tributed watermarking algorithms used by the intermediaries, and finally, discusses 
the logging necessary to maintain the path information. 
3.3.1 Architecture 
Our architecture consists of a hierarchy of intermediaries positioned as end systems 
in the network. Each intermediary is assigned a unique ID either manually or 
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using some prefix labeling algorithm [19]; so to identify the intermediary, there 
exists a unique ID that identifies each path from the source to each intermediary. 
As the content traverses the network, every intermediary through which it passes 
concatenates its ID to the Path ID already embedded in the content. 
The amount of computation required to insert the watermark is more than 
routers today are capable of and possibly even more than the amount of processing 
power proposed by advocates of active networking [34, 195]. Therefore, WHIM-BB 
places a hierarchy of intermediaries as end-systems in the network and forms an 
overlay network between them. This overlay architecture lends itself to end-system 
or application-layer multicast [72, 47, 42]. There has been research that makes 
a case for application-layer multicast stating that it can help avoid many of the 
problems involved in using an IP multicast distribution model such as congestion 
control and end-to-end reliability and even increase security. These works have pro-
posed protocols for enabling application-layer multicast. Other works such as the 
X-bone [197] propose systems for dynamically deploying and managing overlay net-
works. W H I M ' S architecture can use application-layer multicast rather than rely on 
global IP multicast support while still using IP multicast where available, especially 
within domains. 
This idea can be extended to allow the intermediaries to be coupled with existing 
machines in the network that perform computation. Infrastructures in place for 
multimedia applications [48], multimedia proxy servers [187], server replication, and 
caching [39, 114, 69] provide ideal locations for WHIM intermediaries to be located. 
3.3.2 Distributed Watermarking Algorithms 
The fingerprint is the information embedded into the content to uniquely identify 
the recipient. The identifying information consists of a timestamp and the concate-
nation of all the IDs of the intermediaries on the path. This identifying information 
is embedded into each frame of the multimedia content. WHIM-BB embeds the 
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fingerprint incrementally at each intermediary. Existing watermarking methods are 
designed to embed an entire watermark at once. We propose distributed water-
marking algorithms that allow existing watermarking algorithms to be used in a 
distributed manner securely and efficiently. 
Example 1 The watermarking algorithm described by Dittmann, et al. [61] 
works as follows. For each frame, a pseudo random sequence is calculated 
to determine the order in which the blocks will be marked. In the determined 
order, the blocks are discrete cosine transformed; smoothness and edge detec-
tion is done; and the blocks are quantitized with Qm/Qf accordingly. For each 
block, the information is embedded as in the Zhao-Koch algorithm [123]. 
Our distributed version of this algorithm performs as follows. The source 
creates the pseudo random sequence in which the blocks will be watermarked, 
does smooth and edge detection for each block, and quantitizes with Qm/Qf. 
The watermark begins with a timestamp inserted by the source. It then sends 
the new frame and the sequence towards the receivers. As each intermediary 
receives the stream, it uses the sequence to determine the next blocks to water-
mark, adds its ID to the watermark, and sends the remainder of the sequence 
and new frame towards the group. 
Example 2 The watermarking algorithm proposed by Holliman, et al. [101] 
works as follows. An adaptive scheme is used to choose the blocks to be 
watermarked. Smooth and edge detection is done to determine the blocks 
that can withstand watermarking. Also, within each block, coefficients to be 
used to embed the bit are chosen pseudo-randomly based on properties of the 
block. The information is embedded by modifying these chosen coefficients 
based on the Zhao-Koch algorithm. 
Modified to perform in a distributed environment, the algorithm operates 
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as follows. The source does smooth and edge detection and selects coefficients 
for each block. After beginning the watermark with a timestamp, the source 
sends the sequence of blocks to be watermarked and which coefficients are to 
be changed along with the stream towards the receivers. As each intermedi-
ary receives the stream, it uses the sequence to determine the next blocks to 
watermark and which coefficients in that block to use. The intermediary then 
adds its ID to the watermark and sends the rest of the block sequence and 
coefficient information along with the altered frame towards the group. 
Though each frame contains the entire string of identifying information, it does 
not imply concentration of the watermark. It simply means that the entire piece of 
identifying information is embedded into each frame. The embedding algorithm is 
still based on a secure watermarking algorithm that effectively hides the embedded 
information inside of that frame data. Therefore, this results in no reduction in the 
level of security. 
If there is not a need to safeguard single frames or very short clips, selective 
watermarking [198] can be used to increase the performance. This involves a trade-
off in the strength of the security because the length of video clip that is necessary 
to extract the watermark is increased. Instead of inserting the fingerprint in every 
frame, it can be inserted in every n-th frame. This translates into about a n-fold 
increase in performance with a tradeoff of n times the length of the clip that is 
necessary to extract the watermark. For example, with an MPEG stream, it is 
possible to fingerprint only the I frames. If the MPEG stream has the repeating 
IBBPBBPBB pattern, this will reduce the computational overhead by reducing the 
numbers of frames that are fingerprinted by 89%. 
The information exchanged by the intermediaries is encrypted with an interme-
diary group key, lyt, while the content data is encrypted with some session key, Gyt, 
as shown in Figure 7. In cases in which the intermediary does not already have 
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Control Data Content Data 
IP UDP Sequence Path Id Data 
Encrypted with 11̂  Encrypted with G ̂ ^ 
Figure 7: Packet transmitted between Intermediaries. 
Repeat 
Extract Picture ? 
Repea t 
Extract Slice ? 
Repea t 
Extract Macroblock ? 
Repeat 
Extract Luminance Block ? 
Transform VLC To Integers 
Embed Bit By Altering Coefficients For This Block 
Convert Integers Back To VLC 
Until (Finished Inserting Bits) 
Or (No More Luminance Blocks In This Macroblock) 
Until (Finished Inserting Bits) Or (No More Macroblocks In This Slice) 
Until (Finished Inserting Bits) Or (No More Shces In This Picture) 
Until (Finished Inserting Bits) Or (No More Pictures In This Sequence Layer) 
Figure 8: The Bit-Embedding Algorithm at the Intermediary. 
the compressed video data available, it will need to perform the necessary decap-
sulations, possibly including RTP [186], UDP, and IP, to extract the video data. 
Once the video data is available, the intermediary must perform the steps to locate 
the necessary blocks and embed the watermark. An example of this algorithm for 
MPEG video is shown in Figure 8. 
3.3.3 Logging 
To determine the domain of the receiver from retrieved watermarks, the log must 
have enough information so that it can determine which nodes were represented by 
that Path ID at that particular instant in time. Previously, there has not been much 
attention to the logging aspect of such a watermarking system. We have identified 
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it as a key requirement of the system and an important factor in the scalabihty of 
the system with regard to actually determining the party associated with a copy of 
content. While previous schemes for fingerprinting multicast video require extended 
periods of the fingerprinted video in order to extract enough information about the 
embedded fingerprint to determine the recipient, WHIM requires only one frame 
since the entire label is inserted in each frame. Thus, WHIM can safeguard each 
frame of a video. With some other schemes, if a user illegally redistributes a single 
image or a very short clip from a video, there is no way of determining the perpetra-
tor, Also, our logging system requires only minimal information and uses a simple 
and straightforward algorithm to determine receivers. 
Our logging system operates as follows. Each intermediary sends to the logging 
system, the Path ID that has accumulated in the packet (including its own ID). 
This Path ID also includes the timestamp inserted by the source. Depending on 
the overlay management used, the intermediary might also send its IP address or 
some other identifying information. This includes some authentication information 
and a timestamp so that the logging system is assured that the information is being 
received from a legitimate intermediary. This logging information is sent to the 
logger every time that the Path ID of the intermediary changes. Therefore updates 
are only sent when the overlay topology changes, not every time the underlying 
routing topology changes. When a watermark has been extracted and the receiver 
must be determined, only a simple table lookup algorithm is necessary to access this 
information from the log. 
3.4 WHIM Last-Hop (WHIM-LH) 
Whereas WHIM-BB marks the content to identify the last hop intermediary of a 
receiver, WHIM-LH allows a single intermediary to embed distinct User IDs for 
each of its children receivers. This section first explains the WHIM-LH architecture 
and the variations that are allowed by the different types of User IDs. Then, the 
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Figure 9: WHIM-LH Architecture 
different methods that are available for choosing User IDs are explained. 
3.4.1 Methods of Transporting the Video Data 
The architecture we describe here maintains the efficiency of multicast routing while 
enforcing necessary security at endpoints, intermediaries and client. There is signif-
icant research in the area of video watermarking, so we provide a framework that 
allows any watermarking algorithm to be used to fingerprint multicast streams effi-
ciently. We introduce a secure client-side fingerprint insertion program that contains 
a watermarking module that can be based on any chosen watermarking algorithm. 
Figure 9 shows the interaction between the modules of the architecture. The in-
termediary distributes the fingerprinting program with a built-in decryption key, 
which we subsequently denote as program[Kj„ierna/]- The cHent registers with the 
logging and key distribution system to join the group and receives decryption keys 
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and possibly a User Id, The client program then receives the stream encrypted with 
the session key, denoted as {stream}Kp/Qy, from the intermediary and securely adds 
the watermark before making the stream available to the user. The remainder of 
this subsection explains the variations of this architecture that depend on the type 
of User ID used. 
The Assigned User ID scheme has the intermediary communicate with the group 
using the following steps: 
Intermediary to Receivers: 
Multicast: {stream}Kp/Qy 
Multicast: program iKintemai^ 
M u l t i c a s t : {{Kp/ay ,Use r lT>l}Kinternal}Kserl > 
{{Kpiay, User ID2}K 
internal j'^user2 > • - • 
W'^play > u s e r i-y'^J'^internali^usern 
Each User ID and key packet is encrypted with the user's public key or symmetric 
key shared by the logging system and the user, so the same level of security is 
achieved as if they were unicast. A significant portion of the traffic that is sent is 
the User ID information. 
For applications that would benefit from the decrease in traffic that would result 
from not sending this information, we propose a method that allows the user to 
provide her own User ID information to the program. This Local User ID method 
only requires the intermediary to send the following messages to the group: 
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Intermediary to Receivers: 
Multicast: {streain}Kp;ay 
Multicast: program [Kî êrna J 
M u l t i c a s t : {^playf^internal 
The Authentication module authenticates the user and signals the decryption mod-
ule. This approach is used when the logging system already has a mapping between 
the User ID and the actual receiver or can determine the receiver based on the User 
ID, such as when the User ID is derived from the public key as explained in the next 
subsection. 
3.4.2 Methods of Choosing User ID 
The User ID information that is embedded by the intermediaries as the watermark 
uniquely identifies each receiver. While previous literature simply refers to the 
User ID as some unique identifier, perhaps randomly assigned, we propose a new 
technique for creating User IDs. By using cryptographic means, we compose a 
User ID that is more closely bound to a user than a randomly assigned User ID. 
As shown in the previous subsection, this also allows a more efficient distribution 
method. Possible methods of forming a User ID include the following ways: 
• Assigned User ID: This simple scheme involves each user registering with 
the source, authenticating with the source, and the source assigning some 
unique value as a User ID. 
• Public Key-based User ID: This approach allows the User ID to be based 
on the public key of the receiver. This requires the user to have a public key 
certificate [124], a signed message from a trusted certification authority (CA) 
that specifies the user's name and the corresponding public key, such as a 
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X.509 certificate [102]. The fingerprinting program must be assured that the 
public key used is the one assigned to this user by the CA. We suggest two 
methods of doing this. The fingerprinting program requests the user's pubHc 
key from the CA and then uses a nonce to confirm that the user knows the 
corresponding private key. The second method is that the user provides the 
program with the pubUc key certificate and signs it with the private key. Thus, 
the program can verify the public/private key pair and that it was assigned 
by the CA. 
3.4.3 Discussion 
WHIM-LH provides a framework that allows proven watermarking algorithms to be 
used efficiently in a multicast environment. It allows efficient rekeying, introduces 
a new type of secure User ID construction, and has the smallest possible protection 
granularity. It also is capable of being used with selective watermarking [198] to 
increase its efficiency at the cost of an increase in protection granularity. Figure 10 
shows the how the WHIM-LH architecture is combined with WHIM-BB. 
We propose means of preventing the risk of the fingerprinting program being 
reverse engineered to reveal the decryption key or otherwise altered to disallow the 
desired results. There are a number of attacks that malicious users can perform 
against mobile agents including spying out code and data and manipulation of code 
and data [96]. Mobile Cryptography can be used to guard against these attacks [180]. 
This involves executing encrypted functions to guarantee code privacy and code 
integrity. Time Limited Black box Protection [97] can be used to protect the code 
















Figure 10: WHIM 
3.5 Analysis 
In this section, we examine the efficiency of WHIM in terms of data transmission 
and encryption overhead. We look at this relative to the performance of some of 
the other multicast watermarking schemes reviewed in the related work section; in 
particular Brown, et al, and Chu, et al. Figure 11 shows the definitions of variables 
used in this section. 
In WHIM, the source transmits s -\- p -\- cku bytes and encrypts s + (n){ku) 
bytes. The overhead of the Chu, et al. scheme involves the sender transmitting 
nf[2(f) + 2(A;/)] bytes, then the group leader transmits nf[(n){md + bit + kf)] 
bytes. This system also has significant encryption overhead, nf[2{f) -\- kf -\- msg\ 
bytes for the sender and nf[{hit + kf){n)-^msg] bytes for the leader. In the protocol 
of [32], the amount of transmitted data is increased substantially by the amount of 
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s — stream 
nf = number of frames in the stream 
/ = frame 
P = program 
n = number of group members 
ku = key/User ID message 
cku = combined key/User ID messages 
k = decryption key 
uid = User ID 
bit = signifies which stream the user receives 
kf = decryption key for a particular frame 
Figure 11: Definition of Variables Used in Analysis 
necessary redundant data. For a stream of size, s, the amount of data that is 
transmitted is at least ns, where n > d and d is the depth of the multicast tree. 
We seek to analyze the performance of these schemes with two different types of 
group behavior, theater style and dynamic. Theater style involves all of the group 
members arriving or joining the group and leaving the group at approximately the 
same time, as at a movie theater. This allows all of the set up overhead to be 
multicast to the entire group at once. Dynamic groups involve users joining and 
leaving the group at anytime throughout the session and may involve members 
leaving and re-joining. This also involves rekeying of the group. 
To analyze the performance for theater style groups, we created multicast groups 
within transit-stub internetwork topologies using GT-ITM [213]. We performed the 
simulation with group sizes of 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, and 20,000 receivers. For each 
group size, the depth of the tree used in our data is based on the average depth of 
the 10 random shortest path multicast trees that were created. These calculations 
are based on the source multicasting a one hour session of MPEG-2 video at 4 Mbps 
at a framerate of 30 fps. The size of the keys in our simulation are 128 bits for 
WHIM as well as for the scheme of Chu, et al. In our simulation of Chu, et al., the 
source is also the group leader. The size of the insertion program in WHIM was 
determined by adding the size of a common decryption program and the size of a 
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Figure 12: Multicast Fingerprinting Data Overhead at the Source 
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Figure 13: Multicast Fingerprinting Cumulative Data Overhead 
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and encrypted by the architecture is orders of magnitude above the size of the 
program so the accuracy of this value becomes insignificant. We compared the total 
amount of data transmitted and encrypted by the multicast source in WHIM with 
the schemes of Brown, et al. and Chu, et al. and the results are shown in Figure 12. 
The amount of data transmitted by the source in WHIM is about 1.5 GB for all 
group sizes. In the other schemes, the amount of data increases linearly as the size 
of the group increases. In Brown, Perkins, and Crowcroft's scheme, the amount of 
data is almost 25 GB for the smallest group size and continues to increase as the 
group size increases reaching over 35 GB for the 20,000-member-sized group. In 
Chu, Qiao, and Nahrstedt's scheme, the amount of data transmitted is a little over 
5 GB for the 1,000 member group and increases sharply to about 40 GB for the 
20,000 member group. 
For dynamic groups, we used data collected by the Mlisten tool [14] over several 
days for the Mbone multicast of the Space Shuttle Mission STS-80 in November 
1996. This session has a duration of 13 days and has over 1600 join requests. 
We used these traces to simulate the performance of the fingerprinting solutions. 
Figure 13 shows the cumulative amount of data transmitted over the network by 
these schemes and the number of receivers in the group over time. The cumulative 
amount of data transmitted by WHIM is about 80 GB while the total for Chu, Qiao, 
and Nahrstedt's scheme is about 120 GB. The total amount of data for Brown, 
Perkins, and Crowcroft's scheme is about 650 GB. There is a sharp increase in the 
amount of data transmitted using Brown, Perkins, and Crowcroft's scheme between 
500,000 and 600,000 seconds. This is because a group member joined that was a 
considerable number of hops from the source and the number of copies of the content 
that is transmitted by the scheme is based on the depth of the tree. 
One factor that allows WHIM to provide greater scalability than previous so-
lutions is the intermediaries that are used to provide security functionality. In our 
analysis, we do not consider the cost of deploying these intermediaries. This cost 
includes not only the monetary cost but also may possibly include delay. We do 
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not provide quantitative results that show the incurred delay; however, we imple-
mented a prototype of the system to examine this and other issues. As we discuss 
in subsequent sections, the delay incurred was reasonable. We believe that with ap-
propriate buffering, the delay is negligible. Also, many systems utilize content dis-
tribution networks or infrstructures that have introduced intemediaries to perform 
some functionality. Ideally, WHIM's intermediaries will leverage an architecuture 
that is already in place. 
3.6 Implementation 
We developed a prototype implementation of WHIM-BB. The architecture involves 
having multicast video delivered through a hierarchy of intermediaries and marked 
uniquely for each recipient. Our prototype used H.261 [4] video and RTP [186]. The 
rtpplay ^ tool was used as the video source to multicast the original video. Vic was 
used as the client to receive the multicast stream and play the video [134]. 
The WHIM intermediaries utilized rtpgw [18], an application level RTP gate-
way, to provide basic video proxying. The prototype implemented our distributed 
version of the watermarking algorithm presented by Dittmann, et al. [61] to mark 
the content. 
We developed a C4-+ class that performs watermarking as a filter on the video 
content. This allows our functionality to be used within other frameworks such as 
Open Mash [133]. We implemented a base class called WM_Filter and two more 
specific classes called InsertWM_Filter and ExtractWM_Filter. 
We changed the rtpgw's H261Transcoder class to pass the video through the 
watermarking filter. Within the H261Transcoder class, wmJilter() is called from 
the recv() function before the video is re-encoded for retransmission. 





iwmf = new InsertWM_Filter 
(outw_, outh_, decimation_, wmspot_, wmid_); 
iwmf—>wm_filter (decoder,—>fraine()); 
delete iwmf; 
wm_filter() steps through the group of blocks in a frame and for each group of 
block, traverses each of the macroblocks. For each macroblock, wmJilter_mb() is 
called. wmJilter_mb calls wmJilter_blk() for each block of the four luminance blocks 
in the macroblock. wmJilter_blk() implements Dittmann's watermarking scheme. 
It chooses the three coefficients in the block to be marked. It determines the bit that 
must be encoded in this block by shifting the string to be embedded by the number 
of bits that it has inserted in previous blocks. The new coefficients are determined 
based on a Zhao-Koch type algorithm. The coefficients are then re-quantitized and 
the new values are placed in the block. wmJilter() returns after a given frame is 
successfully marked and the watermarked frame is then passed to the encoder to be 
forwarded. 
We also implemented a watermark extraction tool that can be used to iden-
tify embedded information within a recovered video copy. It was also useful for 
debugging. It is called from the recv() function as follows: 
ExtractWM_Filter *ewmf; 
ewmf = new ExtractWM_Filter 
(outw_, outh_, decimation., wmpathlength_); 
ewmf —>wm_f ilter(decoder_—>fraine()); 
delete ewmf; 
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We were able to multicast video to a number of receivers and have the content 
watermarked uniquely based on the receivers location in the network. Notable 
observations were that the watermark insertion did not require buffering and did 
not introduce any noticable delay. 
3.7 Conclusions 
There has been a significant amount of work geared toward developing algorithms 
to securely embed watermarks into multimedia content. The work presented in this 
paper complements these efforts by providing an architecture that allows these al-
gorithms to be used in multicast multimedia. We have presented two architectures, 
WHIM-Backbone, a hierarchy of intermediaries that provides an efficient distribu-
tion architecture that fingerprints the streaming content, and WHIM-Last Hop, a 
secure client/server protocol that fingerprints and distributes content between a 
single entity and a group of receivers, which form WHIM. Our analysis shows the 










Trust High High Medium High High 
Scalability Low High Medium High High 
Resolution High Low High Medium High 
Table 1: Comparison of trust, scalability, and resolution provided by different meth-
ods of fingerprinting content to a group 
Table 1 compares the trust, scalability, and resolution achieved by solutions 
based on the type of transmission of the video and the marking location of the data. 
The first column shows the simple case of marking at the source and unicasting. 
This achieves high trust and resolution but low scalability. The next column shows 
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multicast video that is marked at the source. This results in high trust and scala-
bility but low resolution. The third column shows WHIM-LH which multicasts the 
video and marks at the client. This achieves medium trust and scalability and high 
resolution. The fourth column shows WHIM-BB which multicasts the video and 
marks at the intermediaries. This achieves high trust and scalability and medium 
resolution. The last column shows WHIM which combines WHIM-LH and WHIM-
BB to achieve the scalability of multicast with the trust and resolution of a unicast 
approach. 
In addition to the architecture presented in this chapter, the idea of identifying 
a user by his position in the network can be carried over into other applications 
to offer increased security and the use of a trusted hierarchy to provide scalable 
security functionality can be used in other areas including group key management, 
firewalls, and defending denial-of-service attacks. 
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Chapter 4 
Group Access Control for Content 
Distribution Tree Protection 
The Internet is increasingly being viewed as a medium providing not just connectiv-
ity but also services. This is due to the increase in mechanisms within the network 
to support networked services. An important need is mechanisms to aid in the 
scalability of networked services. Two such mechanisms have received considerable 
attention over the years—multicasting and anycasting. Multicast communication 
provides an efficient transport mechanism for one-to-many and many-to-many com-
munication [56]. Anycast provides a means for a host to send a request to one ad-
dress and have it serviced by one of many servers servicing that address [155]. This 
aids service discovery. There has been significant advances in maturing both of the 
paradigms. There are distinct and significant security problems in both the multi-
cast and anycast models including denial-of-service, theft-of-service, eavesdropping, 
and masquerading. 
We first explain the multicast problem. There are a number of available multicast 
routing protocols that provide the efficient transport mechanisms of multicast by 
routing packets with one group destination address to multiple recipients. The 
routing protocols must be aware of group members in the network in order to deliver 
packets to them. The mechanism provided for doing this is the Internet Group 
Membership Protocol (IGMP) [33]. A host uses this protocol to notify the routing 
system that it should deliver packets for a particular multicast group to this host. In 
the current model, any host can use IGMP to become a member of any IP multicast 
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group causing eavesdropping or theft of service. The common method used to 
protect the information is to encrypt the multicast data and provide decryption 
keys only to authorized members. In some cases, encrypted communication is not 
possible for any number of reasons including legal issues or technical reasons. Even 
if encryption is used, there are still risks involved with unauthorized users receiving 
encrypted data such as traffic analysis and possibly cryptanalysis. The current 
model is also vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack in which malicious hosts join 
a number of multicast groups. This causes potentially large amounts of data to be 
forwarded to it utilizing network resources. 
The anycast paradigm has a different security problem that can be equally as 
damaging. Anycast allows multiple servers to provide a service at a single address 
called the anycast address. This is accomplished by each of these anycast servers 
letting the routing protocol know that it is listening to the anycast address. Then 
when a host wishes to contact a server providing that particular service, it simply 
sends a request to the anycast address. The routing system knows which servers 
said that they are providing that service so it chooses one of those servers and 
forwards the request to it. Besides the basic IP model of anycast [155], global IP 
anycast [116] and application-layer anycast [212] have been proposed. The problem 
in each of these models is that any system can pretend it is providing a service by 
telling the routing system that it is listening to that anycast address. This problem 
has two potential outcomes: denial-of-service or masquerading. The fake server can 
simply attract requests and ignore them causing a denial-of-service attack. Or, the 
fake server can actually respond to the request with false information which can 
lead to a number of additional problems. 
Solving the problems described in the multicast model requires controlling the 
ability of hosts to join the multicast group. We call this multicast group access 
control. The need for a solution to these problems is well known. Gong and 
Shacham first stated the need [81], and the need has been restated by Ballardie and 
Crowcroft [22] Shields and Garcia-Luna-Aceves [188], and Hardjono and Cain [87]. 
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The term secure IGMP has been used to refer to the protocol that would provide 
the solution. Solving the problems described in the anycast model requires control-
ling the ability of a host to advertise itself for the anycast address. This requires 
controlling membership to the anycast server group. We call this anycast server 
group access control. The need for a solution to the anycast problems is also well 
known. Partridge, et al. [155], and Katabi and Wroclawski [116] state the need for 
a solution. Previously, the multicast and anycast problems were viewed as separate 
problems requiring separate solutions. In reality, the problems in multicast and 
anycast can be generalized the same group access control problem. 
In this work, we propose Gothic, a comprehensive architecture for providing 
group access control. The design goals are to maintain security while providing a 
scalable system that involves low computation overhead at the routers, low message 
overhead, and low support infrastructure requirements. The architecture combines 
some novel techniques with some known systems security concepts. We evaluated 
our system relative to two previously proposed systems and find that Gothic main-
tains or increases the level of security relative to previous work while increasing 
scalability. We also propose a group policy management system that allows the 
group owner to be authenticated before being allowed to specify the group access 
rights. This system can be applied to other group policy work. Finally, we propose 
and evaluated group access control aware group key management (GACA-GKM), 
which is a protocol that leverages trust built into an group access control system to 
reduce the requirements of group key management (GKM) and obtain substantial 
overhead reductions. 
For each of the multicast and anycast problems, there are a number of potential 
environments composed of different Internet Protocol (IP) versions, different routing 
protocols, different address allocation schemes, and different inter-domain require-
ments. We call the particular combination of these the implementation environment. 
The proposed architecture is relevant to many flavors of multicast and anycast on 
the Internet such as Global IP-Anycast (GIA) [116], application-layer anycast [212], 
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source-specific multicast [99], and application-layer multicast [49, 106]. This chapter 
freely uses standard terminology from the network and systems security literature 
without further definition [126]. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 gives an overview of the Gothic 
architecture and discusses the two subsystems: the group member authorization 
system and the group policy management system. Section 4.2 describes the autho-
rization system. Section 4.3 discusses the group policy management system spec-
ifying it for multicast and for anycast. Section 4.4 discusses group access control 
aware group key management and Gothic's interaction with the routing system. 
Section 4.5 presents an evaluation and simulation results of the architecture and a 
comparison with previously proposed solutions. We also provide simulation results 
comparing traditional GKM to our group access control aware GKM technique. 
Finally, section 4.6 presents conclusions and discusses possible future work. 
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4.1 Overview of Gothic 
Several functions are necessary to provide controlled access to a group including the 
following: 
1) Group policy specification functions: These involve a host requesting to spec-
ify a group policy, authenticating the host, and verifying that the host is the group 
owner. The group policy is an access control policy that specifies which hosts have 
access rights to become members among other characteristics. The group owner is 
the entity that has been assigned ownership of the multicast group and is therefore 
authorized to specify the group policy. 
2) Access request functions: These involve a host notifying the system that it 
wishes to become a member of a certain group. 
3) Access control functions: These involve receiving a host's request, authenti-
cating the host and performing authorization. Authorization requires checking the 
group policy to determine if that host has the access rights to become a member of 
the requested group. 
Gothic controls the group of hosts that can receive data destined to a specific 
multicast group address; however, Gothic does not control multicast sources. Con-
trolling which hosts can send data to a group is a separate problem. Some solutions 
have been proposed for multicast sender access control [22]. Sender access control 
is becoming less of a problem with recent multicast schemes such as source-specific 
multicast (SSM) [99] that inherently provide sender access control—though they rely 
on traits of the reverse path forwarding and the security is a side effect. 
Gothic is composed of two systems: the group policy management system and the 
group member authorization system. Figure 14 shows Gothic and its two subsystems. 
The group policy management system performs group policy specification functions. 
The group member authorization system involves access request functions and access 
control functions. Gothic also interacts with the routing system and any group key 
management system that may be in place. 
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Figure 14: Gothic Architecture 
Group Policy Management System 
The group policy management system involves a group owner providing the list of 
authorized members and possibly other security policy for the group to the access 
control server (ACS). Previous work has presented requirements for specifying group 
policy [136]. The task of a host specifying the policy to the system is understood. 
The problem that remains unanswered is how the system verifies that the host is 
the group owner. We propose two solutions for a group owner determination and 
authentication system (GODAS), described subsequently. 
Group Member Authorization System 
The group member authorization system provides the core functionality of Gothic 
by controlUng access to the group. Previous proposals for authorization systems that 
handle multicast were proposed by Ballardie and Crowcroft [22] and Hardjono and 
Cain [87]. The design goals of our authorization system are to maintain security and 
to achieve scalability. The main scalability objective is to reduce the computational 
load on network routers and the second objective is to reduce the message overhead. 
We provide evaluation results that show our system improves scalability relative to 
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network and processing overhead while maintaining or increasing the level of security 
of previous systems. 
A Gothic Scenario 
Figure 14 provides an illustrative overview of the operation of Gothic. 
First, the group owner contacts the ACS; the ACS then performs authentication 
and authorization functions; and the group owner states the group policy. Sec-
ond, hosts wishing to join the group request access and the system performs access 
control functions allowing authorized members to join. Finally, use of the group 
by sources and receivers may begin. In anycast routing, initiation means that the 
anycast address may be distributed and requests sent to it. In multicast, initia-
tion means that the source may begin transmitting data even if receivers have yet 
to join the group. We provide this scenario to show the order of operations: the 
group policy management system's operations take place before the operations of 
the group member authorization system. However, the presentation of the paper 
does not follow that order. We will first discuss the core of the architecture, the 
group member authorization system, and then explain the supporting component, 
the group policy management system. 
4.2 Group Member Authorization System 
This section describes the group member authorization system that allows autho-
rization to be performed before the host is allowed to become a member of the 
group. The first subsection presents the base protocol. The second subsection dis-
cusses the operation of the system including reauthorizations and revocations. The 
third subsection elaborates on the interesting design features of the system and how 
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Figure 15: Authorization System 
4.2.1 Authorization Protocol 
The Gothic authorization system involves a host H, a router R, and the access 
control server ACS. In reality, the ACS can be a single server or a group of dis-
tributed servers. Since the authorization protocol takes place between a host and 
a single ACS, our discussion here only involves a single access control server. We 
assume the presence of a public-key infrastructure (PKI) [102]. Hosts and the ACS 
possess public-key pairs and certificates; we do not require that the routers possess 
key pairs or certificates. Also, for environments without a public-key infrastructure, 
we describe how the system can operate without host key pairs and certificates. 
In general, the host and the access control server each have public keys, K+u and 
K+Acs respectively and the corresponding private key, K-H and K^ACS- The cer-
tificate issued by a trusted authority containing a public-key K+x is denoted by 
CERTK^^ These are used to digitally sign messages and verify those signatures. 
Digitally signed messages are shown in brackets with the key used to sign it as a 
subscript [message]K_x^ 
Figure 15 diagrams the operation of the base protocol. The protocol begins 
with the host wishing to join a group sending an authorization request to the access 
control server. The authorizationrequest (AR) contains the group ID (GID) of the 
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group the host wishes to join, the host's public key certificate, and is signed with the 
host's private key. Where key pairs are not available, an alternative authentication 
method can be used such as a password. Also, the AR can be coupled with the 
receiver obtaining the group key from the group key management system. In this 
case, the host is authenticated and authorized once and receives the group key as 
well as the capability. 
1. H -> ACS: 
AR=[GID,CERTK^,]K_^ 
The ACS authenticates the host and checks the group policy to determine if 
the host has access rights to join the requested group. The ACS returns an autho-
rization acknowledgment (AA) specifying a successful or unsuccessful authorization. 
If successful, the AA is a capability that includes the host's IP address IPH, the 
host's distinguished name DNH, the multicast group address, the expire time, the 
public-key certificate of the ACS, and the digital signature of the ACS. The use of 
timestamps to indicate the expire time of the capability requires clocks that are at 
least loosely synchronized. 
2. ACS -> H: 
AA = CAP = 
[IPH. DNH.GID, T,,,]K_,CS^CERTK + ACS 
The receiver's IP address serves as an identifier and provides propagation control. 
The receiver sends a join request (JR) containing the capability(CAP) to the router. 
This join request is formed by including the capability in the IGMP Membership 
Report message [33] or the MLD Multicast Listener Report message [82, 201]. 
3. H -> R: 
JR = CAP 
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The router checks the validity of the capability. This includes verifying the 
ACS's signature, checking the expiration time, and verifying that this capability 
came from the receiver it was assigned to. This can be done by authenticating the 
host and checking the authenticated identity against the identity in the capability. 
Or, the router can simply lookup the IP address in its routing table to confirm that 
the request arrived from the interface leading to that address. This eliminates the 
need to authenticate the host. Section 4.4 discusses how Gothic can be extended to 
integrate with the security of the routing system to provide controlled propagation. 
After verifications, the router sends the host a join acknowledgment (JA) stating a 
successful or unsuccessful join. 
4 . R ^ H: 
J A = Status 
To allow for groups with no access control, if a router receives a join request 
that does not include a capability, then the router queries the ACS to verify that 
the requested group is unrestricted. 
4.2.2 Reauthorizations and Revocations in the Protocol 
This section discusses the reauthorizations and revocations that are part of the 
operation of the system. We explain how we achieve efficient revocations while 
maintaining the desired level of security. We also describe a method for multicast 
groups to achieve greater efficiency by leveraging the GKM system. 
Our base protocol uses time-limited capabilities to provide revocation. Requir-
ing members to refresh their membership state coincides well with the soft-state 
of the IGMP group membership reports and of the routing protocols. However, 
refreshing authorization state is a heavyweight operation compared to a routing or 
IGMP update. Therefore, for efficiency one might consider extending the lifetime 
of the capabilities. This reduces the load by reducing the frequency and number 
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of reauthorizations. However, this weakens the security by increasing the revoca-
tion window. That is, if a member is ejected from the group, there will be some 
vulnerable time where the ex-member still has access because the capability has 
not expired and he has not been required to reauthorize. Therefore there exists a 
tradeoff between reauthorization overhead and security. By changing the capability 
lifetime, the system can be tuned to the desired tradeoff point. 
The ideal system would allow a small revocation window and low reauthorization 
overhead. We propose a method of obtaining this for multicast groups. Our goal 
is to provide a more lightweight reauthorization phase: instead of reauthorizing 
with the ACS to obtain a capability, the host uses the group (decryption) key as 
the authenticator. Since only authorized group members possess the group key, 
knowledge of it successfully authorizes a host as a member of the group. This 
requires the router to possess the group key. In many cases, this is straightforward 
because the router is part of the key distribution path and simply must store the 
key as well as forwarding it. Since the GKM maintains current authorization state, 
the authorization system piggyback on that functionality by using the group key 
as the authenticator. The authorization system can use the group key not only for 
reauthorizations, but for the initial authorization as well. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
This section discusses some of the interesting design features of Gothic's authoriza-
tion system and mentions related designs in other security systems. 
The authorization system is designed to gain efficiency by integrating security 
functions with the current network system that is in place rather than adding bulky 
components. Among the interesting design features of Gothic's authorization system 
are: 
• There is no need for propagation control components in the system because the 
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design inherently provides propagation control by using identity-based capabil-
ities. Gong [80] describes an identity-based capability system. Neumann [150] 
describes a similar concept called the delegated proxy. 
• There is no need for additional components to provide revocation, because 
we use time limited capabilities to provide implicit revocation ^ Explicit 
revocation is heavyweight and is usually provided by the use of certificate 
revocation lists (CRLs) or by supplementing capabilities with access control 
lists (ACLs) that are checked upon access. The normal problem with implicit 
revocation is that large time limits weaken the security and small time limits 
require an increased number of heavyweight reauthorizations. 
• We propose leveraging the GKM system to reduce the overhead of reautho-
rizations; thus allowing the strong security of short lived capabilities without 
the overhead normally involved. 
• The design is simplified by not including complex properties of access control 
models such as lattice security and the *-property [126, 115] that are unnec-
essary for multicast and anycast groups. 
4.3 Group Policy Management System 
This section describes the group policy management system. This system involves 
a group owner providing the list of authorized members and possibly other security 
policy for the group to the ACS. McDaniel, et al. [136] proposed related work 
that presented requirements for specifying group policy for the key management 
and data handling building blocks of the Internet Research Task Force's secure 
multicast framework [88]. The task of a host specifying the policy to the system is 
understood. The problem that remains unanswered is how the system verifies that 
'There has been previous work in efficient revocation schemes including re-acquisitions in 
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Figure 16: Group Owner Determination and Authentication System 
the host is the group owner. We propose two solutions that provide group owner 
determination and authentication. The first subsection describes the two solutions. 
The second and third subsections discuss the use of the group owner determination 
and authentication system in multicast and anycast environments. 
4.3.1 Group Owner Determination and Authentication Sys-
tems 
The group owner is the host that has been allocated control of or use of a particular 
group address. The purpose of the group owner determination and authentication 
system is to allow the ACS to determine if the host that attempts to provide the 
group policy is the group owner. We discuss two different systems that provide this 
functionality. 
The first solution is the use of group-owner certificates as shown in Figure 16(a). 
These are similar to traditional digital certificates in that the certificate verifies the 
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identity of the entity that possesses the corresponding private key. With group-
owner certificates, the identity in the certificate is the group address .̂ The group-
owner certificate can be issued by a local Certificate Authority (CA) that is asso-
ciated with the entity that allocates group addresses in each domain .̂ We specify 
the association between the certificate authority and the address allocator for differ-
ent environments in the next two subsections. The group owner presents the group 
owner certificate to the ACS along with the request to specify the group policy. This 
allows the ACS to verify that the host is indeed the group owner. 
The second solution is the deployment of a group-ownership service as shown in 
Figure 16(b). Rather than the host providing proof-of-ownership to the ACS, the 
ACS queries the address allocator. It accepts queries specifying a particular group 
address and responds with the identity of the host that owns the group. The group 
ownership service is deployed on a system that is associated with the entity that 
allocates group addresses in each domain. It is deployed at a common address and 
port number to allow it to be located. Upon receiving a request from a host to specify 
the group policy, the ACS authenticates the host then queries the group ownership 
service and verifies that the reply matches the identity of the requesting host. We 
specify how the group ownership service can be deployed in certain multicast and 
anycast environments in the next two subsections. 
4.3.2 Group Owner Determination and Authentication in 
Multicast environments 
In this section, we discuss how group owner determination and authentication can 
take place for the different multicast address allocation schemes. 
• Multicast Address Allocation Architecture (MAAA): MAAA [196] specifies 
^For example, this can be accomplished with X.509 v3 certificates by specifying the group 
address in the Subject Alternative Name Extension. [102] 
"̂ To ease PKI requirements, the local certificate authority can possess a certificate issued by a 
globally trusted certificate authority. 
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inter-domain and intra-domain address allocation methods . A well-known in-
stance of this architecture includes MASC [167], AAP [83], and MADCAP [86]. 
Thus the owner of a multicast group is the host that is allocated that address 
by MADCAP. The group ownership service can be added to the MADCAP 
protocol. Or the MADCAP protocol can provide group owner certificates to 
the host that is allocated the address. 
• Source-Specific Multicast (SSM): In SSM [99] , a multicast group is specified 
by a tuple (5, G) where S is the IP address of the source and G is a SSM 
destination address from the assigned 232/8 range. This provides a straight-
forward mapping between the group owner and the group address since a host 
S owns all multicast groups (S', *). When a host wishes to specify the policy 
for any group ( 5 , 0 ) , the access control server simply authenticates the host 
to verify that it is indeed host S. 
• GLOP: GLOP [139, 138] provides a method for statically assigning multicast 
group addresses to Autonomous Systems (AS). The identity of the autonomous 
system is encoded into the group address. Within each AS, different alloca-
tion schemes can be used such as static allocation, MADCAP, or SAP. If the 
internal allocation scheme is also static allocation, then the AS can provide a 
group ownership service or provide a group owner certificate authority. 
• Session Announcement Protocol (SAP)/ Session Description Protocol (SDP): 
SAP [85] and SDP [84] provide mechanisms to describe a session and to an-
nounce that session. The group owner is the host that advertises a session 
at a particular group address. A malicious user can disobey the protocol and 
advertise sessions that are not his, thereby making itself the group owner and 
obtaining the ability to specify access control policy. Therefore, for the high-
est level of security, one of the previously described address allocation schemes 
should be used. 
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4.3.3 Group Owner Determination and Authentication in 
Anycast environments 
In this section, we discuss how group owner determination and authentication can 
take place with the different anycast schemes. 
• IP Anycast: IP anycast includes both IPv4 and IPv6 environments. IPv4 
anycast uses a separate class of addresses for anycast addresses [155]. For 
IPv4, group owner certificates can distributed to the host that is assigned the 
address. IPv6 anycast addresses are indistinguishable from unicast addresses 
and consist of a set of reserved addresses within each subnet prefix [94, 107]. 
For IPv6, group owner certificates can be used or a group ownership service 
can be used since the address is related to the unicast address and the domain. 
• Global IP Anycast (GIA): In GIA [116], anycast addresses consist of an any-
cast indicator, the home domains unicast prefix, and a group ID. Domains are 
allocated anycast addresses according to their allocated unicast address space. 
Thus, the domain owns its set of anycast addresses and may give control to 
some host. Each domain can provide a group ownership service or use group 
owner certificates. 
• Application-Layer Anycast: In Zegura's et al. application-layer anycast scheme [212], 
anycast services are referred to by anycast domain names (ADNs) that con-
tain the domain of the authoritative resolver for the ADN. A group ownership 
service can be deployed at the authoritative resolver. Or, group owner certifi-
cates can be used and the authoritative resolver can be the local certificate 
authority. 
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4.4 Group Access Control Aware GKM 
There has been a significant amount of work in group key management (GKM); 
see for example [38, 35, 209, 142]. Most of this work has been in creating efficient 
algorithms and systems for GKM for dynamic groups. These GKM solutions were 
designed around the assumption of an open Internet multicast group where all hosts 
have access to the multicast tree. This is due to the fact that IGMP allows any host 
to join a multicast group and receive the data being sent to that group. 
With multicast receiver access control deployed, this assumption no longer holds. 
Multicast receiver access control provides a means to restrict access to the multicast 
tree to authorized users. There have been proposals for systems providing multicast 
receiver access control in the research community as well as in the IETF. Since group 
access control changes the assumptions of GKM designers, the requirements and 
approach of GKM should be reconsidered. The goal of group key encryption is to 
prevent unauthorized receivers from obtaining the content. Group key management 
focuses on the dynamic group problem. That is, when a member joins or leaves, the 
group key must be changed so the new member cannot decrypt past content or so 
the former member can not decrypt future content. 
In traditional GKM, the key is changed upon a join because it is assumed that 
the new member could easily used IGMP to receive the encrypted content from 
before it was a member. Thus, giving the new member the old group key will allow 
it to decrypt the content from before it was a member. Now, with group access 
control in place, the host can use IGMP to receive the encrypted content before it 
is a member. If the host does not have the earlier content, then there is no need to 
rekey the group. There are similar implications for a member leave. In traditional 
key management, the key is changed upon a leave because it is assumed that the 
leaving member can use IGMP to easily continue to receive the encrypted content 
and not changing the key will allow it to decrypt it. With group access control 
in place, the leaving member can not use IGMP to access the distribution tree to 
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obtain the encrypted content. If the host can not continue to receive the content, 
then there is no need to rekey the group. 
With these new assumptions, we propose a new GKM technique that leverages 
the existence of multicast receiver access control. We show that even with the 
existence of GACA, the need to rekey is not abolished. There are certain issues that 
must be considered such as the lack of access control beyond the subnet or shared 
link level. Also, we discuss the risk associated with eavesdroppers. We will show 
that the system is robust against local eavesdropping attacks, but not against some 
more involved eavesdropping-based attacks. 
A GACA-GKM system requires the group key controller to have knowledge of 
the multicast topology and the placement of members in the tree. This information 
is not available in readily available in existing GKM systems. We will explore three 
methods of providing this functionality. The methods are: 
• Traceroute-type Approach 
• Topology Inference-based Approach 
• Enhanced IGMP-based Approach 
4.4.1 GACA-GKM Technique 
In the first subsection, we provide some definitions by explaining how Gothic in-
tegrates with the multicast routing system. The second subsection discusses the 
GACA-GKM technique. 
4.4.1.1 Group Access Control and the Routing System 
For multicast group access control, after the router accepts the host, the router must 
forward the join request according to the multicast routing protocol. The routing 
protocol may require reauthorizations or provide its own message authentication 
methods. There have been a number of studies that propose secure multicast routing 
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Figure 17: Gothic Trusted Routers form Trusted Subtrees 
protocols [188, 205, 144]. Some routing protocols do not assume trust of the entire 
routing system but only of some subset that are considered trusted routers. In the 
context of Gothic, a trusted router is defined as a router that correctly authorizes 
all join requests according to the protocol. An untrusted router is a router that 
may accept unauthorized join requests or forward fabricated or unauthorized join 
requests. 
When a host sends a join request to its upstream router, the router forwards the 
request containing the capability according to the routing protocol. Any trusted 
router on the path will perform access control by verifying the capability. Thus, 
an untrusted router may accept and forward requests from unauthorized hosts but 
trusted routers on the path will provide access control. The scope of trust extends 
from the source to the multicast tree and is bordered by trusted routers. A trusted 
subtree is a subtree of the multicast tree rooted at a trusted router. A trusted 
subtree can exist within another trusted subtree. A host is a member of the trusted 
subtree of its first upstream trusted router. Figure 17 shows how trusted subtrees 
are formed. 
4.4.1.2 Detai ls of the Rekey Condit ions 
With the introduction of group access control, the goals and requirements of group 
key management must be reconsidered. The goal of group key encryption is to 
prevent unauthorized receivers from obtaining the content. Group key management 
(GKM) focuses on the dynamic group problem. That is, when a member joins or 
leaves, the group key must be changed so the new member cannot decrypt past 
content or so the former member cannot decrypt future content. There has been 
a significant amount of work in group key management; see for example [38, 35, 
209, 142]. These GKM solutions were designed around the assumption of an open 
Internet multicast group where all hosts had access to the multicast tree. With group 
access control in place, this assumption no longer holds. We propose a GACA-GKM 
technique that leverages the inclusion of a group access control system. 
We show how we are able to relax the requirements of GKM. In traditional 
GKM, the key is changed upon a join because it is assumed that the new member 
could have received the encrypted content from before it was a member. Thus, 
giving the new member the old group key will allow it to decrypt the content from 
before it was a member. Now, with group access control in place, the host can not 
receive the encrypted content before it is a member. If the host does not have the 
earlier content, there is no need to rekey the group. There are similar implications 
for a member leave. In traditional key management, the key is changed upon a 
leave because it is assumed that the leaving member can continue to receive the 
encrypted content and not changing the key will allow it to decrypt it. With group 
access control in place, the leaving member will not be able to access the distribution 
tree to obtain the encrypted content. So, there is no need to rekey the group. 
This simple example shows the significant impact of introducing group access 
control. However, we are not able to achieve such gains for every member join and 
leave. For example, if a new member, host A, is on a shared link with current group 
member, host B, then we must rekey when host A joins since she had access to the 
distribution tree before she became a member. Similarly, if leaving member, host 
C, is on a shared link with current member host D, then we must rekey when host 
C leaves because she will have access to the distribution tree after she is no longer 
a member. In reality, these cases include not only if the two users are on a shared 
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link but also if they are in the same trusted subtree. The GACA-GKM technique 
is stated as follows: 
KTSG is the set of known trusted subtrees for a multicast session G. 
TSfi is the trusted subtree of host h. 
riTSh is the current number of members in trusted subtree TSh-
For a join: // {TSh in KTSG) 
If [uTs > 0) 
rekey 
Else If {LastRekeyTime < LastMemberLeaveTime ) 
rekey 
For a leave: / / {riTSh ̂  ^) 
rekey 
1. If a host h joins multicast session G from a trusted subtree that has 
previously been part of the multicast tree for session G, then if the 
trusted subtree currently has session members or if the group has 
not been rekeyed since the last session member from this trusted 
subtree left the group, then rekey. 
2. If a host h leaves multicast session G from a trusted subtree that 
will remain part of the multicast tree for session G, then rekey must 
occur, 
3. Otherwise, there is no need to rekey. 
91 
4.4.2 GACA-GKM System: Providing Topology Informa-
tion 
A GACA-GKM implementation would require the group key controller to know 
certain information such as the trusted subtree of each host, the trusted subtree 
hierarchy, and if the number of members of a trusted subtree is 0, 1, or greater. We 
propose three ways to obtain this information. 
4.4.2.1 Traceroute-type Approach 
The mtrace tool [71] allows multicast receivers to learn the route to a multicast 
source. It is an extension of the traceroute tool for unicast routes. Tracetree [183] 
allows a multicast source to receive mtrace data for each of its group members. The 
tracer protocol proposed by Levine, et al. [127] organizes receivers into a logical trees 
using mtrace packets. These techniques provide more information than is needed for 
GACA-GKM. We can reduce this topology information to just the trusted subtree 
hierarchy. Also, for each leaf trusted subtree, the system does not need the exact 
count of child receivers. It only needs to know if the count is 0, 1, or greater. 
4.4.2.2 Topology Inference-based Approach 
Topology inference techniques such as those proposed by Ratnasamy, et al. [171] 
and Duffield, et al. [62] observe network characteristics and make inferences about 
the multicast topology. This technique are not as accurate as traceroute-type ap-
proaches. In general, these techniques are used when the receivers cannot be explic-
itly polled to determine the topology. 
4.4.2.3 Enhanced IGMP-based Approach 
IGMP [33] does not send topology or membership information to the source. It 
only sends an indication there is some number of interested receivers downstream. 
EXPRESS multicast included a proposal for an enhanced IGMP that provides group 
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membership counts [100]. This approach provides only the count. GACA-GKM also 
needs the trusted subtree information. We propose changes in the IGMP protocol 
that allows the hierarchy information to be passed up the tree up to the source. 
4.5 Evaluation 
We now present separate evaluations of Gothic and of GACA-GKM. The first sub-
section examines the efficiency of Gothic in terms of message overhead and compu-
tational overhead. The second subsection presents evaluation results showing that 
GACA-GKM reduces message overhead by 50 
4.5.1 Gothic Evaluation 
We evaluate Gothic in the multicast environment because the number of users is 
larger than the number of anycast servers so this provides the best evaluation of 
the scalability of the architecture with regards to group size. This also allows the 
performance to be compared to Hardjono and Cain's and Ballardie and Crowcroft's 
secure IGMP schemes reviewed in the related work section. To simulate the perfor-
mance of these schemes, we use data collected by the Mlisten [14] tool over several 
days for the Mbone multicast of the Space Shuttle Mission STS-80 in November 
1996. The session has a duration of 13 days and over 1600 join requests. Figure 20 
shows the group membership over the length of the session. 
Figure 18(a) shows the total network overhead at all last-hop routers involved 
in the system. The amount of data transmitted by Gothic and Hardjono and Cain's 
scheme is 1.2 KB compared to 138.1 KB by Ballardie and Crowcroft's scheme; 
therefore, they are not clearly visible in the figure. Figure 18(b) shows the total 
network overhead at all group members. Figure 19(a) shows the cumulative network 
overhead at the ACS. Figure 19(b) shows the overall network overhead. These 
figures show that Gothic involves less than half of the total network overhead of the 
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Operation Performance 
3DES encryption 4.75 MB/sec 
MD5 message digest 100.74 MB/sec 
HMAC/MD5 message digest 99.86 MB/sec 
RSA 1024 signature 10.29 sec 
RSA 1024 verification 0.30 sec 
Table 2: Cryptographic computation processing time 
other two schemes. The related work section above explains how such performance 
improvements were achieved. 
To analyze the computational overhead, we determine the number of computa-
tional operations invoked by each of the schemes. We evaluate these operations at 
the router and access control server. We then translate the number of operations 
to the actual computation load by evaluating the processing time involved with 
these operations. The computation operations include host authentications, digital 
signatures creation and verifications, authorization lookups, and encryptions. The 
processing times for the computation operations are based on benchmarks published 
for the publicly available Crypto++ library [53]. The simulation used 128-bit Triple 
DES encryption, MD5 message digest, RSA 1024-bit digital signatures, and IPSec 
AH with HMAC-MD5 authentication. The performance of each of those operations 
is shown in Table 11. Figure 21 shows the computational overhead of the three 
schemes at the router in terms of processing time. The computational overhead of 
Gothic is an order of magnitude less than that of the other schemes. This shows 
that the Gothic authorization system achieved its goal of reducing the computational 
overhead at the router. Again, the related work section discusses the operations of 
these two schemes relative to Gothic and explains how such performance improve-
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Figure 20: Group membership 
4.5.2 GACA-GKM Evaluation 
We next provide simulation results to show the efficiency gains of GACA-GKM over 
traditional approaches. In addition to the NASA session trace described above we 
also use a trace from a simulated multicast group. This allows us to simulate the 
performance for a range of trusted subtree sizes. The simulated multicast group 
model has the following parameters: 
1. The pool of potential receivers has 65, 536 receivers. Each receiver joins and 
leaves the group independently. 
2. The length of an individual active phase is an exponential distribution with 
an average of r. The length of an individual inactive phase is an exponential 
distribution with an average of lOr. The ratio of active to inactive duration 
is 1 : 10, so the average group size is approximately 5, 958 receivers during 
steady state. 
3. The length of the group session is lOOr. 
We evaluate the GKM message overhead at the group key controller. We use a log-
ical key hierarchy (LKH) [209, 204] as the underlying rekeying algorithm. Thus, we 
compare traditional LKH to GACA-LKH, LKH using the GACA-GKM technique. 
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Figure 21: Computational overhead at last hop routers 
widespread. This is the case when each router is trusted so each trusted subtree 
includes one host. The other extreme is if the group access control system is not 
present. In this case, the scope of trust only includes the source. Thus, the only 
trusted subtree is the one rooted at the source and it includes all n group members. 
This is equivalent to traditional GKM. We evaluate the scheme in a range of envi-
ronments based on the average trusted subtree size which is denoted by t. Figure 
22 shows the GACA-LKH (t = 1) performance in terms of GKM message overhead 
at the group key controller as compared to traditional LKH {t = 65,536). Figure 
22(a) shows the results for the actual mlisten trace data. GKM traffic overhead 
is reduced from 171 KB with traditonal GKM to 19 KB with GACA-GKM. The 
simulated trace results in Figure 22(b) show how the size of the trusted subtrees 
affects the overhead. The graph shows GACA-LKH denoted as t = 1 as compared 
to traditional LKH denoted as t = 65, 536 and a range of environments in between 
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Figure 22: Group key management traffic overhead 
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267 MB. By introducing some trusted routers such that t = 16, the overhead is 
reduced to 233 MB. In systems in which all routers are trusted, the overhead is 
reduced to 128 MB. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The need for a solution for secure multicast group joins and secure anycast server ad-
vertisements is well-known. We have generalized these problems into a single group 
access control problem and proposed a secure and scalable solution, Gothic. We pre-
sented a novel authorization system that improves the scalability and security over 
previous solutions. We also presented solutions for group owner determination and 
authentication. We have introduced GACA-GKM and evaluated the performance 
improvements. We have presented Gothic in the context of many flavors of multicast 
and anycast including Global IP-Anycast, application-layer anycast, Source-Specific 
Multicast, and Application-Layer Multicast. 
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Chapter 5 
Rights Management in Peer-to-Peer 
Systems 
Peer-to-peer file sharing systems allow content to be shared between distributed 
end-systems. Files stored at peers are transferred directly between peers rather than 
storage at or transmission through a central server. The last few years have seen 
the popularity of such systems grow tremendously. One such system, Napster [148] 
was the fastest growing application on the Internet, boasting a total of 50 million 
users downloading its software. Users are drawn to peer-to-peer systems to locate 
and retrieve a wide variety of content. 
There are two main varieties of peer-to-peer systems. Centralized systems such 
as Napster provide indexing and searching functions at a centrally managed location 
or a set of replicated locations; while decentralized systems such as Gnutella [78] and 
Freenet [74] depend on the peers themselves to manage content indexing and search 
functions in a distributed manner. In both types of systems, content is exchanged 
directly between peers. 
The large number of users freely exchanging content has increased the interest 
of content creators and owners in the protection of content that can be shared on 
these systems. They, along with legal authorities are attempting to force peer-to-
peer system operators and users to control the exchange of content on their systems. 
In this context we use the term content protection to refer to the ability to control 
or restrict the exchange of content within a peer-to-peer file sharing environment. 
We emphasize here the central importance that effective content protection will 
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play in the future success of many peer-to-peer systems. Napster faced many le-
gal/court imposed obstacles to its operation because of its lack of 
content protection, and will re-emerge only after implementing stringent content 
protection functions [51]. Other existing decentralized peer-to-peer systems such 
as Gnutella [78], Freenet [74], KaZaA[118] and Morpheus[146], continue to operate 
without content protection, but some are constantly under legal pressure to imple-
ment content protection [28]. We believe that it is a matter of time before many 
peer-to-peer file sharing systems will have a need for content protection features. 
While on one hand content providers are actively trying to stop these peer-to-peer 
systems from allowing uncontrolled content distribution, at the same time, con-
tent providers are actively seeking content protection technology that will allow 
them to effectively leverage the popularity of peer-to-peer distribution. The content 
providers interest and exploration shows in many forms including working groups 
and requests for proposals [2, 1], creating new companies [163, 147], or acquiring 
technology companies [6]. 
Some people are opposed to content protection systems because they feel that 
such systems unfairly restrict the users ability to access content. We aim to pro-
vide a system that provides the level of protection needed by content owners while 
maintaining the flexibility that end-users desire. This is ultimately beneficial to 
end-users because content owners will not make content available in the forms that 
users want until adequate protection measures are in place. By providing a system 
that meets the needs of both parties, this will ideally increase access to a greater 
variety of content and flexible business models that users are accustomed to from 
other distribution models. 
Some content protection systems have been implemented or proposed for cen-
tralized peer-to-peer systems [122]. Such systems rely on the central authority that 
maintains the indexing and location functions to provide content protection and, 
therefore, cannot be applied to decentralized peer-to-peer systems. In this paper 
we present CITADEL, a novel content protection system designed specifically for 
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use within a decentralized peer-to-peer system \ CITADEL builds a protected file 
sharing environment over a normal peer-to-peer network using secured content ob-
jects and file sharing software enhanced to perform protection operations. A flexible 
content importation system that is part of CITADEL allows all users to insert new 
content as well as additional copies of protected content. Our work also includes an 
implementation that shows that CITADEL is a practical and lightweight approach 
to creating a protected peer-to-peer file sharing environment. 
This chapter is organized as follows. We begin by discussing the benefits of 
content protection in Section 5.1. We then motivate the approach of an overlay 
security layer in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 provides some background discussion on 
peer-to-peer environments and explains the design issues in a content protection 
architecture for peer-to-peer file sharing systems. Section 5.5 presents an overview 
of the CITADEL architecture. Section 5.8 presents the detailed operations of the 
CITADEL components. We conclude in Section 5.9. 
5.1 The Benefits of Content Protection 
Some people are opposed to content protection systems because they feel that such 
systems unfairly restrict the users' ability to access content. There are many in-
teresting legal and policy questions concerning file sharing and "fair use". We do 
not attempt to answer those questions or provide a technical solution to those ques-
tions. Instead, we argue that in many environments the ability to provide content 
protection will provide benefits to many different parties. Therefore, content protec-
tion systems should be developed so that they are available for environments that 
can benefit from them. The idea of providing protection in a content distribution 
system is not new. Most content distribution systems are built upon the ability 
to provide access control including cable television, video-on-demand, information 
^The system can also be viewed as an alternative to current proposals for content protection in 
a centralized system. We focus, in this paper, on its use in decentralized systems. 
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websites, and even print mediums. 
It is often portrayed that the primary goal of content protection is to control 
or stop file-sharing systems such as Gnutella and Freenet. We suggest that this is 
not the single goal of content protection work and that these systems alone cannot 
obtain this goal. For those interested in achieving this goal, there are two possible 
ways that protection systems can help: 
1. Protection systems for peer-to-peer systems alone cannot stop users from cre-
ating new file-sharing networks and freely exchanging content. One view is 
that along with other protection mechanisms such as secure audio compact 
discs, operating systems and hardware, peer-to-peer protection may help pro-
vide an overall, security-in-depth solution. 
2. More importantly and more realistically, protection systems will allow the cre-
ation of legitimate file-sharing systems. Most users are willing to pay for 
access to content and the conveniences that accompany such a service [65]. 
They only use existing file sharing systems because there are no legitimate 
alternatives. So even if rogue networks do exist, they will represent a minority 
of the users and such practices have become accepted by content providers 
in other distribution mediums [157]. Content providers aim to "keep honest 
people honest" [27] and peer-to-peer content protection provides a solution to 
achieve that goal. 
The introduction of content protection systems for peer-to-peer networks will 
allow content providers to safely take advantage of the numerous benefits of the 
peer-to-peer distribution paradigm. This will lead to the availability of more con-
tent, richer content, new applications, and traditional content distribution business 
models in peer-to-peer systems. Thus, content protection will benefit peer-to-peer 
network operators, content providers, and end-users. We argue that the currently 
popular file-sharing networks are only the tip of the iceberg in peer-to-peer content 
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distribution systems and that future systems will build upon the foundation pro-
vided by content protection to allow rich, flexible, on-demand content location and 
access functionality. 
Content protection can provide benefits for the different parties involved: 
• Network Operators: Eff"ective content protection will play a central importance 
in the future success of many peer-to-peer file-sharing systems. Systems such 
as Morpheus and Napster were shut down after legal pressures due to their 
lack of content protection. Other existing systems continue to operate without 
content protection, but some are constantly under legal pressure to implement 
content protection [28]. It may be only a matter of time before operators 
of many peer-to-peer file sharing systems are obligated to provide content 
protection features. 
• Content Providers: There are a number of parties ranging from individual 
musicians and producers to large content providers that desire to utilize peer-
to-peer distribution, but require the ability to protect their content. Content 
providers are actively trying to stop peer-to-peer systems from allowing un-
controlled content distribution. At the same time, however, content providers 
are actively seeking content protection technology that will allow them to 
eff"ectively leverage the benefits and popularity of peer-to-peer distribution. 
The content providers' interest is evident in their participation in working 
groups [2], requests for proposals [1], creation of new companies [163, 147], 
and acquisition of technology companies [6]. 
• End-users: We argue that the lack of content protection is currently hindering 
the introduction of richer content distribution systems. Content protection 
is ultimately beneficial to end-users because content owners will not make 
content available in the variety, quality, and formats that users want until 
adequate protection measures are in place. Content protection will enable 
providers to off"er flexible business models that users are accustomed to from 
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other types of distribution systems. These systems will possibly offer more 
reliability and convenience than systems not supported by providers. Protec-
tion systems should aim to provide the level of protection needed by content 
owners while maintaining the flexibility that end-users desire. 
5.2 The Case for an Overlay Security Layer 
In this section, we describe current peer-to-peer environments, discuss the problems 
with previous approaches to content protection for peer-to-peer systems and describe 
how an overlay security layer-based approach overcomes these problems. 
5.2.1 Our Approach 
We argue that previous peer-to-peer content protection systems are inadequate and 
we propose a new approach based on the use of an Overlay Security Layer (OSL) 
that is a secondary overlay layer that is built on top of the existing peer-to-peer 
network and below the application. Due to this layering, the OSL is able to provide 
content protection by securing the content and controlling all user access to content. 
Previous attempts at content protection for peer-to-peer systems have included pro-
prietary systems designed for centralized peer-to-peer systems. These systems are 
not portable across different peer-to-peer systems; thus, each peer-to-peer applica-
tion developer must create a custom content protection solution. Furthermore, these 
systems cannot be utilized for decentralized peer-to-peer systems such as Gnutella, 
Morpheus, and KaZaa. Also, these systems only provide the ability to enforce sim-
ple all-or-none access policies; therefore they provide limited protection and do not 
provide the flexibility to support traditional business models. 
We propose the use of an OSL to provide solutions to these issues and de-
scribe CITADEL [108] as an example of an architecture based on this approach. 
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C I T A D E L ' S O S L builds a protected file-sharing environment over a normal peer-
to-peer network by being a secondary overlay situated on top of the existing peer-
to-peer overlay infrastructure. We explain four benefits of the OSL: portability 
including use in decentralized peer-to-peer systems, reusability, increased security, 
and support of new applications and business models. 
5.2.2 Environment Description 
Peer-to-peer file sharing systems consist of two components, the file location process 
and the file retrieval process. In most peer-to-peer systems, the file retrieval process 
is decentralized. That is, files are transferred directly between peers rather than 
through a client-server model. However, peer-to-peer systems differ in the file loca-
tion process. As previously defined, there are centralized and decentralized systems. 
Among the decentralized systems, there are naive broadcast query systems such as 
Gnutella [78] and distributed hash table (DHT)-based systems such as CAN, Chord, 
Pastry and Tapestry [170, 194, 179, 214]. 
Peer-to-peer networks are formed as a logical connection of endhosts over the 
physical network. Thus, peer-to-peer systems currently add one layer over the nor-
mal network. We refer to this as the distribution layer and it includes content 
location, routing, and retrieval mechanisms. We propose a protection layer that 
provides security services independently of the specifics of the distribution layer. 
We show that the functionality provided by the protection layer enables greater ap-
plication functionality and consequently further defining the application layer for 
peer-to-peer systems. 
5.2.3 Problems with previous approaches 
One of the most well-known attempts at a content protection system for peer-to-peer 
was implemented by Napster [148]. Napster's centralized design requires information 
about shared files to be sent to the central server where they are indexed. All 
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queries are sent to the central server which replies with the location of the file. 
This design provides two points to restrict the ability to distribute certain content: 
upon indexing and upon querying. To restrict content upon indexing, when a user 
attempts to share a file that is not approved, the central server does not index the 
file. To restrict content upon querying, when a user searches for an unapproved file, 
the central server does not return a valid response. 
One issue is that Napster's content protection system relies on the central server 
to store and enforce the access control policy. Therefore, this approach cannot be 
applied to decentralized peer-to-peer systems because there is no central server that 
can be used. The most widely used peer-to-peer systems today are decentralized 
and therefore lack any means of providing content protection. 
A second problem that peer-to-peer distribution has faced is the lack of service 
models and business models from traditional content distribution methods. Systems 
have been unable to offer these models because of the absence of the protection 
functionality required to support them. Previous content protection systems can 
only enforce simple all-or-none access control policies which is not enough to support 
popular business models that require a more granular and flexible access control 
policy. 
A third issue is that these content protection systems are not portable across 
different peer-to-peer systems; thus, each peer-to-peer application developer must 
create a custom content protection solution. One reason these systems lack porta-
bility is that they are situated in the middle of the file location process. As we 
have shown earlier, the file location process varies across different types of systems. 
However, the file retrieval process maintains common features across all peer-to-
peer systems. So, in order to achieve greater portability content protection systems 
should be implemented as part of the file retrieval process rather than the file loca-
tion process. 
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5.2.4 Overcoming those problems 
We propose the CITADEL architecture that provides solutions to these issues. 
CITADEL is based on an overlay security layer that builds a protected file-sharing 
environment over a normal peer-to-peer network. This protection layer is a sec-
ondary overlay that is layered on top of the existing peer-to-peer overlay infras-
tructure. There are at least four advantages to using an OSL to provide content 
protection in peer-to-peer systems: 
L Decentralized approach: A primary goal of the OSL is to provide a content 
protection system that can be used in decentralized peer-to-peer systems. This 
is achieved by pushing the required functionality from the central server to the 
peers. The OSL allows decentralized storage of the access control policy by 
storing the policy at the peers along with the content and allows decentralized 
enforcement of the policy by providing the protection mechanisms at the peers. 
2. Reusability: The OSL provides an architecture that can easily be integrated 
into different peer-to-peer systems and applications. The protection function-
ality provided by the OSL is built into applications as an underlying library or 
API making it transparent and easy to incorporate. Thus, peer-to-peer appli-
cation developers can include protection functionality with minimal effort and 
without significant application changes. This also allows applications to con-
tinue to take advantage of specialized functionality such as lookup and routing 
functionality without interference from content protection mechanisms. 
3. Enhanced Security: The overlay security layer is able to create a protected file-
sharing environment. Thus, only protected objects can be exchanged within 
this peer-to-peer system. Additionally, all content objects in the system are 
protected and all access to these objects is controlled. In the past, the goal of 
content protection in peer-to-peer systems has been to restrict certain content 
from being exchanged within the system. Thus, these systems only provided 
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all-or-none access; if content was allowed in the system, then anyone in the 
system could access it. Due to the efficiency provided by the OSL, the pro-
tection goals can be expanded to be able to control access to content on a 
per user basis. Due to the placement of the content protection mechanisms 
between the application and the distribution mechanisms, the system is able 
to provide protected distribution by controlling the user's ability to retrieve 
the content and provide protected storage by controlling the user's ability to 
access the plaintext content within a local copy of the content. 
4. Enables new applications and support business models: While content control 
has been criticized in some circles as spelling the end of true peer-to-peer 
file sharing, we suggest that it may actually be beneficial in that it has the 
potential to enable many different and desirable service models. As we have 
mentioned, there are a number of common content distribution business mod-
els that peer-to-peer systems have been unable to support because they lack 
enhanced protection functionality. The OSL provides flexible protection func-
tionality that the application can interact with thereby enabling new appli-
cation functionality and business models. We describe three such models in 
Section 6.1. 
5.3 Background and Design Issues 
Peer-to-peer file sharing systems have two parts, the file location process and the 
file retrieval process. In most peer-to-peer systems, the file retrieval process is de-
centralized. That is, files are transferred directly between peers rather than through 
a client-server model. Peer-to-peer systems diflfer in the file location process. There 
are centralized and decentralized file location systems. Among the decentralized sys-
tems, there are naive broadcast query systems such as Gnutella [78] and distributed 
hash table(DHT)-based systems such as CAlN, Chord, and Pastry [170, 194, 179]. 
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In centralized file location systems such as Napster, information about shared 
files is sent to the central server where they are indexed. All queries are sent to the 
central server which replies with the location of the file as shown in Figure 23(a). 
This design provides two points to restrict the ability to distribute certain content: 
upon indexing and upon querying. To restrict content upon indexing, when a user 
attempts to share a file that is not approved, the central server does not index the 
file. To restrict content upon querying, when a user searches for an unapproved file, 
the central server does not return a valid response. 
The file sharing processes of a broadcast query-based file sharing system and a 
DHT-based file sharing system are shown in Figures 23(b) and 23(c). These figures 
show the absence of a central entity in the file location process. Thus, it is clear 
that the content protection approach used in centralized systems cannot be directly 
applied to decentralized peer-to-peer systems because there is no central location to 
filter indexed files or searches. 
For each type of file sharing system. Figure 23 shows the separation of the file 
location process and the file retrieval process. It can be seen here that even though 
these three systems vary significantly in the way that files are located, the file 
retrieval processes of the systems are nearly identical. 
In CITADEL, therefore we create a content protection system that focuses on 
the file retrieval process. Because of its independence from the file location process, 
CITADEL can be used in any peer-to-peer file sharing system including centralized, 
query-based decentralized, DHT-based, or some hybrid systems 
In developing our proposal for CITADEL, we start with an assumption that 
content rights lists are provided by content owners. This assumption is based on the 
involvement of content owners in recent real-world content protection issues [122]. 
These lists describe the access rights associated with each content object. The rights 
described may be dynamic and can change over time. 





(b) Decentralized, Query-Based 
(c) Decentralized, DHT-Based 
Figure 23: File location and retrieval in different peer-to-peer systems 
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5.4 CITADEL Objectives 
We outline the design objectives of a content protection system for decentralized 
peer-to-peer file sharing systems. 
• Content Protection: In the past, the goal of content protection in peer-to-
peer systems has been to restrict certain content from being exchanged within 
the system. Thus, these systems only provided all-or-none access; if content 
was allowed in the system, then anyone in the system could access it. In 
CITADEL, the fundamental content protection goal is to be able to control 
access to content on a per user basis. Controlling access refers to providing 
protected distribution by controlling the user's ability to retrieve the content 
and providing protected storage by controlling the user's ability to access 
the plaintext content within a local copy of the content. CITADEL does not 
aim to provide output protection-protection for the analog or digital output 
after access has been granted to an authorized user. Refer to section ?? for a 
discussion of related work in these three areas of content protection. 
• Maintain an open peer-to-peer sharing experience: We define an open 
peer-to-peer environment as one in which, even in the face of content pro-
tection, all peers are equally able to insert content into the system including 
independent content and copies of protected content (including variations such 
as different formats or compression rates). This requires the content protec-
tion system to be able to appropriately secure all content that is introduced 
into the system without regard to the peer inserting the content. Without 
this ability, systems have struggled to find the correct balance of openness 
and security [5]. We suggest that without the openness, the peer-to-peer sys-
tem loses many of its attractive features and resembles a client-server model 
in many respects. When most or all content is introduced by a central source, 
a peer's role turns from content provider to content cache. At this point, the 
system is effectively a client-server based distribution system with extensive 
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caching. In section 5.6.4, we discuss the content importation system that will 
provide such functionality within CITADEL. 
• Avoid dependency on trusted client software: Providing content protec-
tion in a decentralized peer-to-peer system requires modifications or additions 
to the file-sharing software. We assume the presence of malicious users that 
wish to circumvent the content protection system. The system should be 
robust against attacks by users with full access to the software and the oper-
ating system on their computer. Additionally, the system should not rely on 
the file-sharing software being tamper-proof or trusted software. 
• Maintain privacy: The content protection system should at least maintain 
the level of privacy that exists in the normal file-sharing environment. It 
should be possible to allow a user to obtain access rights and to be authorized 
without providing identifying information. Additionally, the system should be 
able to interoperate with the work in anonymous systems such as anonymous 
communication [189, 172, 173], anonymous authorization [40], anonymous pay-
ment [41, 29], and anonymous peer-to-peer file sharing [185, 74]. 
• Avoid dependency on centralized security infrastructure: In a decen-
tralized file-sharing system, the content protection system should not introduce 
a single central authority. The protection system should allow a decentralized 
security infrastructure that can support multiple separate hierarchies of trust 
and control. For example, all content should not be controlled by a single 
entity. A more realistic approach would be to allow all content providers to 
establish independent trust systems. Also for a given trust system, the archi-
tecture should allow decentralized entities to perform the necessary operations 
rather than a central server. The security infrastructure should be flexible to 
allow different types of authorization and payment systems depending on the 
requirements of each content provider. 
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• Provide the flexibility to support common content distribution busi-
ness models: There are a number of common content distribution business 
models that peer-to-peer systems have been unable to support because they 
lack enhanced protection functionality. While content control has been crit-
icized in some circles as spelling the end of true peer-to-peer file sharing, we 
suggest that it may actually be beneficial in that it has the potential to enable 
many different and desirable service models. For example, we suggest three 
such models: Pay-per-view and Subscription Models Syndication Model, and 
Reseller Model. In chapter 6 we explain how CITADEL supports these models. 
5.5 Overview of the CITADEL Architecture 
In this section, we provide an overview of the CITADEL architecture. We discuss 
possible approaches to a decentralized content protection system and motivate our 
approach. We then introduce the components of CITADEL. 
5.5.1 Our Approach 
As explained above, due to the nature of decentralized peer-to-peer systems, there 
is no central authority in the file sharing process, so policy enforcement must be 
done at the peers. This implies that peers must know the access control policy The 
question is, how do the peers securely and efficiently access the global content rights 
list in order to enforce it? The content rights list is a form of an Access Control 
List (ACL). In the distributed ACL approach, the content rights list is distributed 
to all peers. However, there is significant overhead associated with distributing the 
entire content rights list to all peers. An alternate approach, the queried ACL 
approach, is to have the peers access the list by querying the content rights list 
server as necessary for each access to a content object. However, there is significant 
overhead associated with repeatedly querying the content rights list server .̂ 
^Section 6.2 presents an evaluation of CITADEL relative to these two approaches. 
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To avoid these types of overhead, our system takes a different approach in which 
the access control poHcy for each content object is stored with the content object. 
Thus, every access control policy that a peer must enforce is available and accessed 
locally. Compared to the queried ACL approach, this approach behaves like a cache 
of the relevant access control policy information. This provides greater scalability 
than the other two approaches. In order to distribute the content rights list with 
the content, we must protect the integrity of each object's access control policy. 
To provide this and other protection, we introduce the concept of a protected file-
sharing environment. The system builds a protected environment over a normal 
peer-to-peer network. Only protected objects can be exchanged within this peer-to-
peer system. Thus, all content objects in the system are protected and all access to 
these objects is controlled. 
Figure 24 shows the protected file-sharing environment. The system uses the 
peer-to-peer network strictly as a means of file location and distribution. CITADEL 
exists as the protection layer built upon this distribution layer. The service layer is, 
in turn, built on top of the protection layer. Thus, service providers and application 
developers can introduce new services and applications based on a peer-to-peer 
distribution model by building the services on top of the CITADEL protection layer. 
5.5.2 CITADEL Components 
In this section, we introduce the components of the CITADEL architecture. The 
components include the secured content objects, access tokens, the file sharing soft-
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Figure 24: The CITADEL protected file sharing environment. 
5.5.2.1 File Sharing Software 
We refer to file sharing software that is enhanced with content protection software 
modules as compliant file sharing software(CFSS). Within Figure 24, there is a 
high-level diagram of the compliant file sharing software. The CFSS provides three 
types of operations: distribution operations, protection operations, and application 
operations. Distribution operations involve normal duties of peer-to-peer file sharing 
software such as interacting with the file location system and the file retrieval system. 
Protection operations involve interacting with the secured content objects to control 
access to the content. Protection operations also include periodic interactions with 
the content rights list server and the content token server as necessary. Application 
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operations involve supporting the application and the service model interacting with 
the protection layer to provide access to the content files in the secured content 
objects. We assume the presence of malicious users that aim to gain unauthorized 
access to content by circumventing the mechanisms in the CFSS. In Section 5.8, we 
show that even without any software protection or tamper resistance, the design of 
the system makes the CFSS robust against any such attacks. 
5.5.2.2 Content Containers 
Access to content is protected by the use of secured content objects or content 
containers, cryptographically secured objects consisting of a protection label and an 
encrypted content file. Figure 25 shows the elements of a content container. The 
protection label contains a content label that provides content identification and 
ownership information and the content's ACL. In Section 5.6.1.2, we explain that 
the ACL only requires a small number of entries. The protection label is digitally 
signed by the appropriate authority to ensure integrity. The content file is encrypted 
with a random key, KR which is encrypted with K_fiTs_iDj a unique decryption key 
associated with the token needed to access the content. This encrypted form of KR is 
stored in the content container. Additionally, the encrypted KR and the protection 
label are encrypted with KCFSSI the decryption key that is built-in the compliant 
file sharing software. Thus, only the CFSS can access the content container, and 
even the CFSS can not access the content file in the content container without 
K-RTs_iD, which is provided to authorized users along with the content access 
token. The idea of protection labels and attaching protection labels to the objects 
that they describe has been in the security literature for some time [25]. Slightly 
more recent work extended this into the concept of a secure package for storing 
content and its controls [113, 190]. We utilize a similar concept and further define 
the details of a secure content package; however, our contribution is a complete 
architecture for content protection in decentralized peer-to-peer systems. Along 
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the way, we define the details of the content container and its interaction with its 
reference monitor [125], in our case, the CFSS. 
5.5.2.3 Content Importation System 
The only objects that can be shared in this protected environment are objects that 
have been imported into the system in the form of a content container with the 
appropriate access rights. The CITADEL architecture includes a content importa-
tion system{C\S) shown in Figure 26, that controls the insertion of objects into the 
system. It functions as the secure gateway to import any objects into the protected 
file-sharing environment. A key design goal of the CIS is that it allows content 
providers to easily protect content and insert it into the distribution network. The 
CIS enforces that content is identified correctly, labeled with the correct policy, and 
encapsulated in a content container. The content importer is a person or entity that 
inserts the content object into the protected environment. There are two classes of 
content that is imported into the environment: new content and existing content. 
New content is content that does not exist in the environment. The content im-
porter that inserts new content is called the content provider. Existing content 
includes copies or different versions of content that has already been imported into 
the environment by the content provider. The CIS supports our goal of maintaining 
an open peer-to-peer sharing experience by allowing all peers to insert new content 
or existing content. 
5.6 Detailed Operations of CITADEL Components 
In this section we discuss the details of the different components of CITADEL. We 
first discuss how hosts obtain access tokens. We then explain host interaction during 
normal file sharing. Next, we present the details of the CFSS and the operations 
that it supports. Then, we discuss the content importation process. We then discuss 
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Figure 26: Content importation at a high-level. 
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common content distribution models that can be supported with CITADEL. 
5.6.1 Token Distribution 
Token distribution is the process of a user obtaining or purchasing rights to some set 
of content. This involves the user and the content token server. There are numerous 
proposals for electronic payment systems that can be leveraged for user authorization 
for token distribution; see for example [52, 177, 137, 41, 29]. Here, we explain the 
basic functionality necessary for CITADEL. For example, A user contacts a content 
seller and obtain a subscription to access all content on the network or perhaps all 
content in a particular category. We discuss this further in Section 6.1; for now, the 
point is that this process should be thought of as occuring infrequently and outside 
of the normal file-sharing experience. It is similar to how a cable subscription is 
set up for certain channels, but a user watches television regularly without dealing 
with obtaining new rights. The system can involve different content token services 
for different content providers. For each content provider, the content token service 
can be a single server or a group of distributed servers. 
5.6.1.1 Detailed Token Distribution Protocol 
Since a single instance of the authorization protocol takes place between a host h and 
a single content token server, CTS. The content token servers possess public-key cer-
tificates [102] that are used for authentication and digitally signing messages. This 
does not require a global public-key infrastructure; the key management require-
ments are minimal and are equivalent to the common use of public-key certificates 
for secure sockets layer/transport layer security (SSL/TLS) [58] web server authen-
tication 
The CTS has a public key certificate, CERTK^CTS ^̂ <̂  ^^^ corresponding pri-
vate key, K-cTS- These are used to digitally sign messages and verify signatures. 
Digitally signed messages are shown in brackets with the key used to sign it as a 
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subscript ['message]K_x -̂î d encrypted messages are shown in curly braces with the 
key used to encrypt it as a subscript {message}Ks • 
The host estabhshes a encrypted communication channel with the CTS and sends 
an authorization request (AR). This secure communication channel can be achieved 
with SSL, IPSEC [120] or any other secure communications protocol. We show the 
communication encrypted with a session key, Kgess- The AR contains the content 
rights ID(RTSJD) and the authorization information(AZJNFO). RTSJD is the 
subject in the ACL; its format depends on the authorization language that is used. 
We discuss this further subsequently. Also, the specifics of the authorization infor-
mation depends on the payment system that is used by the content seller and may 
include account information or an electronic cash payment. In some situations the 
payment system may be out of band, and obtaining a rights token may only require 
some sort of authentication, such as a username and password. In some situations, 
no payment will be required to obtain certain rights tokens so the authorization 
information will not be needed. 
l.H -> CTS: 
AR = {RTSJD,AZJNFO}Ksess 
The CTS returns an authorization acknowledgment (AA) specifying a successful 
or unsuccessful authorization of the user for the requested rights. If successful, 
the AA contains an access token and the accompanying content decryption key, 
K -RTS^D- The access token includes the RTSJD, the public-key for RTSJD, and 
the expiration time, T^xp- K^RTS^D is used for the content decryption key and for 
authentication. Recall that the content decryption key is required because it is used 
by the CFSS to access the encrypted content file in the content container. 
2.CTS -> H: 
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Figure 27: Role-based access control models. 
5.6.1.2 Access Control Model 
To provide an efficient solution that reduces the size of the content ACL and re-
duces the number of tokens needed by each user, we use role-based access control 
(RBAC) [181]. The basic notion of RBAC is that permissions are assigned to roles, 
users are assigned to appropriate roles, and users obtain permissions by being mem-
bers of roles. The system can use flat RBAC or hierarchical RBAC [182]. 
Flat RBAC allows many-to-many relationships between user-role and permission-
role assignments. Thus, a user can be assigned to many roles and a single role can 
have many users. Also, a single role can have multiple permissions and a certain per-
mission can be assigned to multiple roles. Flat RBAC is illustrated in Figure 27(a) 
froma work by Sandhu, et al. [181]. This allows a user, in CITADEL, to be assigned 
to multiple roles. A particular role may have permission to access a particular con-
tent object or a group of content objects. For example, assume a system that has 
the following four roles: all content, jazz category content, contemporary jazz cat-
egory (that is a subset of the jazz category), and jazz song X (that is a member 
of the contemporary jazz category). The ACL of the content object for jazz song 
123 
X specifies entries for each of these four roles. This allows a user to gain access by 
presenting a token that shows membership in any of the four roles. 
Hierarchical RBAC allows role hierarchies, seniority relations between roles where 
a senior role possesses the permissions of the junior roles. The hierarchy can be 
expressed mathematically as a partial ordering: a reflexive, transitive and anti-
symmetric relation. Hierarchical RBAC is illustrated in Figure 27(b) from [181]. 
In CITADEL, a hierarchical RBAC model allows a leaf role to have permissions 
relating to a specific content object and then have senior roles acquire permissions 
from these roles. This differs from the use of flat RBAC in that instead of role for 
the jazz category having explicit permissions to every object in the jazz group, the 
jazz role is a senior role that acquires permissions for jazz subcategory roles that 
acquire permissions from specific content roles. Thus, the ACL of a content object 
only needs to specify the single role corresponding to that object. In the CITADEL 
prototype described in section 6.3, we implemented hierarchical RBAC. 
5.6.2 Host Interaction during File Sharing 
Figure 28 shows host interaction during file sharing. Note that the file location 
process is not aflPected. For each file exchange, the user that receives the file is 
called the downloader and the user that sends the file is called the uploader. 
The downloader first locates the desired content and then sends a request including 
the access token to a peer that has the content. The uploader verifies that the 
downloader is authorized before providing access to the file. 
5.6.2.1 Detailed Host Interaction Protocol 
The process begins, as normal, with the downloader(D) sending a location query(LQ) 
to the file location system(FLS) as normal. The actual contents of the LQ depends 
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Figure 28: Host interaction during file sharing, 
l.D -> FLS: 
LQ = [KW] 
The file location system responds with a location reply(LR) specifies the location 
of the content. 
2.FLS -> D: 
LR = [LOC] 
The downloader sends a content request(CR) to the uploader(U) including the 
identification of the requested content and the appropriate access token. To authen-
ticate the downloader, the uploader sends a random nonce, Â , to the downloader 
and the downloader responds with a copy of the nonce encrypted with private key 
corresponding to the access token. This avoids the possibility of replay attacks by 
eavesdroppers or by the uploader. We must avoid the uploader being able to replay 
the authorization because the access token used by the downloader may contain 
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rights that the uploader does not have. This is the reason that tokens that require 
no additional authentication or tokens that use password-based authentication could 
not be used. 
3.D -> U: 
CR = [CID,TOKEN] 
4.U -> D: 
N 
5.D -> U: 
{N}K. -RTS-ID 
Upon successfully authenticating the downloader, the uploader verifies the access 
rights presented by the access token against the access rights specified in content's 
ACL. The uploader first checks the validity of the token. This includes verifying 
the CTS's signature and checking the expire time. The uploader then checks the 
access rights. The ACL of the content contains the name of the content provider 
or issuer, as shown in Figure 25. This is used to verify that the access token was 
provided by the correct content provider. After verifications, the uploader sends 
the downloader a content request acknowledgment(CRA) stating a successful or 
unsuccessful request. Upon success, the CRA contains the requested content file or 
instructions to obtain the file. 
5.U -> D: 
CRA — Status (file or failure) 
5.6.2.2 Discussion 
Policy enforcement at the peers can take place at two times: 1) the file location 
process; or 2) the file retrieval process. Even though CITADEL can support both 
methods, we suggest enforcement during retrieval for several reasons. First, it allows 
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independence of the content protection functions from search functions which can 
differ widely among the different decentralized schemes as described earlier. Sec-
ond, we feel that controlling the search functions without controlling the retrieval 
functions makes the system vulnerable to users who may be able to determine file 
locations by other means (e.g., users advertising file locations on web pages). So 
controlling file retrieval functions is necessary at any rate. Third, it removes the 
requirement of having to store access rights along with indexing information. Fi-
nally from a commercial viewpoint, allowing users to see what is available on the 
system without authorization might be an inducement for them to become paying 
customers. The file location service could also provide information about the access 
rights necessary to obtain the content. This access rights information could be pro-
vided as metadata just as systems currently report information such as the quality 
of the content of the size of the file. 
5.6.3 Compliant File Sharing Software 
In this section we describe the operations and security of the CFSS. The CFSS 
supports three operations: content exchange, content import, and content export. 
Content exchange is referred to as content download at the peer that is receiving 
the file and content upload at the peer that is sending the file. Content upload 
is the process of a user responding to a file request by transmitting the file to the 
other peer. Content download is the process of a user obtaining a file that has 
been requested. Content import is the process of a user inserting content into the 
protected file sharing environment from a content file stored in a native file format. 
Content export is the process of a user exporting content from the file sharing 
system by creating a copy of the content in its unprotected file format. The first 
subsection describes the details of the operations. The second subsection discusses 
the techniques used to protect the CFSS from malicious users. 
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Figure 29: Content upload. 
5.6.3.1 Operation Details 
The content upload process is shown in Figure 29. During the content upload 
process, the uploader receives the request and token from the downloader, validates 
the token, checks the access rights, and then sends the file. The token verification 
module receives the token, verifies its authenticity, retrieves the rights from the 
token, and verifies these against the rights specified in the ACL of the requested 
content. Upon success, the file delivery module sends the file to the downloader. 
The content download process includes a number of protection schemes. Even 
after the file is received, the user must possess the token and the content decryp-
tion key to access the content. Since the content container is double encrypted, the 
content's decryption key is required. This provides an extra layer of security by re-
quiring the token and content key on both sides of the operation: 1) requesting the 
content and 2) receiving or using the content. Additionally, to provide more imme-
diate propagation of access rights changes and to confine any security breach that 
may somehow occur, the administrator of CITADEL deployments can optionally 







Figure 30: Content export. 
against situations in which a user somehow bypasses the security of his CFSS, alters 
the ACL of the content, and distributes content with illegitimate rights. With this 
double checking of the ACL, the breach of the security is confined to an individual 
user. 
Content export will not be necessary by many applications because CITADEL 
aims to provide as many of the functions related to the content as possible within the 
protected file-sharing environment in order to reduce the need for content export. 
For example, the CFSS allows the inclusion of a content player to allow content to 
be viewed or listened to while still in the content container. If the user needs to 
use the content for purposes other than this, then the file must be exported. The 
content export process is shown in Figure 30. The CFSS decapsulates the content 
file from the content container and stores a copy in the native unprotected format. 
The system can be configured to completely disallow content export by default or 
require additional access rights in order to export content; we discuss this further 
in section 6.L 
5.6.3.2 Policy updates and revocations 
Here we discuss how the poHcy or the access rights for content can be updated 
or revoked by the content owner. By updating the policy at the CRLS, the new 
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policy is reflected in all future copies of the content imported. Also, if the system 
is configured with the option to perform ACL checking on file receipt, then all 
future downloaded copies of the content will get the new policy. Using these two 
methods, the system can update policy for all content objects imported after the 
policy update as well as for each existing content object that is shared after the 
policy update. Another approach is to use expiration times in the protection label 
that causes the CFSS to retrieve an updated policy for the content object after a 
certain period of time. These three methods do not provide the ability to explicitly 
revoke rights for a particular user. This could be achieved by revoking outstanding 
access tokens; however, due to the heavyweight operations of explicit revocation 
schemes, we do not use this method. Instead, we provide implicit revocation based 
on the use of time-limited tokens. The combination of these four methods provides a 
flexible framework for performing policy updates and revocations without requiring 
a heavyweight protocol. 
5.6.4 Content Importation System 
Content importation is the process of a user inserting a copy of content from a native 
content file into the file sharing system. The content importation system(CIS) is 
the secure gateway that assures the protection of content that is introduced into the 
protected domain. It involves modules on the CFSS that identify the content and 
retrieve the appropriate rights from the content rights service. This system is also 
the means that allows end users to introduce new content or new copies and formats 
of old content. We first provide an overview of the CIS. Then, we discuss the content 
identification process. We then describe the content importation process. 
5.6.4.1 Overview of Importing Content 
During content importation, the system identifies the content, retrieves the ACL and 



















Figure 31: Content importation. 
Figure 31 shows this process. The first step, content identification, is performed 
by a content identification module in the CFSS. The identity information is then 
passed to the ACL retrieval module which sends it in a query to the content rights 
service. The service responds with the protection label and the encryption keys for 
the content. This information is passed to the content wrapper module that creates 
the content container by encrypting the content with the supplied key and attaching 
the protection label. The CFSS does not store the encryption key. To access the 
content, a user must possess the appropriate token and decryption key. 
5.6.4.2 Content Identification Process 
In this section, we discuss possible methods of content identification and explain 
why some are ideal candidates for CITADEL and some are not. 
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In order to protect content with the correct access rights, it is important to accu-
rately identify content as it is imported into the system. Straightforward approaches 
such as identifying content by the actual file name have been used by content protec-
tion systems in the past and proved to be vulnerable. Many applications support the 
identification of content using metadata, descriptive information about the content 
such as artist, title, and publisher [145, 3, 206], that is usually stored as a header in 
the content file [105, 151]. Due to the ability of the user to alter this information, 
this is not sufficient for our system. 
One method to provide metadata in a form that is not susceptible to alteration 
by users is to embed the information as a watermark. Watermarking is the em-
bedding of some identifying information into the content in such a manner that it 
can not be removed by the user but it can be extracted or read by the appropriate 
party. Use of this technology would allow the content identification to be securely 
embedded by the content provider and read by the CFSS. Content creators could 
embed watermarks in all content that is created and distributed via any means. 
One problem with this approach is that there are millions of content files already in 
distribution that are not watermarked. 
A different approach is to not rely on metadata or watermarks to provide the 
information, but to have the system determine the identity of the content. The 
system examines the file to extract identifying properties and then determines the 
actual identity of the content by comparing the properties with a database of all 
known content files. We discuss this further in the next subsection. This is achieved 
using a content-based identification algorithm. Content-based identification algo-
rithms analyze the perceptual qualities of the content to derive a fingerprint of 
the content. A number of such algorithms have been proposed for audio files; see 
for example [75, 208]. These are different from cryptographic signatures such as 
MD5 [175] and SHA-1 [7] that examine the bits of the file and can not correlate the 
same content in two different formats or even different qualities of the same format. 
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5.6.4.3 Content Importation Process 
The content importation process is independent of the identification algorithm that 
is used. Recall that the two types of content that are imported into the environment 
are: existing content and new content. We first describe how the system is used to 
import additional copies of existing content. We then describe the additional steps 
needed to import new content. 
The first step in content importation is the content identification module execut-
ing the identification algorithm on the content file and producing a set, 5, containing 
n identification properties, ii to in- The ACL retrieval modules sends a query con-
taining s to the content rights service. Upon receiving 5, the content rights lookup 
module uses each i„ to search the content rights database for a match to a known 
content entry. The matching process need not result in a binary decision, but can 
result in a match and a certainty value, c, associated with the match. If c is above 
the defined certainty threshold t then the match is considered valid and the content 
rights service sends a response containing the rights for the content file. 
To import new content, the process involves a few additional steps. The user 
importing the content specifies the access control policy, p, including rights keys and 
the content encryption key, KR. The user's CFSS performs content identification 
and sends {S,P,KR) to the content rights service in a content importation request. 
The content rights lookup module first searches the database for the content using 
combinations of s. Upon a failed lookup, a new entry is added for (5,p, KR). 
Essential to the effectiveness of this system is the establishment of a complete 
database and maintaining the database by adding new content before it is made 
available to the public. Although this may seem like a daunting task, we point to 
some current efforts that are a creating catalogs of all available music content such 
as CDDB [55] and Loudeye [54]. Alone, these efforts have made significant progress 
and it is reasonable to suggest that a content database to support content protection 
will have considerable support from content providers. 
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Goal Single User Attack Collusion Attack 
Protected Distribution Forge Access Token 
Replay Access Token 
Bypass Authorization Checks 
Re-distribute Tokens 
Alter ACL 




Output Protection Obtain KRTS^D 
Obtain Plaintext Content 
Re-distribute Content 
Table 3: Summary of attacks on protection goals 
5.7 Analysis 
In this section, we discuss how the system maintains the level of assurance relative 
to its protection goals by being robust against compromise or circumvention. As in 
any protection system, we assume the presence of malicious users that aim to gain 
unauthorized access to content. 
5.7.1 Threat Analysis 
There are different levels of threats to content protection ranging from the casual 
user to the hobbyist/hacker to the professional pirate [157]. These levels somewhat 
parallel the following taxonomy of attackers described by the Abraham, et al. [12]: 
class I (clever outsiders), class II (knowledgeable insiders), and class III (funded 
organizations). The generally accepted practice in the content distribution industry 
is that content protection technology is most effective for low to mid-level threats 
from casual users and hobbyists/hackers while legal protection is most effective for 
higher level attackers such as professional pirates. The goal of commercial content 
protection is to "stop unauthorized, casual copying of commercial entertainment 
content" [157]. This has also been phrased as "keeping honest people honest" [27]. 
These are somewhat modest goals compared to the protection goals in many military 
and financial applications. 
Table 3 shows the protection goals of the system and possible attacks on these 
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goals. We look at attacks by an individual user as well as attacks by a collusion. 
Recall that CITADEL aims to provide protected distribution and protected storage. 
We briefly mention extensions to CITADEL that can provide output protection. 
Some of the attacks listed in the table provide no benefit to an attacker and some of 
the attacks are sufficiently complex due to fundamental properties of cryptography. 
For example, without an appropriate access token, determining Kfi can only be done 
by brute force attack. For these reasons, we do not detail each of the attacks in this 
section, but discuss the less obvious ones. 
We assume a hobbyist/hacker end-user that has appropriate knowledge and re-
sources. This user has full access to and control of the CFSS and the operating 
system. Since users have access to the CFSS on their PC, it will be a target for 
attackers seeking to circumvent the protection of the system. We will show that 
even without software protection or tamper resistance, attackers can not defeat the 
CFSS to obtain unauthorized access to content. Let us assume that the attacker 
reverse engineers the CFSS or otherwise fully compromises the CFSS. We analyze 
the risk associated with each attack. We show that the damage is limited and does 
not defeat our protection goals. 
We further discuss three of the potential threats: 
1. Determine KCFSS- An attacker may obtain the decryption key, KCFSS, that 
is used to access content containers. 
2. Bypass Authorization Checks: An attacker may cause the authorization checks 
to be bypassed so that the CFSS will allow unauthorized peers to download 
content. 
3. Alter ACL: An attacker may attempt to remove a protection label and replace 
it with a protection label requiring lesser or no rights. 
We now analyze the actual vulnerability associated with each of the above po-
tential attacks. 
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Determine KCFSS Attack: If an attacker reverse engineers the CFSS to obtain 
the decryption key, he only obtains the key used to access the protection label. 
The actual content keys are encrypted with key for the rights role. Therefore, even 
with the CFSS's decryption key, an attacker can not directly access the content file. 
The attacker could attempt to alter the ACL in the content object, however, it is 
digitally signed by the content rights list server, so any alterations will be noticed 
by the CFSS and the content container will be rejected. 
An attacker that legitimately obtains a content token and rights key, K-BTS-ID-, 
can use the compromised KCFSS ^nd K_BTS-ID to obtain KR and consequently 
obtain the decrypted content. However, since the user legitimately obtained a con-
tent token, the user has the rights to access the content. As stated in section 5, 
CITADEL does not provide output protection. In general, once access rights are 
presented, the user is able to access the content in the content container. We discuss 
output protection further in subsequent sections. 
Bypass Authorization Checks Attack: If an attacker is able to alter the operation 
of the CFSS to cause it to bypass authorization checks, then the CFSS will allow 
unauthorized peers to download content containers. However, the content containers 
can not be accessed at the receiving peer without the access token and key because 
the CFSS requires the token to access the content container and the rights decryption 
key to access the encrypted content. 
Alter ACL Attack: If an attacker removes a protection label from a content 
container and replaces it with a protection label that requires lesser rights, then this 
will not work for a number of reasons. Let us assume that a user creates a content 
container that includes content X and a protection label for content Y. Assume 
the user attempts to access this content with only the access token and key for Y. 
The user can use the content token for F , but the KR retrieved from the protection 
label will not match the key used to encrypt content X. Therefore the user can not 
access content X with only the rights for Y. 
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5.7.2 Additional Robustness using Software Protection 
We have shown that the system's design includes protection mechanisms that are 
robust even in the face of a completely compromised CFSS. We now point out that 
there are mechanisms that can be used to make it more difficult for an attacker to 
even compromise the CFSS. The CFSS can be considered to be a mobile agents 
a program that is executed on an untrusted computing base. The authors of [96] 
discuss a number of attacks that malicious users can perform against mobile agents 
including spying out code and data (i.e. the CFSS's decryption key) and manip-
ulation of code and data. One method that can be used to guard against these 
attacks is mobile cryptography [180]. This involves executing encrypted functions 
to guarantee code privacy and code integrity. Another method is time limited black 
box protection [97] that can protect the code and data of a mobile agent from being 
read or modified for at least some minimal time interval. Although there is work, 
such as [16], that discusses the inability of these approaches to provide long-term 
security against high-level attacks, it is understood that such approaches do protect 
against casual attackers and also increase the cost of an attack by capable attackers. 
A deployed implementation should employ these techniques to heighten the security 
of the application; however, as we have shown, the security of CITADEL does not 
rely on the protection of the CFSS. 
5.7.3 Related Protection Systems 
Protected distribution work takes many forms differing greatly depending on the 
distribution method. In cable and satellite, conditional access is provided by set-
top boxes enforcing subscription and pay-per-view models; see for example [149]. 
In CD and DVD sales, conditional access simply means that the person that pays 
for the content receives the media containing the content. On websites that sell 
content, protected distribution is performed in the client-server model of purchasing 
rights and obtaining content. In multicast or group communications, protected 
137 
distribution is provided by using group keys to access encrypted content [35] and by 
controlling access to the multicast distribution tree [110]. 
Protected storage work includes Content Protection for Pre-recorded Media 
(CPPM) [8] for protection pre-recorded DVD-Audio, Content Protection for Record-
able Media (CPRM) [9] for protecting content stored on recordable media such as 
DVD-R or flash memory, Content Scrambling System(CSS) [10] for protecting pre-
recorded DVD-Video, and copy-protected CD solutions such as [141] for protecting 
pre-recorded CDs from replication or extraction to files such as MP3s. 
5.7.4 Output Protection 
As stated previously, CITADEL has the primary goal of providing protected dis-
tribution and storage. It is possible to add components to CITADEL to provide 
output protection. Some of this requires integration with previous work in output 
protection for devices. Other mechanisms can be leveraged to help provide output 
protection and protection against some collusion attacks such as redistribution of 
content or access tokens. 
Fingerprinting provides an eflfective deterrence against redistribution of con-
tent [203, 17]. Such systems can be integrated into the content importation system 
or the compliant file-sharing software. Other systems such as digital signets [63] and 
traitor tracing [44] can be used to discourage redistribution of access tokens. 
Other output protection work includes Digital Transmission Content Protec-
tion(DTCP) [11] for protecting content during transmission between devices using 
IEEE 1394 or Universal Serial Bus (USB), Macrovision Copy Protection [132], High-
bandwidth Digital Content Protection(HDCP) [59] for protecting content during 
transmission to digital displays, and Microsoft's Secure Audio Path [140] for pro-
tecting content on PCs during transmission to audio devices such as sound cards. 
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5.8 Discussion 
Recent work in peer-to-peer systems have proposed different types of file retrieval 
and file location systems. In this section, we discuss how CITADEL is aflPected by 
such systems. 
5.8.1 Interaction with different types of file retrieval 
Most peer-to-peer systems allow content to be exchanged directly between peers 
and require that content is stored only at the peer that is providing or sharing that 
content. However, there are systems in which this is not the case and this can cause 
problems with some content protection approaches. In some anonymous peer-to-
peer systems such as Freenet and APFS, files are delivered through the peer-to-peer 
network in order to mask the identity of the responder and provide some caching. In 
some peer-to-peer systems including some that are based on distributed hash tables, 
peers' files are replicated and cached at other peers. This can be used to provide 
cooperative mirroring, time shared storage, or increased scalability. 
Some content protection approaches assume that the only hosts that will have 
access to content is the sharing peer and the downloading peer. Therefore, these 
content protection systems only enforce the policy upon file request, but do not 
protect the file during download. This leads to vulnerabilities where unauthorized 
users can gain access to files based on their location in the peer-to-peer network. 
Furthermore, malicious users can aggressively participate in cooperative mirroring 
and time shared storage in order to gain access to more content. The design of 
CITADEL accounts for these systems that require other peers to have access to the 
content file. In addition to performing authorization upon file request, CITADEL 
also stores the file in a secure content container that can only be accessed by the 
authorized users. Thus, even if other peers must cache or forward the file, there is 
no vulnerability since only authorized users can access the actual content within the 
content container. 
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Another variation of peer-to-peer systems that can cause problems for some con-
tent protection system designs is parallel downloading. Parallel downloading allow a 
host to retrieve different parts of a content file from diff'erent peers simultaneously. 
There are two properties of parallel downloading that may cause issues: 1) for a 
single file retrieval, there are multiple file requests involved and 2) software at the 
retrieving peer creates a file that is a combination of parts from multiple files. In 
CITADEL, parallel downloads are supported since authorization will be performed 
for each file request and the retrieved parts will be combined to form a secure content 
container. 
5.8.2 Interaction with different types of file location 
We have described an approach in which content protection is transparent to the 
file location system and described how this assists portability and ease of imple-
mentation. However, we also believe that in some situations gains in efficiency 
and usability can be achieved by the location system and protection system having 
knowledge of each other. For example, improved usability and efficiency can be 
achieved by restricting query results to items that the user is authorized to access. 
In systems such as Gnutella where query results only come from peers that 
have access to the content and the access control policy this is straightforward. In 
distributed hash table-based systems, the solution is more involved. Since many of 
the lookup operations in these systems may be performed by entities that do not 
possess the content or the access control policy, they are not able to restrict the query 
results based on the access control policy. In these systems, it is important to be 
able to restrict queries based on authorizations because of the resources that can be 
wasted otherwise. If queries are not restricted at the first hop of the lookup process, 
then this query can possibly traverse a number of nodes wasting computation and 
bandwidth. The following questions are potential paths of future work: 
1. How can decentralized hash table lookup systems be made aware of the access 
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control policy? 
2. What are the design details of a system that restricts the hosts' ability to 
lookup based on an access control policy? 
3. How would such a system assist in making the lookup system more robust to 
other types of attacks such as denial-of-service? 
5.9 Conclusions 
Predicting how peer-to-peer systems will evolve is difficult at best. What has become 
clear, however, is that content protection will play an increasingly important role in 
the success of such systems. The challenge has been how to design a system that 
provides adequate content protection and yet maintains the openness of the peer-to-
peer model. In this work we explained the need for content protection in peer-to-peer 
networks, argued that such functionality should be provided as an overlay security 
layer, and proposed CITADEL as an example of such an architecture. 
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Chapter 6 
CITADEL Evaluation and 
Implementation 
In this chapter, we further discuss, evaluate and define the CITADEL architecture 
from a real world viewpoint. Now that the architecture has been motivated and de-
fined, we examine the feasibility of the CITADEL as a real-world, content protection 
architecture. We address three issues: 
1. Can CITADEL be used to provide common content distribution business mod-
els? 
2. What is the overhead of CITADEL in terms of support infrastructure and at 
the peers? 
3. How feasible is the CITADEL architecture in terms of the ability to implement 
the components and its ability to be used with common peer-to-peer networks? 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 describes how content protection 
can allow common business models to be supported in a peer-to-peer environment. 
Section 6.2 evaluates the costs of CITADEL in terms of message overhead and com-
putation overhead. Section 6.3 describes our implementation of a working prototype 
of CITADEL. We conclude in section 6.4. 
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6.1 Supporting Content Distribution Business Mod-
els 
There are a number of business and service models that are popular in other content 
distribution methods that peer-to-peer systems have been unable to offer due to the 
lack of the protection functionality required to support such models. We identify 
three common content distribution business models and show how each of these 
can be supported in a peer-to-peer distribution system by providing the appropriate 
underlying content protection functionality. We then show how CITADEL supports 
this additional content protection functionality. 
6.1.1 Common Business Models 
1. Pay-per-view and Subscription model 
Description: The goal of this model is to allow users to subscribe to specific 
content or set of content. This model follows the subscription by users to 
particular channels or individual pay-per-view items. Current peer-to-peer 
content protection systems can only control whether or not a file is allowed 
in the system [122]; they cannot restrict access to files to certain users. Our 
system supports this model and allows a user to purchase access to specific 
content or groups of content. For example, in a music sharing system, music 
from each record label could require a separate subscription. Another exam-
ple supported by our model is where users can purchase access to individual 
songs. 
Underlying access control functionality: To support this model, our system 
provides subject-based access rights such as user-based or group-based access 
rights rather than only the default world-based access rights provided in cur-
rent systems [122]. 
2. Syndication model 
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Description: The goal of this model is to only allow certain users to purchase 
the right to redistribute content. This model aims to mimic the distribution of 
syndicated television shows and pay-for-content services such as the services 
used by retail stores to provide background music. In current peer-to-peer 
systems, there is no way to specify different types of access rights for a file; 
thus, all users have all possible access rights for every file. Our system supports 
this model by allowing an access control policy that specifies multiple types of 
access rights. Our system supports this model and allows a user to be granted 
a subset of the possible access rights. For example, a user could have the right 
to download a file, but not to share it. 
Underlying access control functionality: To support this model, our system is 
able to enforce multiple types of access rights. In a peer-to-peer system, the 
different access rights include share, download, and export. Additionally, each 
type of access right can have parameters in addition to "allow" and "disallow". 
For instance, share rights can specify the number of times the file is allowed 
to be distributed. 
3. Reseller model 
Description:The goal of this model is to allow certain users to act as resellers 
and redistribute content for a fee. This model aims to mimic the distribution 
of CDs and video via stores. Our system supports this model by building upon 
the syndication model and adding the ability to have reseller peers perform 
authorization of downloading peers. 
Underlying access control functionality: To support this model, our system 
provides delegated authorization. That is, end users are able to perform au-
thorization for peers attempting to download content. 
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6.1.2 CITADEL'S Support of Business Models 
The base CITADEL system, as described in previous sections, provides the subject-
based access rights necessary to support the pay-per-view and subscription model. 
To support the syndication model, separate download and upload access rights 
are specified in the access control policy and in the resulting access tokens. The 
examples in previous sections depicted an environment that controls a peer's ability 
to download certain content. We now describe how the system can support another 
approach that involves controlling a peer's ability to upload or share certain content. 
To enforce share rights with CITADEL, for each content container to be shared, 
the user must possess an access token that specifies share rights for that content. 
If the necessary rights are not provided for certain content, then the CFSS will 
not allow sharing of this content container by either not responding to file location 
requests or file retrieval requests for that content. 
To support parameterized access rights such as share limits and time-restricted 
downloads with CITADEL, a new field for each parameter is added to the ACL in 
the content container or in the access token. For example, to control share limits, a 
field is added to the ACL in the access token that specifies the number of authorized 
shares. This field is initialized when the access token is received and decremented 
at each file download. This portion of the access token is not be signed by the CTS, 
but is edited and signed by the CFSS. 
To provide delegated authorization to support the reseller model, we identify 
two approaches: 1) Tokens are obtained from the content provider and submitted 
to the reseller for verification when requesting the content. 2) Tokens are issued 
by the reseller. CITADEL inherently supports the first approach. To support the 
second approach, the reseller is issued a certificate by the content provider and the 
reseller issues access tokens digitally signed with its private key. This allows tokens 
issued by the reseller to be verified or traced back to the original content provider. 




We evaluate the performance of CITADEL relative to the performance of the dis-
tributed ACL and queried ACL approaches to decentralized content protection that 
we discussed in Section 5.5. We analyze the costs of operations in each system and 
then present the results of a simulation based on these costs. 
6.2.1 Analysis 
We examine the costs associated with file exchange and content importation in 
CITADEL, the distributed ACL system, and the queried ACL system. Table 4 
shows the definitions of the variables used in the analysis. 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 show computation and message costs for file exchanges at the 
downloader, the uploader, and the ACS. For example, the table shows the computa-
tion cost at the uploader in CITADEL is {v -f cl)x. This shows the digital signature 
verification and content container ACL lookup for each file that is uploaded. 
ACS computational costs are significantly greater in the queried system than in 
the other two systems and slightly more in CITADEL than in the distributed system. 
This is because in the queried system, the ACS must perform the operations for every 
file exchange, while it must only perform such operations at most once per user in 
the other systems. The cost is more in CITADEL than in the distributed system 
because CITADEL authenticates the host, looks up the rights and digitally signs 
the token for each user while the distributed system creates a single digitally signed 
ACL for all users. 
Computational costs at the uploader and downloader are interesting because one 
may hypothesize that due to the computation required by the CFSS of CITADEL 
the computational load and associated processing time may introduce some service 
delay. However, as shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7, the computational costs at the 
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peers in all three systems are similar since all systems require the downloader to sign 
the request and the uploader to verify the message from the downloader or ACS. 
Message costs are significantly greater in the distributed system than in the other 
two due to the distribution of the ACL. Even with compression, the ACL can be 
quite a large file due to the number of entries in the list. Therefore, message costs 
in the distributed system will remain higher since the ACL will be large relative to 
the size of the token that is sent by CITADEL. Message costs in the queried system 
are also higher than in CITADEL because message volume is proportionate to the 
number of files exchanged since the ACS and uploader communicate on every file 
exchange. 
For each content importation, the user that imports the content is referred to as 
the importer. Tables 8 , 9 and 10 show computation and message costs associated 
with a single content importation at the importer, the ACS, and all other peers. For 
example, the table shows that the message cost at the importer in the queried and 
distributed ACL systems is CID and similarly CS in CITADEL. This is due to 
the message costs of transmitting the content identification to the the ACS for each 
content object that is imported. 
Content importation involves computation cost at the CTS or CRLS for all 
three schemes since each requires some lookup of the content identification. The 
distributed system also involves an ACL update sent to all peers; thus, the compu-
tational and message costs at the ACS are higher in the distributed system. Also 
due to the ACL update, all peers in a distributed ACL system must verify the signa-
ture on the ACL update; thus, the distributed system is the only one that requires 
some computation by all peers for a content importation. An implementation could 
somewhat reduce this cost by batching a number of ACL updates into a single ACL 
update message depending on the frequency of content importations. CITADEL 
requires a signature extraction at the importer; likewise, the other schemes require 
some form of content identification at the importers as well. 
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System Parameters 
n = number of peers 
X = number of files exchanged by each peer 
Message Transmission Costs 
T = token 
ACL = access control list 
ACLMP = access control list update 
AR == authorization request 
AA = authorization acknowledgment 
FR = file request 
F = content file 
CS = content signature tuple {s^r,k) 
CID = CID tuple [CID.r) 
SM = status message 
Computational Costs 
ds = digital signature 
V = signature verification 
I = ACL lookup 
d = content container ACL lookup 
cse = content signature extraction 
csl = content signature lookup 
cidl = CID lookup 




File Exchange Costs 
downloader uploader CTS 
computation ids) {2v + cl)x {v + I -{- ds)n 
message {FR + T)x + AR {F)x {T)n 
Table 5: Cost of file exchange in CITADEL 
6.2.2 Simulation Results 
To better examine the file exchange costs that we have discussed, we provide simu-
lation results that show the performance of the three systems. We use a simulated 
peer-to-peer file sharing system based on a model that has the following parameters: 






File Exchange Costs 
downloader uploader CTS 
computation {ds)x {v-{-l)x ids) 
message {FR)x (F)x {ACL)n 




File Exchange Costs 
downloader uploader CTS 
computation {ds)x {v)x {v + I + ds){x)n 
message {FR)x {F + AR)x {AA){x)n 
Table 7: Cost of file exchange in the Queried System 
2. An active phase refers to time in which the peer is connected to the peer-
to-peer system and an inactive phase refers to time in which the peer is not 
connected to the peer-to-peer system. The length of an individual active phase 
is an exponential distribution with an average of r. The length of an individual 
inactive phase is an exponential distribution with an average of 23r. The 
ratio of active to inactive duration is 1 : 23, so the average group size, g is 
approximately n/24 during steady state. (This is proportionate to 1 hour a 
day.) 
3. The length of the group session is 168r. (This provides a session length that 
is proportionate to 1 week. The figures provide information in terms of a 24r 
period within the session.) 
4. The number of files downloaded by a peer in an active phase is a discrete 
value derived from an exponential distribution with an average of x. (We 
show results for varying values oi x.) 
5. The file size is 3.7 MB. 
Many of the parameters of our model are derived from the results of a mea-





Content Importation Costs 
importer CTS other peers 
1 computation cse csl 0 
message CS SM 0 
Table 8: Cost of content importation in CITADEL 
1 Distributed System 
Type of 
Cost 
Content Importation Costs 
importer CTS other peers 
computation 0 cidl + ds V 
message CID SM + {ACLVP)n 0 
Table 9: Cost of content importation in the Distributed System 
the authors of the study determined that the median session duration is about one 
hour, thus our active to inactive ratio. The authors determined the average size 
of a shared file is 3.7 MB. Our inactive phase includes the active and offline states 
described in [184]. 
Our simulation results only examine file exchange costs and not content impor-
tation costs. There are two reasons for this. First, as explained in the analysis 
section, the costs of file exchange in the systems vary significantly and we aim to 
better understand the magnitude of difference. However, the costs of content im-
portation in the systems are fairly close; therefore we feel that the importance of 
the magnitude of the difference is somewhat lessened. Secondly, we suggest that in 
most environments file exchanges far outnumber content importations. Thus, the 
cost of file exchanges is a more important measure. 
The simulation calculates the computation load by evaluating the processing 
time involved with cryptographic operations. The values for processing time for the 
cryptographic operations are shown in table 11 and are based on benchmarks pub-
lished for the publicly available Crypto++ library [53]. The simulation used 128-bit 
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1 Queried System 
Type of 
Cost 
Content Importation Costs 
importer CTS other peers 
1 computation 0 cidl 0 
message CID SM 0 
Table 10: Cost of content importation in the Queried System 
1 Operation Performance 
1 3DES encryption 4.748 MB/sec 
1 MD5 message digest 100.738 MB/sec 
1 HMAC/MD5 message digest 99.863 MB/sec 
RSA 1024 signature 10.29 sec 
1 RSA 1024 verification 0.30 sec 
Table 11: Cryptographic computation processing time 
Figure 32 shows the message overhead and computation overhead at the ACS 
as a function of the number of potential peers. Figure 32(a) shows that the mes-
sage overhead of the distributed ACL system is almost three orders of magnitude 
greater than the other systems for small group sizes and continues to increase with 
the number of peers. With 65, 536 potential peers, the message overhead of the 
distributed ACL system is 60, 213.1MB compared to 219.3MB in the queried ACL 
system and 31.6MB in CITADEL. Figure 32(b) shows that the computational over-
head in the queried ACL system increases with the number of peers and becomes 
an order of magnitude greater than the other systems. For a system with 6,5536 
peers, the computation overhead of the queried ACL system is 10, 979.29ms com-
pared to 1294.6ms in CITADEL and 674.4ms in the distributed ACL system. This 
shows that as the number of peers in the system increases, the queried ACL and 
distributed ACL approach have difficulties scaling due to computation costs and 
message costs, respectively. 
Figure 33 shows the message and computation overhead at the ACS as a function 
of the average number of files shared per peer. For this particular simulation, the 
number of potential peers was 16384. Figure 33(b) shows that the computation 
overhead in the queried ACL system increases with the number of files shared in the 
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system. The computation overhead of the other two systems scales better with an 
increase in the number of files shared. With peers sharing an average of 4 files each, 
the computation overhead is 1371.9ms in the queried system, 301.8ms in CITADEL, 
and 168.59ms in the distributed ACL system,. However, as the average number of 
shared files increases to 20, the computation overhead of the queried system increases 
fivefold to 6877.0ms while the others remain approximately the same. Figure 33(a) 
shows that the message overhead of CITADEL maintains around 7.SMB and the 
queried ACL system does increase fivefold from 27.3MB to 137.4MB, but they 
both remain a couple of orders of magnitude less than the 15056.9MB of message 
overhead in the distributed ACL system. 
6.3 Practical Implementation 
We have implemented a CITADEL prototype using open source components includ-
ing the Gnutella network as the distribution layer [78] and the LimeWire graphical 
user interface-based Gnutella client [129] as the filesharing software. One of the key 
goals of the implementation efforts was to show that the CITADEL architecture 
is a realistic and lightweight approach and that it can be implemented as part of 
any popular file-sharing network. LimeWire is written in Java and runs on multiple 
platforms including flavors of Windows and UNIX. Our prototype was developed on 
Solaris machines and also runs on Linux. 
Figure 34 depicts the CITADEL prototype. The implementation consisted of cre-
ating a CFSS by providing download authorization and upload authorization mod-
ules and creating a content insertion and exportation system including the content 
wrapper and unwrapper. Rather than implement custom authorization protocols 
and content container formats, we aimed to use standard security protocols to per-
form these operations. Overall, our implementation involved creating authorization 
modules that were added to the LimeWire software by modifying two LimeWire 








































Figure 34: CITADEL implementation 
and exportation. 
6.3.1 Authorization 
Our design does authorization based on standard X.509 version 3 public-key certifi-
cates [102] just like those used for web server authentication. The identity in the 
public-key certificate directly specifies the role to which the holder is assigned. This 
allows standard X.509 version 3 certificates to be used as the access token without 
any new extensions. Alternatively, there have been proposals for extensions to X.509 
certificates to allow the identity to specify the user and have new attributes that 
specify the roles assigned to the user [153]. 
Our system currently provides hierarchical RBAC by creating leaf roles for each 
content object and forming a role hierarchy. Membership in any senior role can 
be shown by authenticating with the public-key certificate for that role. Instead of 
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specifying the role hierarchy in the ACL of the content object, we create a certifi-
cate issuance hierarchy that reflects the role hierarchy. A role token also includes 
the trusted certification path from the content's role certificate to the token's role 
certificate. This allows the uploader to perform authorization by authenticating the 
downloader then verifying the certificate chain. 
We use the private key corresponding to the content role's public-key certificate 
as the content decryption key, -AT-RTS-./D- TO perform authentication, we use the 
strong client authentication that is part of the SSL/TLS protocol. This allows 
the client to be cryptographically authenticated by the server based on the client's 
public-key certificate. In the Gnutella protocol, a file download request is sent as 
an HTTP GET request. Instead, in our system we use HTTPS [174], HTTP over a 
SSL connection. This allows the uploader to utilize the SSL protocol to authenticate 
the downloader upon receiving the GET request. The SSL protocol at the uploader 
verifies the validity of the certificate and that the client possesses the corresponding 
private key. The application then performs an authorization lookup based on the 
authenticated identity. In our implementation, the authorization table is stored in 
memory and is initialized at start-up by retrieving the rights from each shared file. 
Since in the real world, users will share a large number of files, this authorization 
table should cache only a certain amount and then lookup other files as necessary. 
6.3.2 Content Containers 
Content containers are created using S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail 
Extension) [169, 168]. Although S/MIME was designed for securing Internet mail, 
we feel that it provides a simple and elegant example of content containers. MIME [73] 
supports virtually any content type including MPEG, JPEG, GIF, and generic bi-
nary application data. We create the encrypted content file using the S/MIME enve-
lope functionality. This envelope function creates a MIME entity by first encrypting 
the content data with a triple DES symmetric session key, KR and encrypting the 
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session key with a public key, In our system, this public key is K+RTS-ID, the public 
key of the role identity that is authorized to access this content. The MIME entity 
consists of the encrypted content and a header containing the sender's public-key 
certificate, an identifier of the algorithm used to encrypt the session key, and the 
encrypted session key. Now that we have the encrypted content file and KR, we add 
the content rights list to complete the protection label of the content container. In 
this design, we only need to specify the role identity and the rights. We achieve 
this by attaching the public-key certificate of the role identity to the protection la-
bel. To perform this, we create a new multipart MIME entity that includes a part 
containing the public key certificate of the role identity and a part that contains 
the S/MIME envelope. So after one S/MIME and one MIME operation, we have 
a content container. For the content wrapper and unwrapper, we wrote shell script 
programs that perform the content rights lookup, token verification, MIME opera-
tions, and uses OpenSSL libraries [152] for S/MIME operations. The CFSS creates 
the authorization lookup table using OpenSSL commands to retrieve the public-key 
certificate from the protection label of each content container. 
Also, since in our implementation, all authorized users for a certain content 
object had the same set of rights on the object, we were able to only specify the 
identities in the protection label and not the access rights. Our implementation can 
be extended to support different access rights by using S/MIME security labels [95] 
to create the protection label. Our implementation can also support flat RBAC 
and its need for multiple content rights list entries in the protection label. This can 
be achieved because S/MIME envelopes allow a single entity to be encrypted with 
different decryption keys for a set of users. S/MIME does this by encrypting the 
entity with a session key then generating a different encrypted version of the session 
key for each user similarly to how we proposed. 
157 
6.4 Conclusions 
One of our central premises is that content protection should be viewed as an oppor-
tunity to enable new service functionality and not a nuisance that designers have to 
deal with. This layered approach to content protection and the focus on providing a 
flexible framework allows CITADEL to perform the role that we envision for it. This 
point is illustrated in our work through the proposal and description of services and 
business models that can be deployed on top of the CITADEL architecture. Our 
work also considers the performance of CITADEL relative to other approaches that 
can be used in decentralized systems. Our work also includes the description of a 
prototype that shows a practical implementation and validates that CITADEL is 




Conclusions and Future Work 
This thesis describes research in securing large-scale content distribution systems. 
It addresses the security issues that are introduced by emerging content distribu-
tion paradigms. It addresses the need for authentication and authorization, data 
protection, and system security in such systems. Here we summarize the specific 
contributions made in this research. 
In multicast and content distribution network environments, there was a need for 
a scalable system to provide theft deterrence. Chapter 3 describes the development 
of WHIM, a system that uses a hierarchy of intermediaries to fingerprint multicast 
multimedia content. We show the benefits of this approach as compared to previous 
approaches that were implemented at the network-layer or within the application. 
This work also proposed distributed and real-time watermarking of multimedia con-
tent. We described a prototype of the system that validated the feasibility of these 
techniques. 
Chapter 4 describes the GOTHIC group access control architecture that provides 
a solution to the secure IGMP problem in multicast and the secure anycast server 
advertisement problem. This work generalized the two problems into a problem of 
group access control and proposed a generic scalable architecture for Internet group 
access control. We specify how the system can be used in a range of environments 
including different flavors of multicast and anycast. This work also considers issues 
in group policy. We identify the problem of group owner determination and authen-
tication and propose two solutions. Within this work we also propose the possibility 
of group access control-aware group key management and provide results that show 
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the performance improvements that it can achieve. 
In the area of content protection in peer-to-peer systems, we propose the CITADEL 
architecture that is presented in Chapter 5. We discuss the benefits of content pro-
tection in peer-to-peer systems and define the objectives of such systems. We show 
that the objectives of end-users and content providers conflict and propose a system 
that is able to achieve both sets of objectives. We describe the details of the content 
protection system including the content containers, the content importation system, 
and the access control model that is used to maintain manageability. In chapter 6, 
we explain that content protection can enable the support of common content dis-
tribution service models. We provide an analysis and simulation results to show 
the costs of providing content protection. We also describe an implementation of 
the CITADEL architecture that shows how the system can be implemented as a 
lightweight addition to current peer-to-peer systems. 
7.1 Future Work 
We provide a discussion of possible directions for future work based on this research. 
• In Chapter 4 we described the performance improvements that could be gained 
by a group access control aware group key management system. We proposed 
three approaches to providing topology information. A potential area of future 
work is the further definition and evaluation of these approaches. The evalu-
ation must consider not only the costs of providing the topology information, 
but also the varying performance improvements based on the trusted subtree 
topology and the placement of receivers. One issue is the placement of trusted 
routers for performance optimization. Further optimization can be achieved 
based on the grouping of receivers within the group key management system 
based on the receivers location in the trusted subtree topology. 
• The CITADEL architecture as described in Chapter 5 is transparent to the 
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file location system and we described how this assists portability and ease of 
implementation. However, we also believe that in some situations gains in 
efficiency and usability can be achieved by the location system and protection 
system having knowledge of each other. For example, improved usability and 
efficiency can be achieved by restricting query results to items that the user 
is authorized to access. 
In systems such as Gnutella where query results only come from peers that 
have access to the content and the access control policy this is straightforward. 
In distributed hash table-based systems, the solution is more involved. Since 
many of the lookup operations in these systems may be performed by entities 
that do not possess the content or the access control policy, they are not able to 
restrict the query results based on the access control policy. In these systems, 
it is important to be able to restrict queries based on authorizations because 
of the resources that can be wasted otherwise. If queries are not restricted 
at the first hop of the lookup process, then this query can possibly traverse 
a number of nodes wasting computation and bandwidth. Further research 
could design a system that restricts a host's ability to perform lookups based 
on an access control policy. This would involve detailing how decentralized 
hash design a system that restricts a host's ability to perform lookups based 
on an access control policy. This would involve detailing how decentralized 
hash table lookup systems can be made aware of the access control policy. 
Additionally, one could consider how such a system could assist in making the 
lookup system more robust to other types of attacks such as denial-of-service. 
Currently, if a single content distribution system needs some combination of 
security services such as encryption, fingerprinting, and content protection, it 
must utilize three different security systems. This requires the creation and 
maintenance of multiple security policies. Our work has taken steps toward 
this. For example. In GOTHIC, we showed how group key management and 
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group access control can benefit from each other. WHIM showed that data 
encryption, distribution, and watermarking can be effectively joined. A desired 
approach would be to allow a single framework that can accept a security policy 
for a particular system and provide the necessary content security services. 
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